



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Introduction

The 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction opened on September 12, 2016 and the results were posted on September 23, 2016. This document provides information for PJM stakeholders regarding the results of the 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction. Incremental Auctions provide both a forum for capacity suppliers to purchase replacement capacity, and a means for PJM to adjust previously committed capacity levels due to Reliability Requirement increases or decreases.

Summary of 2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 1 summarizes the clearing prices and cleared participant activity of the 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction. The EMAAC LDA and ComEd LDA were constrained LDAs in the 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction, and were constrained LDAs in the 2018/2019 BRA as well. The RCP for Capacity Performance (“CP”) Resources located in the rest of RTO outside of these LDAs is \$27.15/MW-day. The RCP for CP Resources in the EMAAC LDA is \$84.68/MW-day and RCP for CP Resources in the COMED LDA is \$30.00 /MW-day. The Base Capacity Resource Constraint is a binding constraint in the auction for the DPL-SOUTH LDA, as well as for the overall RTO, resulting in a price decrement for Base Capacity located in DPL-SOUTH of \$49.00/MW-day relative to the RCP of CP resources located in the DPL-SOUTH LDA, and a price decrement of \$4.64/MW-day for Base Capacity located in the rest of the RTO outside of the DPL-SOUTH LDA.

Across the entire RTO, total cleared participant sell offers (2,545.3 MW) exceeded total cleared participant buy bids (2,365.8 MW) by 179.5 MW; participants sold a total net capacity amount of 179.5 MW. PJM effectively procured a total net capacity amount of 179.5 MW, comprised of cleared PJM sell offers totaling 153.8 MW and cleared PJM buy bids totaling 333.3 MW. The cleared PJM buy bid quantity of 333.3 MW reflects an increase in the reliability requirement of the RTO and each applicable LDA exactly equal to the total UCAP Value of EE Resources that cleared in the auction. The cleared MW quantity of EE Resources must be offset by a PJM buy bid in order to avoid double-counting of cleared EE Resource MWs since energy efficiency measures are directly reflected in each peak load forecast.



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 1 – Summary of 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction Results

| Region | Capacity Type | Clearing Price (\$/MW-Day) | Cleared Participant Sell Offers (UCAP MW) | Cleared Participant Buy Bids (UCAP MW) | Net Cleared Participant Buy Bids (UCAP MW) |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|---|--|--|
| RTO (minus MAAC and COMED) ⁽¹⁾ | Base DR/EE | \$22.51 | 53.0 | 228.1 | 175.1 |
| | Base | \$22.51 | 395.2 | 231.2 | -164.0 |
| | Capacity Performance | \$27.15 | 422.7 | 738.3 | 315.6 |
| | TOTAL | -- | 870.9 | 1,197.6 | 326.7 |
| MAAC (minus EMAAC) ⁽²⁾ | Base DR/EE | \$22.51 | 41.1 | 60.2 | 19.1 |
| | Base | \$22.51 | 14.1 | 302.4 | 288.3 |
| | Capacity Performance | \$27.15 | 877.0 | 121.1 | -755.9 |
| | TOTAL | -- | 932.2 | 483.7 | -448.5 |
| EMAAC (minus DPL-SOUTH) ⁽³⁾ | Base DR/EE | \$80.04 | 78.7 | 70.3 | -8.4 |
| | Base | \$80.04 | 64.5 | 16.3 | -48.2 |
| | Capacity Performance | \$84.68 | 101.4 | 112.5 | 11.1 |
| | TOTAL | -- | 244.6 | 199.1 | -45.5 |
| DPL-SOUTH | Base DR/EE | \$35.68 | 0.3 | 11.4 | 11.1 |
| | Base | \$35.68 | 7.0 | 0.0 | -7.0 |
| | Capacity Performance | \$84.68 | 21.7 | 0.3 | -21.4 |
| | TOTAL | -- | 29.0 | 11.7 | -17.3 |
| COMED | Base DR/EE | \$25.36 | 22.2 | 184.8 | 162.6 |
| | Base | \$25.36 | 435.5 | 0.0 | -435.5 |
| | Capacity Performance | \$30.00 | 10.9 | 288.9 | 278.0 |
| | TOTAL | -- | 468.6 | 473.7 | 5.1 |
| TOTAL RTO | Base DR/EE | -- | 195.3 | 554.8 | 359.5 |
| | Base | -- | 916.3 | 549.9 | -366.4 |
| | Capacity Performance | -- | 1,433.7 | 1,261.1 | -172.6 |
| | TOTAL | -- | 2,545.3 | 2,365.8 | -179.5 |

(1) Comprised of AEP, APS, ATSI, Dayton, DEOK, DOM, EKPC, Duquesne and External Zones

(2) Comprised of BGE, MET-ED, PENELEC, PEPCO, and PPL Zones

(3) Comprised of AECO, DPL, JCPL, PECO, PSEG and RECO Zones



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Participant Sell Offers and Buy Bids

Table 2 shows the offered and cleared quantities for participant sell offers. A total of 16,487 MW¹ of supply was offered into the First Incremental Auction composed of uncleared capacity from prior 2018/2019 auctions and new capacity in the form of uprates or new resources that were not previously capacity resources in PJM. Across the entire RTO, 2,545.3 MW of participant sell offers cleared, mostly in the form of CP capacity.

Table 2 – Participant Sell Offers (Offered and Cleared Quantities)

| LDA | Sell Offers (UCAP MW) * | | | | Cleared Sell Offers (UCAP MW) | | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------|----------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|----------------|
| | Base DR/EE | Base | Capacity Performance | Total | Base DR/EE | Base | Capacity Performance | Total |
| DPL-SOUTH | 3.5 | 44.5 | 26.6 | 74.6 | 0.3 | 7.0 | 21.7 | 29.0 |
| PS-NORTH | 19.3 | 379.9 | 474.5 | 873.7 | 10.8 | 12.2 | 4.9 | 27.9 |
| PSEG (rest of) | 27.9 | 556.7 | 696.9 | 1,281.5 | 13.4 | 14.2 | 10.6 | 38.2 |
| EMAAC (rest of) | 129.4 | 97.8 | 1,173.0 | 1,400.2 | 54.5 | 38.1 | 85.9 | 178.5 |
| EMAAC Total | 180.1 | 1,078.9 | 2,371.0 | 3,630.0 | 79.0 | 71.5 | 123.1 | 273.6 |
| PEPCO | 73.3 | 0.0 | 126.4 | 199.7 | 38.9 | 0.0 | 19.8 | 58.7 |
| BGE | 16.4 | 401.8 | 664.6 | 1,082.8 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 3.5 | 4.5 |
| SWMAAC (rest of) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| SWMAAC Total | 89.7 | 401.8 | 791.0 | 1,282.5 | 39.9 | 0.0 | 23.3 | 63.2 |
| PPL | 14.0 | 0.4 | 1,483.2 | 1,497.6 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 36.5 | 37.7 |
| MAAC (rest of) | 9.9 | 65.8 | 1,184.8 | 1,260.5 | 0.4 | 13.7 | 817.2 | 831.3 |
| MAAC Total | 293.7 | 1,546.9 | 5,830.0 | 7,670.6 | 120.1 | 85.6 | 1,000.1 | 1,205.8 |
| ATSI (rest of) | 39.9 | 514.1 | 1,408.7 | 1,962.7 | 12.3 | 250.0 | 320.2 | 582.5 |
| ATSI-Cleveland | 8.3 | 0.0 | 235.5 | 243.8 | 8.3 | 0.0 | 19.6 | 27.9 |
| COMED | 88.1 | 525.4 | 3,248.6 | 3,862.1 | 22.2 | 435.5 | 10.9 | 468.6 |
| RTO (rest of) | 453.1 | 145.2 | 2,149.5 | 2,747.8 | 32.4 | 145.2 | 82.9 | 260.5 |
| RTO Total | 883.1 | 2,731.6 | 12,872.3 | 16,487.0 | 195.3 | 916.3 | 1,433.7 | 2,545.3 |

* Sell Offers include the MW amounts offered from all Product Types of coupled sell offers, only one of which is capable of clearing in the auction.

¹ Within the total supply quantity, the Sell Offer total was determined using the largest MW value of each coupled Sell Offer segment to represent the maximum possible quantity that could clear.



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 3 provides a further breakdown of the capacity offered and cleared in the 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction.

Table 3 - 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction Supply Resource Mix

| Resource Type | Type | Total Sell Offers (MW UCAP) | Cleared Sell Offers (MW UCAP) |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| DEMAND * | DEMAND | 500.7 | 116.2 |
| EE | EE | 563.6 | 333.3 |
| GEN | New Generation (including Uprates) | 998.7 | 568.0 |
| | Uncleared from Prior Auction | 11,926.2 | 1,527.8 |
| | | 13,989.2 | 2,545.3 |

* The total Sell Offer quantity was determined using the largest MW value of each coupled Sell Offer segment, and therefore represents the maximum possible quantity that could clear.

Participant demand in an Incremental Auction is composed of buy bids submitted by participants. The buy bids are specified in UCAP terms and, if cleared, are binding commitments to purchase capacity for the entire Delivery Year. Table 4 shows bid and cleared quantities of participant buy bids. There was a total of 9,601.7 MW of buy bids submitted by participants into the auction. Across the entire RTO, 2,365.8 MW of participant buy bids cleared comprised of 554.8 MW of Base Capacity DR/EE buy bids, 549.9 MW of Base Capacity Generation buy bids and 1,261.1 MW of CP capacity buy bids.



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 4 – Participant Buy Bids (Bid and Cleared Quantities)

| LDA | Buy Bids (UCAP MW) | | | | Cleared Buy Bids (UCAP MW) | | | |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------------------|--------------|----------------------|----------------|
| | Base DR/EE | Base | Capacity Performance | Total | Base DR/EE | Base | Capacity Performance | Total |
| DPL-SOUTH | 13.7 | 293.0 | 0.6 | 307.3 | 11.4 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 11.7 |
| PS-NORTH | 35.7 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 37.7 | 10.2 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 11.2 |
| PSEG (rest of) | 36.9 | 0.0 | 13.0 | 49.9 | 16.8 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 29.3 |
| EMAAC (rest of) | 115.8 | 875.9 | 664.8 | 1,656.5 | 43.3 | 16.3 | 99.0 | 158.6 |
| EMAAC Total | 202.1 | 1,168.9 | 680.4 | 2,051.4 | 81.7 | 16.3 | 112.8 | 210.8 |
| PEPCO | 11.8 | 0.0 | 3.9 | 15.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| BGE | 18.0 | 0.8 | 6.5 | 25.3 | 7.2 | 0.8 | 6.5 | 14.5 |
| SWMAAC (rest of) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| SWMAAC Total | 29.8 | 0.8 | 10.4 | 41.0 | 7.2 | 0.8 | 10.4 | 18.4 |
| PPL | 43.9 | 1.1 | 51.5 | 96.5 | 4.4 | 1.1 | 26.5 | 32.0 |
| MAAC (rest of) | 83.6 | 401.3 | 322.9 | 807.8 | 48.6 | 300.5 | 84.2 | 433.3 |
| MAAC Total | 359.4 | 1,572.1 | 1,065.2 | 2,996.7 | 141.9 | 318.7 | 233.9 | 694.5 |
| ATSI (rest of) | 59.4 | 0.0 | 53.3 | 112.7 | 27.6 | 0.0 | 37.3 | 64.9 |
| ATSI-Cleveland | 58.3 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 59.0 | 45.7 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 46.4 |
| COMED | 224.0 | 435.8 | 2,121.2 | 2,781.0 | 184.8 | 0.0 | 288.9 | 473.7 |
| RTO (rest of) | 283.6 | 618.3 | 2,750.4 | 3,652.3 | 154.8 | 231.2 | 700.3 | 1,086.3 |
| RTO Total | 984.7 | 2,626.2 | 5,990.8 | 9,601.7 | 554.8 | 549.9 | 1,261.1 | 2,365.8 |

PJM Sell Offers and Buy Bids

The total net amount of capacity procured or released by PJM is a function of the clearing of the PJM sell offers and buy bids. Tables 5a and 5b show the offered and cleared quantities of PJM sell offers and PJM buy bids, respectively, employed in the 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction. For the 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction, across the entire RTO region, cleared PJM sell offers totaled 153.8 MW and cleared PJM buys bids totaled 333.3 MW; therefore, PJM procured a total net capacity amount of 179.5 MW. Table 5b includes 172.6 MW of PJM CP Buy Bids and 160.7 MW of PJM Base DR/EE Buy Bids to reflect an increase in the reliability requirement of the RTO and each applicable LDA equal to the total UCAP Value of EE Resources that cleared in the auction. The



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

cleared MW quantity of EE Resources must be offset by a PJM buy bid in order to avoid double-counting of cleared EE Resource MWs since energy efficiency measures are directly reflected in each peak load forecast.

Table 5a – PJM Sell Offers (Offered and Cleared Quantities)

| LDA | Sell Offers (UCAP MW) | | | | Cleared Sell Offers (UCAP MW) | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|--------------|
| | Base DR/EE | Base | Capacity Performance | Total | Base DR/EE | Base | Capacity Performance | Total |
| DPL-SOUTH | 0.0 | 138.7 | 0.0 | 138.7 | 0.0 | 4.4 | 0.0 | 4.4 |
| PS-NORTH | 0.0 | 59.3 | 0.0 | 59.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| PSEG (rest of) | 0.0 | 259.7 | 0.0 | 259.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| EMAAC (rest of) | 0.0 | 793.2 | 0.0 | 793.2 | 0.0 | 49.2 | 0.0 | 49.2 |
| EMAAC Total | 0.0 | 1,250.9 | 0.0 | 1,250.9 | 0.0 | 53.6 | 0.0 | 53.6 |
| PEPCO | 0.0 | 15.8 | 0.0 | 15.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| BGE | 0.0 | 249.8 | 0.0 | 249.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| SWMAAC (rest of) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| SWMAAC Total | 0.0 | 265.6 | 0.0 | 265.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| PPL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| MAAC (rest of) | 0.0 | 777.3 | 0.0 | 777.3 | 0.0 | 85.7 | 0.0 | 85.7 |
| MAAC Total | 0.0 | 2,293.8 | 0.0 | 2,293.8 | 0.0 | 139.3 | 0.0 | 139.3 |
| ATSI (rest of) | 0.0 | 252.2 | 0.0 | 252.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| ATSI-Cleveland | 0.0 | 77.1 | 0.0 | 77.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| COMED | 0.0 | 1,043.4 | 0.0 | 1,043.4 | 0.0 | 14.5 | 0.0 | 14.5 |
| RTO (rest of) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RTO Total | 0.0 | 3,666.5 | 0.0 | 3,666.5 | 0.0 | 153.8 | 0.0 | 153.8 |



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 5b – PJM Buy Bids (Bid and Cleared Quantities)

| LDA | Buy Bids (UCAP MW) | | | | Cleared Buy Bids (UCAP MW) | | | |
|---------------------|--------------------|------------|----------------------|--------------|----------------------------|------------|----------------------|--------------|
| | Base DR/EE | Base | Capacity Performance | Total | Base DR/EE | Base | Capacity Performance | Total |
| DPL-SOUTH | 0.3 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 3.5 |
| PS-NORTH | 4.2 | 0.0 | 4.9 | 9.1 | 4.2 | 0.0 | 4.9 | 9.1 |
| PSEG (rest of) | 12.3 | 0.0 | 8.9 | 21.2 | 12.3 | 0.0 | 8.9 | 21.2 |
| EMAAC (rest of) | 46.1 | 0.0 | 36.5 | 82.6 | 46.1 | 0.0 | 36.5 | 82.6 |
| EMAAC Total | 62.9 | 0.0 | 53.5 | 116.4 | 62.9 | 0.0 | 53.5 | 116.4 |
| PEPCO | 38.9 | 0.0 | 19.8 | 58.7 | 38.9 | 0.0 | 19.8 | 58.7 |
| BGE | 1.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 4.2 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 4.2 |
| SWMAAC (rest of) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| SWMAAC Total | 39.9 | 0.0 | 23.0 | 62.9 | 39.9 | 0.0 | 23.0 | 62.9 |
| PPL | 0.8 | 0.0 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 3.1 | 3.9 |
| MAAC (rest of) | 0.4 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.5 |
| MAAC Total | 104.0 | 0.0 | 80.7 | 184.7 | 104.0 | 0.0 | 80.7 | 184.7 |
| ATSI (rest of) | 12.3 | 0.0 | 8.2 | 20.5 | 12.3 | 0.0 | 8.2 | 20.5 |
| ATSI-Cleveland | 8.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.3 |
| COMED | 3.7 | 0.0 | 5.7 | 9.4 | 3.7 | 0.0 | 5.7 | 9.4 |
| RTO (rest of) | 32.4 | 0.0 | 78.0 | 110.4 | 32.4 | 0.0 | 78.0 | 110.4 |
| RTO Total | 160.7 | 0.0 | 172.6 | 333.3 | 160.7 | 0.0 | 172.6 | 333.3 |



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Configuration

Participant Buy Bids and Sell Offers

RPM Incremental Auctions provide capacity suppliers with an opportunity to sell or purchase capacity for the Delivery Year through a PJM-administered auction process. Resource-specific sell offers are submitted into this auction by suppliers with available, uncommitted capacity. All sell offers into an Incremental Auction from existing generation capacity resources are subject to market power mitigation through the application of the Market Structure Test. Any resource that can qualify as a CP Resource may submit separate but coupled sell offers for CP and Base Capacity product types. For such coupled sell offers, the offer price of the CP product must be at least \$.01 per MW-day greater than the offer price of the coupled Base Capacity product. When sell offer segments of both capacity product types are coupled with different offer prices, the auction clearing engine will clear only one of the products at most and will clear the product that results in the lowest overall cost solution for the system.

Any party that desires to purchase replacement capacity for the Delivery Year may do so by submitting a buy bid into the Incremental Auction. In addition to quantity, price and LDA-specific location, participants submitting a buy bid must also specify the desired capacity type (CP, Base Capacity Generation or Base Capacity DR/EE). Cleared Buy Bids purchased in an Incremental Auction may be used as replacement capacity to cover a Delivery Year commitment provided the cleared buy bid has the same locational characteristics and same or better temporal characteristics than the resource that it replaces. Cleared buy bids of CP capacity type may replace commitments of CP Resources, Base Capacity Generation and/or Base Capacity DR/EE. Cleared buy bids of Base Capacity Generation capacity type may replace commitments on Base Capacity Generation and/or Base Capacity DR/EE but may not replace commitments of CP Resources. Cleared buy bids of Base Capacity DR/EE capacity type may replace commitments of Base Capacity DR/EE but may not replace commitments of CP Resources or Base Capacity Generation.

PJM Buy Bids and Sell Offers

Sections 5.4 and 5.12 of Attachment DD of the Tariff define the Incremental Auction requirements regarding the procurement or sale of capacity by PJM. Section 5.4 describes the triggering tests used by PJM prior to an Incremental Auction to determine the need for the procurement and/or sale of capacity by PJM in relation to updates of the Reliability Requirement and capacity already procured. Section 5.12 describes the determination of the MW quantities, capacity types and prices of buy bids and/or sell offers that PJM will submit when the various tests in section 5.4 are triggered.

Prior to each Incremental Auction, PJM recalculates the Reliability Requirement, the Base Capacity DR/EE Constraint and the Base Capacity Constraint for the RTO and each LDA based on an updated peak load forecast, updated Installed Reserve Margin and other



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

updated planning information. For the RTO and each LDA, PJM sums the following component quantities to determine the total quantity that it will seek to procure or release in each Incremental Auction:

- the Updated Reliability Requirement minus the Reliability Requirement utilized in the most recent prior auction conducted for that Delivery Year. Note that this quantity is negative if the Updated Reliability Requirement is less than the Reliability Requirement utilized in the most recent prior auction. For a First or Second Incremental Auction, this difference is only considered if the change in Reliability Requirement is greater than the lesser of 500 MW or 1% of the prior auction's Reliability Requirement,
- plus/minus the amount of committed capacity that PJM sought to procure/release that did not clear in previous Incremental Auctions for the same Delivery Year,
- minus any capacity PJM seeks to release in a parent LDA as a result of any Conditional Incremental Auction commitments for the same Delivery Year.

If the result of such summation is a positive quantity, PJM will seek to procure such quantity by employing a PJM buy bid. The price of the PJM buy bid is based on the Updated VRR Curve Increment which is the portion of the Updated VRR Curve located to the right of the point representing all capacity already procured for the Delivery year. If the result of such summation is a negative quantity, PJM will seek to release such quantity by employing a PJM sell offer. The price of the PJM sell offer is based on the Updated VRR Curve Decrement which is the portion of the Updated VRR curve to the left of the point representing all capacity already procured for the Delivery year. The product type of the capacity PJM will seek to procure or release will consider previously procured levels of Base Capacity DR/EE and Base Capacity Generation, as compared to the updated Base Capacity DR/EE Constraint and Base Capacity Constraint.

Based on an application of the Incremental Auction requirements of Sections 5.4 and 5.12 of Attachment DD of the Tariff and summarized above, PJM submitted the buy bids and sell offers, shown in Table 6, into the First Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year². Note that a PJM sell offer is indicated by a negative PJM buy bid in Table 6 and that PJM submitted sell offers for the First Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year in each LDA for a total sell offer quantity across the entire RTO of 3,666.5 MW. All PJM sell offers were of the Base Capacity Generation product type because the total RTO commitment level of Base Capacity DR/EE and Base Capacity Generation from prior auctions was in excess of the updated RTO Base Capacity Constraint. Table 6 also defines the pricing points associated with the PJM sell offers.

² The determination of the PJM buy bid and sell offer quantities is detailed in the 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction Planning Parameters located at <http://www.pjm.com/~media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2018-2019-first-incremental-auction-planning-parameters.ashx>.



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 6 – PJM Buy Bids and PJM Sell Offers for 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction

| Location | Change in Reliability Requirement (MW) | STRPT (MW) | Uncleared PJM Buy Bids from Prior IA (MW) | Additional Buy Bids | PJM Buy Bid | | Price Points for PJM Buy Bids and PJM Sell Offers | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--|------------|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------|---|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|
| | | | | | (MW) ⁽¹⁾ | Capacity Type | Point 1 | | Point 2 | | Point 3 | | Point 4 | |
| | | | | | | | x-axis (MW) | y-axis (\$/MW-Day) | x-axis (MW) | y-axis (\$/MW-Day) | x-axis (MW) | y-axis (\$/MW-Day) | x-axis (MW) | y-axis (\$/MW-Day) |
| RTO (Rest of) | 80.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| MAAC (Rest of) | -1,544.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -777.3 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$17.39 | 777.3 | \$63.84 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| EMAAC (Rest of) | -793.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -793.2 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$74.46 | 793.2 | \$164.42 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| SWMAAC (Rest of) | 68.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| PS (Rest of) | -259.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -259.7 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$104.76 | 259.7 | \$199.72 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| PS NORTH | -59.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -59.3 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$181.77 | 59.3 | \$223.27 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| DPL SOUTH | -138.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -138.7 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$30.08 | 128.8 | \$194.22 | 138.7 | \$218.19 | -- | -- |
| PEPCO | -15.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -15.8 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$156.93 | 15.8 | \$164.13 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| ATSI (Rest of) | -252.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -252.2 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$76.76 | 252.2 | \$141.49 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| ATSI-CLEVELAND | -77.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -77.1 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$110.14 | 77.1 | \$162.40 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| COMED | -1,043.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -1043.4 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$22.78 | 1043.4 | \$208.87 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| BGE | -249.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -249.8 | BaseGen | 0.0 | \$58.23 | 249.8 | \$161.54 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| PL | 618.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| TOTAL | -3,666.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -3,666.5 | | | | | | | | | |

(1) A PJM Sell Offer is indicated by a negative PJM Buy Bid.

LDA Capacity Import Limits

Table 7 shows each LDA’s CETL limits for the Base Residual Auction and each LDA’s CETL as updated for the First Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year. The CETL remaining for use in the First Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year shown in the last row of Table 7 represents the LDA capacity import limits that were employed in the First Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and are equal to the LDA CETL as updated for the First Incremental Auction minus the total capacity import levels into the LDA.



2018/2019 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 7 – LDA Capacity Import Capability for 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction

| | LDA | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | MAAC | EMAAC | SWMAAC | PS | PS NORTH | DPL SOUTH | PEPCO | ATSI | ATSI-C | COMED | BGE | PPL |
| BRA CETL | 7,883.0 | 8,375.0 | 9,888.0 | 7,926.0 | 3,761.0 | 1,702.0 | 7,045.0 | 9,240.0 | 4,557.0 | 5,227.0 | 6,527.0 | 4,538.0 |
| 1st IA CETL | 7,883.0 | 8,375.0 | 9,888.0 | 7,926.0 | 3,761.0 | 1,702.0 | 7,045.0 | 9,240.0 | 4,557.0 | 5,227.0 | 6,527.0 | 4,538.0 |
| Capacity Import Level (from BRA) | 6,214.7 | 8,375.0 | 6,244.8 | 7,423.6 | 3,369.5 | 1,521.3 | 2,959.3 | 6,435.4 | 3,981.6 | 5,227.0 | 5,658.0 | 881.9 |
| Capacity Import Limit for 1st IA | 1,668.3 | 0.0 | 3,643.2 | 502.4 | 391.5 | 180.7 | 4,085.7 | 2,804.6 | 575.4 | 0.0 | 869.0 | 3,656.1 |

Incremental Auction Clearing

Participant supply offers and buy bids are combined with the PJM sell offers and buy bids shown in Table 6 to form the supply and demand curves. The solution algorithm clears all buy bids and sell offers in a least-cost manner while respecting the capacity import limits into each LDA. CP capacity buy bids may only clear against sell offers from CP Resources; Base Capacity Generation buy bids may only clear against sell offers from CP Resources and/or Base Capacity Generation; and Base Capacity DR/EE buy bids may clear against sell offers of any capacity type.

Mitigation in the 2018/2019 First Incremental Auction

All regions of the RTO, including the RTO as a whole, failed the Market Structure Test. As a result, mitigation was applied to all existing generation resources in the execution of the RPM auction clearing. Therefore, in the event a generator’s price-based offer exceeded the calculated offer cap, cost-based offers were utilized in the RPM auction clearing. Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources are not subject to market mitigation.