

**OATT OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF - OATT I. COMMON SERVICE PROVISIONS  
- OATT I. Definitions - OATT Definitions – O – P - Q**

**Definitions – O – P - Q**

**1.27C Office of the Interconnection:**

Office of the Interconnection shall have the meaning set forth in the Operating Agreement.

**1.28 Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS):**

The information system and standards of conduct contained in Part 37 and Part 38 of the Commission’s regulations and all additional requirements implemented by subsequent Commission orders dealing with OASIS.

**1.28A Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. or Operating Agreement:**

That agreement dated as of April 1, 1997 and as amended and restated as of June 2, 1997 and as amended from time to time thereafter, among the members of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

**1.28A.01 Option to Build:**

The option of the New Service Customer to build certain Customer-Funded Upgrades, as set forth in, and subject to the terms of, the Construction Service Agreement.

**1.28B Optional Interconnection Study:**

A sensitivity analysis of an Interconnection Request based on assumptions specified by the Interconnection Customer in the Optional Interconnection Study Agreement.

**1.28C Optional Interconnection Study Agreement:**

The form of agreement for preparation of an Optional Interconnection Study, as set forth in Attachment N-3 of the Tariff.

**1.29 Part I:**

Tariff Definitions and Common Service Provisions contained in Sections 2 through 12.

**1.30 Part II:**

Tariff Sections 13 through 27 pertaining to Point-To-Point Transmission Service in conjunction with the applicable Common Service Provisions of Part I and appropriate Schedules and Attachments.

**1.31 Part III:**

Tariff Sections 28 through 35 pertaining to Network Integration Transmission Service in conjunction with the applicable Common Service Provisions of Part I and appropriate Schedules and Attachments.

**1.31A Part IV:**

Tariff Sections 36 through 112 pertaining to generation or merchant transmission interconnection to the Transmission System in conjunction with the applicable Common Service Provisions of Part I and appropriate Schedules and Attachments.

**1.31B Part V:**

Tariff Sections 113 through 122 pertaining to the deactivation of generating units in conjunction with the applicable Common Service Provisions of Part I and appropriate Schedules and Attachments.

**1.31C Part VI:**

Tariff Sections 200 through 237 pertaining to the queuing, study, and agreements relating to New Service Requests, and the rights associated with Customer-Funded Upgrades in conjunction with the applicable Common Service Provisions of Part I and appropriate Schedules and Attachments.

**1.32 Parties:**

The Transmission Provider, as administrator of the Tariff, and the Transmission Customer receiving service under the Tariff. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to Transmission Customers.

**1.32.01 PJM:**

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

**1.32A PJM Administrative Service:**

The services provided by PJM pursuant to Schedule 9 of this Tariff.

**1.32B PJM Control Area:**

The Control Area that is recognized by NERC as the PJM Control Area.

**1.32C PJM Interchange Energy Market:**

The regional competitive market administered by the Transmission Provider for the purchase and sale of spot electric energy at wholesale interstate commerce and related services, as more fully set forth in Attachment K – Appendix to the Tariff and Schedule 1 to the Operating Agreement.

**1.32D PJM Manuals:**

The instructions, rules, procedures and guidelines established by the Transmission Provider for the operation, planning, and accounting requirements of the PJM Region and the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**1.32E PJM Region:**

Shall mean the aggregate of the PJM West Region, the VACAR Control Zone, and the MAAC Control Zone.

**1.32F PJM South Region:**

The VACAR Control Zone.

**1.32.F.01 PJMSettlement:**

PJM Settlement, Inc. (or its successor).

**1.32G PJM West Region:**

The PJM West Region shall include the Zones of Allegheny Power; Commonwealth Edison Company (including Commonwealth Edison Co. of Indiana); AEP East Operating Companies; The Dayton Power and Light Company; and the Duquesne Light Company.

**1.33 Point(s) of Delivery:**

Point(s) on the Transmission Provider's Transmission System where capacity and energy transmitted by the Transmission Provider will be made available to the Receiving Party under Part II of the Tariff. The Point(s) of Delivery shall be specified in the Service Agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service.

**1.33A Point of Interconnection:**

The point or points, shown in the appropriate appendix to the Interconnection Service Agreement and the Interconnection Construction Service Agreement, where the Customer Interconnection Facilities interconnect with the Transmission Owner Interconnection Facilities or the Transmission System.

**1.34 Point(s) of Receipt:**

Point(s) of interconnection on the Transmission Provider's Transmission System where capacity and energy will be made available to the Transmission Provider by the Delivering Party under Part II of the Tariff. The Point(s) of Receipt shall be specified in the Service Agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service.

**1.35 Point-To-Point Transmission Service:**

The reservation and transmission of capacity and energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under Part II of the Tariff.

**1.36 Power Purchaser:**

The entity that is purchasing the capacity and energy to be transmitted under the Tariff.

**1.36.01 PRD Curve**

PRD Curve shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.36.02 PRD Provider**

PRD Provider shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.36.03 PRD Reservation Price**

PRD Reservation Price shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.36.04 PRD Substation:**

PRD Substation shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.36.01-05 Pre-Confirmed Application:**

An Application that commits the Eligible Customer to execute a Service Agreement upon receipt of notification that the Transmission Provider can provide the requested Transmission Service.

**1.36A Pre-Expansion PJM Zones:**

Zones included in this Tariff, along with applicable Schedules and Attachments, for certain Transmission Owners – Atlantic City Electric Company, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company, Jersey Central Power and Light Company, Metropolitan Edison Company, PECO Energy Company, Pennsylvania Electric Company, Pennsylvania Power & Light Group, Potomac Electric Power Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Allegheny Power, and Rockland Electric Company.

**1.36A.01 Price Responsive Demand**

Price Responsive Demand shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.36A.01-02 Project Financing:**

Shall mean: (a) one or more loans, leases, equity and/or debt financings, together with all modifications, renewals, supplements, substitutions and replacements thereof, the proceeds of which are used to finance or refinance the costs of the Customer Facility, any alteration, expansion or improvement to the Customer Facility, the purchase and sale of the Customer Facility or the operation of the Customer Facility; (b) a power purchase agreement pursuant to which Interconnection Customer's obligations are secured by a mortgage or other lien on the Customer Facility; or (c) loans and/or debt issues secured by the Customer Facility.

**1.36A.02-03 Project Finance Entity:**

Shall mean: (a) a holder, trustee or agent for holders, of any component of Project Financing; or (b) any purchaser of capacity and/or energy produced by the Customer Facility to which Interconnection Customer has granted a mortgage or other lien as security for some or all of Interconnection Customer's obligations under the corresponding power purchase agreement.

**1.36B Queue Position:**

The priority assigned to an Interconnection Request, a Completed Application, or an Upgrade Request pursuant to applicable provisions of Part VI.

**1.3 Definitions.**

**1.3.1 Acceleration Request.**

“Acceleration Request” shall mean a request pursuant to section 1.9.4A of this Schedule to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 or 1.9.4.

**1.3.1A Auction Revenue Rights.**

“Auction Revenue Rights” or “ARRs” shall mean the right to receive the revenue from the Financial Transmission Right auction, as further described in Section 7.4 of this Schedule.

**1.3.1B Auction Revenue Rights Credits.**

“Auction Revenue Rights Credits” shall mean the allocated share of total FTR auction revenues or costs credited to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

**1.3.1B.01 Batch Load Demand Resource.**

“Batch Load Demand Resource” shall mean a Demand Resource that has a cyclical production process such that at most times during the process it is consuming energy, but at consistent regular intervals, ordinarily for periods of less than ten minutes, it reduces its consumption of energy for its production processes to minimal or zero megawatts.

**1.3.1B.02 Congestion Price.**

“Congestion Price” shall mean the congestion component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line loadings, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

**1.3.1B.03 Curtailment Service Provider.**

“Curtailment Service Provider” or “CSP” shall mean a Member or a Special Member, which action on behalf of itself or one or more other Members or non-Members, participates in the PJM Interchange Energy Market by causing a reduction in demand.

**1.3.1B.04 Day-ahead Congestion Price.**

“Day-ahead Congestion Price” shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.3.1C Day-ahead Energy Market.**

“Day-ahead Energy Market” shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

**1.3.1C.01 Day-ahead Loss Price.**

“Day-ahead Loss Price” shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.3.1D Day-ahead Prices.**

“Day-ahead Prices” shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.3.1D.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves” shall mean thirty-minute reserves as defined by the Reliability First Corporation and SERC.

**1.3.1D.02 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement” shall mean the thirty-minute reserve requirement for the PJM Region established consistent with Reliability First Corporation and SERC reliability standards, or those of any additional and/or successor regional reliability organization(s) that are responsible for establishing reliability requirements for the PJM Region, plus any additional thirty-minute reserves scheduled in response to an RTO-wide Hot or Cold Weather Alert or other reasons for conservative operations.

**1.3.1D.03 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources.**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources” shall mean synchronized and non-synchronized generation resources and Demand Resources electrically located within the PJM Region that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

**1.3.1D.04 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market.**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market” shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

**1.3.1D.05 Day-ahead System Energy Price.**

“Day-ahead System Energy Price” shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.3.1E Decrement Bid.**

“Decrement Bid” shall mean a bid to purchase energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.3.1E.01 Demand Resource.**

“Demand Resource” shall mean a resource with the capability to provide a reduction in demand.

**1.3.1F Dispatch Rate.**

“Dispatch Rate” shall mean the control signal, expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour, calculated and transmitted continuously and dynamically to direct the output level of all generation resources dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the Offer Data.

**1.3.1G Energy Storage Resource.**

“Energy Storage Resource” shall mean flywheel or battery storage facility solely used for short term storage and injection of energy at a later time to participate in the PJM energy and/or Ancillary Services markets as a Market Seller.

**1.3.2 Equivalent Load.**

“Equivalent Load” shall mean the sum of a Market Participant’s net system requirements to serve its customer load in the PJM Region, if any, plus its net bilateral transactions.

**1.3.2A Economic Load Response Participant.**

“Economic Load Response Participant” shall mean a Member or Special Member that qualifies under Section 1.5A of this Schedule to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market through reductions in demand.

**1.3.2A.01 Economic Minimum.**

“Economic Minimum” shall mean the lowest incremental MW output level a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch.

**1.3.2B Energy Market Opportunity Cost.**

“Energy Market Opportunity Cost” shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of available run hours



due to limitations imposed on the unit by Applicable Laws and Regulations (as defined in PJM Tariff), and (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Energy Market Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same compliance period, which compliance period is determined by the applicable regulatory authority and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Energy Market Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement. Generation Capacity Resources recovering Energy Market Opportunity Cost that self-schedule generation run hours 50% or less of the total available run hours shall consider the generation unit outages when the limited number of available run hours are exhausted as an Out of Management Control (OMC) Outage.

### **1.3.3 External Market Buyer.**

"External Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for consumption by end-users outside the PJM Region, or for load in the PJM Region that is not served by Network Transmission Service.

### **1.3.4 External Resource.**

"External Resource" shall mean a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the PJM Region.

### **1.3.5 Financial Transmission Right.**

"Financial Transmission Right" or "FTR" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2 of this Schedule.

#### **1.3.5A Financial Transmission Right Obligation.**

"Financial Transmission Right Obligation" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(b) of this Schedule.

#### **1.3.5B Financial Transmission Right Option.**

"Financial Transmission Right Option" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(c) of this Schedule.

### **1.3.6 Generating Market Buyer.**

"Generating Market Buyer" shall mean an Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity that owns or has contractual rights to the output of generation resources capable of serving the Market Buyer's load in the PJM Region, or of selling energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or elsewhere.

### **1.3.7 Generator Forced Outage.**

“Generator Forced Outage” shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

### **1.3.8 Generator Maintenance Outage.**

“Generator Maintenance Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform necessary repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility meets the guidelines specified in the PJM Manuals.

### **1.3.9 Generator Planned Outage.**

“Generator Planned Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

### **1.3.9A Increment Bid.**

“Increment Bid” shall mean an offer to sell energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. An accepted Increment Bid results in scheduled generation at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

### **1.3.9B Interface Pricing Point.**

“Interface Pricing Point” shall have the meaning specified in section 2.6A.

### **1.3.10 Internal Market Buyer.**

“Internal Market Buyer” shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for ultimate consumption by end-users inside the PJM Region that are served by Network Transmission Service.

### **1.3.11 Inadvertent Interchange.**

“Inadvertent Interchange” shall mean the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the individual Control Areas operated by PJM.

#### **1.3.11.01 Load Management.**

“Load Management” shall mean either a Demand Resource (“DR”) or an Interruptible Load for Reliability (“ILR”) resource, both as defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.11A Load Reduction Event.**

“Load Reduction Event” shall mean a reduction in demand by a Member or Special Member for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**1.3.11B Loss Price.**

“Loss Price” shall mean the loss component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission losses, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

**1.3.12 Market Operations Center.**

“Market Operations Center” shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by or on behalf of a Market Participant to communicate and coordinate with the Office of the Interconnection in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

**1.3.12A Maximum Emergency.**

“Maximum Emergency” shall mean the designation of all or part of the output of a generating unit for which the designated output levels may require extraordinary procedures and therefore are available to the Office of the Interconnection only when the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency and requests generation designated as Maximum Emergency to run. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the aggregate amount of megawatts that are classified as Maximum Emergency.

**1.3.13 Maximum Generation Emergency.**

“Maximum Generation Emergency” shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection to address either a generation or transmission emergency in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more Generation Capacity Resources, or Non-Retail Behind The Meter Generation resources to operate at its maximum net or gross electrical power output, subject to the equipment stress limits for such Generation Capacity Resource or Non-Retail Behind The Meter resource in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

**1.3.14 Minimum Generation Emergency.**

“Minimum Generation Emergency” shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more generating resources to operate at or below Normal Minimum Generation, in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

**1.3.14A NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator.**

“NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator” shall mean the NERC mechanism that is in effect and being used to calculate the distribution of energy, over specific transmission interfaces, from energy transactions.

**1.3.14B Net Benefits Test.**

“Net Benefits Test” shall mean a calculation to determine whether the benefits of a reduction in price resulting from the dispatch of Economic Load Response exceeds the cost to other loads resulting from the billing unit effects of the load reduction, as specified in Section 3.3A.4 of this Schedule.

**1.3.15 Network Resource.**

“Network Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Tariff.

**1.3.16 Network Service User.**

“Network Service User” shall mean an entity using Network Transmission Service.

**1.3.17 Network Transmission Service.**

“Network Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part III of the PJM Tariff, or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

**1.3.17A Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost.**

“Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost” shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of starts or available run hours resulting from (i) the physical equipment limitations of the unit, for up to one year, due to original equipment manufacturer recommendations or insurance carrier restrictions, (ii) a fuel supply limitation, for up to one year, resulting from an event of force majeure; and, (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit’s lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same period of time in which the unit is bound by the referenced restrictions, and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement. Generation Capacity Resources recovering Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost that self-schedule generation run hours 50% or less of the total available run hours shall consider the generation unit outages when the limited number of available run hours are exhausted as an Out of Management Control (OMC) Outage.

**1.3.17B Non-Variable Loads.**

“Non-Variable Loads” shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

**1.3.18 Normal Maximum Generation.**

“Normal Maximum Generation” shall mean the highest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

**1.3.19 Normal Minimum Generation.**

“Normal Minimum Generation” shall mean the lowest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

**1.3.20 Offer Data.**

“Offer Data” shall mean the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new resource, and other data and information necessary to schedule and dispatch generation resources and Demand Resource(s) for the provision of energy and other services and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the PJM Region, and specified for submission to the PJM Interchange Energy Market for such purposes by the Office of the Interconnection.

**1.3.21 Office of the Interconnection Control Center.**

“Office of the Interconnection Control Center” shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by the Office of the Interconnection to coordinate and direct the operation of the PJM Region and to administer the PJM Interchange Energy Market, including facilities and equipment used to communicate and coordinate with the Market Participants in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

**1.3.21A On-Site Generators.**

“On-Site Generators” shall mean generation facilities (including Behind The Meter Generation) that (i) are not Capacity Resources, (ii) are not injecting into the grid, (iii) are either synchronized or non-synchronized to the Transmission System, and (iv) can be used to reduce demand for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**1.3.22 Operating Day.**

“Operating Day” shall mean the daily 24 hour period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the PJM Interchange Energy Market are scheduled.

**1.3.23 Operating Margin.**

“Operating Margin” shall mean the incremental adjustments, measured in megawatts, required in PJM Region operations in order to accommodate, on a first contingency basis, an operating contingency in the PJM Region resulting from operations in an interconnected Control Area.

Such adjustments may result in constraints causing Transmission Congestion Charges, or may result in Ancillary Services charges pursuant to the PJM Tariff.

#### **1.3.24 Operating Margin Customer.**

“Operating Margin Customer” shall mean a Control Area purchasing Operating Margin pursuant to an agreement between such other Control Area and the LLC.

#### **1.3.25 PJM Interchange.**

“PJM Interchange” shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds, or is exceeded by, the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller; or (e) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (f) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

#### **1.3.26 PJM Interchange Export.**

“PJM Interchange Export” shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load is exceeded by the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup sales; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller.

#### **1.3.27 PJM Interchange Import.**

“PJM Interchange Import” shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup purchases; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (d) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

#### **1.3.28 PJM Open Access Same-time Information System.**

“PJM Open Access Same-time Information System” shall mean the electronic communication system for the collection and dissemination of information about transmission services in the PJM Region, established and operated by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with FERC standards and requirements.

**1.3.28A Planning Period Quarter.**

“Planning Period Quarter” shall mean any of the following three month periods in the Planning Period: June, July and August; September, October and November; December, January and February; or, March, April and May.

**1.3.28B Planning Period Balance.**

“Planning Period Balance” shall mean the entire period of time remaining in the Planning Period following the month that a monthly auction is conducted.

**1.3.29 Point-to-Point Transmission Service.**

“Point-to-Point Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part II of the PJM Tariff.

**1.3.29A PRD Curve**

PRD Curve shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.29B PRD Provider**

PRD Provider shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.29C PRD Reservation Price**

PRD Reservation Price shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.29D PRD Substation**

PRD Substation shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.29E Price Responsive Demand**

Price Responsive Demand shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.30 Ramping Capability.**

“Ramping Capability” shall mean the sustained rate of change of generator output, in megawatts per minute.

**1.3.30.01 Real-time Congestion Price.**

“Real-time Congestion Price” shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.30.02 Real-time Loss Price.**

“Real-time Loss Price” shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.30A Real-time Prices.**

“Real-time Prices” shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.30B Real-time Energy Market.**

“Real-time Energy Market” shall mean the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges for quantity deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.30B.01 Real-time System Energy Price.**

“Real-time System Energy Price” shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.31 Regulation.**

“Regulation” shall mean the capability of a specific generation resource or Demand Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to increase or decrease its output or adjust load in response to a regulating control signal, in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals.

**1.3.31.01 Residual Auction Revenue Rights.**

“Residual Auction Revenue Rights” shall mean incremental stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights created within a Planning Period by an increase in transmission system capability or a change in any other relevant factor that was not modeled pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement in compliance with section 7.4.2 (h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, and, if modeled, would have increased the amount of stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to section 7.4.2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement; provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, Residual Auction Revenue Rights shall exclude: 1) Incremental Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Part VI of the Tariff; and 2) Auction Revenue Rights allocated to entities that are assigned cost responsibility pursuant to Schedule 6 of this Agreement for transmission upgrades that create such rights.

**1.3.31.02 Special Member.**



“Special Member” shall mean an entity that satisfies the requirements of Section 1.5A.02 of this Schedule or the special membership provisions established under the Emergency Load Response Program.

**1.3.31A [Reserved]**

**1.3.31B [Reserved]**

**1.3.32 Spot Market Backup.**

“Spot Market Backup” shall mean the purchase of energy from, or the delivery of energy to, the PJM Interchange Energy Market in quantities sufficient to complete the delivery or receipt obligations of a bilateral contract that has been curtailed or interrupted for any reason.

**1.3.33 Spot Market Energy.**

“Spot Market Energy” shall mean energy bought or sold by Market Participants through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at System Energy Prices determined as specified in Section 2 of this Schedule.

**1.3.33A State Estimator.**

“State Estimator” shall mean the computer model of power flows specified in Section 2.3 of this Schedule.

**1.3.33B Station Power.**

“Station Power” shall mean energy used for operating the electric equipment on the site of a generation facility located in the PJM Region or for the heating, lighting, air-conditioning and office equipment needs of buildings on the site of such a generation facility that are used in the operation, maintenance, or repair of the facility. Station Power does not include any energy (i) used to power synchronous condensers; (ii) used for pumping at a pumped storage facility; (iii) used for compressors at a compressed air energy storage facility; (iv) used for charging an Energy Storage Resource; or (v) used in association with restoration or black start service.

**1.3.33B.01 Synchronized Reserve.**

“Synchronized Reserve” shall mean the reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes from the request of the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

**1.3.33B.02 Synchronized Reserve Event.**

“Synchronized Reserve Event” shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources and/or Demand Resources able, assigned or self-scheduled, to provide

Synchronized Reserve within ten minutes, to increase the energy output or reduce load by the amount of assigned or self-scheduled Synchronized Reserve capability.

**1.3.33B.03 System Energy Price.**

“System Energy Price” shall mean the energy component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a resource, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

**1.3.33C Target Allocation.**

“Target Allocation” shall mean the allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits as set forth in Section 5.2.3 of this Schedule or the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits as set forth in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

**1.3.34 Transmission Congestion Charge.**

“Transmission Congestion Charge” shall mean a charge attributable to the increased cost of energy delivered at a given load bus when the transmission system serving that load bus is operating under constrained conditions, or as necessary to provide energy for third-party transmission losses in accordance with Section 9.3, which shall be calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.1 of this Schedule.

**1.3.35 Transmission Congestion Credit.**

“Transmission Congestion Credit” shall mean the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Charges credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.2 of this Schedule.

**1.3.36 Transmission Customer.**

“Transmission Customer” shall mean an entity using Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

**1.3.37 Transmission Forced Outage.**

“Transmission Forced Outage” shall mean an immediate removal from service of a transmission facility by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the transmission facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A removal from service of a transmission facility at the request of the Office of the Interconnection to improve transmission capability shall not constitute a Forced Transmission Outage.

**1.3.37A Transmission Loading Relief.**

“Transmission Loading Relief” shall mean NERC’s procedures for preventing operating security limit violations, as implemented by PJM as the security coordinator responsible for maintaining transmission security for the PJM Region.

**1.3.37B Transmission Loading Relief Customer.**

“Transmission Loading Relief Customer” shall mean an entity that, in accordance with Section 1.10.6A, has elected to pay Transmission Congestion Charges during Transmission Loading Relief in order to continue energy schedules over contract paths outside the PJM Region that are increasing the cost of energy in the PJM Region.

**1.3.37C Transmission Loss Charge.**

“Transmission Loss Charge” shall mean the charges to each Market Participant, Network Customer, or Transmission Customer for the cost of energy lost in the transmission of electricity from a generation resource to load as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

**1.3.38 Transmission Planned Outage.**

“Transmission Planned Outage” shall mean any transmission outage scheduled in advance for a pre-determined duration and which meets the notification requirements for such outages specified in this Agreement or the PJM Manuals.

**1.3.38A Variable Loads.**

“Variable Loads” shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

**1.3.39 Zonal Base Load.**

“Zonal Base Load” shall mean the lowest daily zonal peak load from the twelve month period ending October 21 of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which an annual Auction Revenue Right allocation is conducted, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone.

**1.7 General.**

**1.7.1 Market Sellers.**

Only Market Sellers shall be eligible to submit offers to the Office of the Interconnection for the sale of electric energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Market Sellers shall comply with the prices, terms, and operating characteristics of all Offer Data submitted to and accepted by the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**1.7.2 Market Buyers.**

Only Market Buyers shall be eligible to purchase energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Market Buyers shall comply with all requirements for making purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**1.7.2A Economic Load Response Participants.**

Only Economic Load Response Participants shall be eligible to participate in the Real-time Energy Market and the Day-ahead Energy Market by submitting offers to the Office of the Interconnection to reduce demand.

**1.7.3 Agents.**

A Market Participant may participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market through an agent, provided that the Market Participant informs the Office of the Interconnection in advance in writing of the appointment of such agent. A Market Participant participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market through an agent shall be bound by all of the acts or representations of such agent with respect to transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, and shall ensure that any such agent complies with the requirements of this Agreement.

**1.7.4 General Obligations of the Market Participants.**

(a) In performing its obligations to the Office of the Interconnection hereunder, each Market Participant shall at all times (i) follow Good Utility Practice, (ii) comply with all applicable laws and regulations, (iii) comply with the applicable principles, guidelines, standards and requirements of FERC, NERC and Applicable Regional Reliability Councils, (iv) comply with the procedures established for operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region and (v) cooperate with the Office of the Interconnection as necessary for the operation of the PJM Region in a safe, reliable manner consistent with Good Utility Practice.

(b) Market Participants shall undertake all operations in or affecting the PJM Interchange Energy Market and the PJM Region including but not limited to compliance with all Emergency procedures, in accordance with the power and authority of the Office of the

Interconnection with respect to the operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market and the PJM Region as established in this Agreement, and as specified in the Schedules to this Agreement and the PJM Manuals. Failure to comply with the foregoing operational requirements shall subject a Market Participant to such reasonable charges or other remedies or sanctions for non-compliance as may be established by the PJM Board, including legal or regulatory proceedings as authorized by the PJM Board to enforce the obligations of this Agreement.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection may establish such committees with a representative of each Market Participant, and the Market Participants agree to provide appropriately qualified personnel for such committees, as may be necessary for the Office of the Interconnection and PJMSettlement to perform its obligations hereunder.

(d) All Market Participants shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection the scheduling and other information specified in the Schedules to this Agreement, and such other information as the Office of the Interconnection may reasonably require for the reliable and efficient operation of the PJM Region and PJM Interchange Energy Market, and for compliance with applicable regulatory requirements for posting market and related information. Such information shall be provided as much in advance as possible, but in no event later than the deadlines established by the Schedules to this Agreement, or by the Office of the Interconnection in conformance with such Schedules. Such information shall include, but not be limited to, maintenance and other anticipated outages of generation or transmission facilities, scheduling and related information on bilateral transactions and self-scheduled resources, and implementation of active load management, interruption of load, [Price Responsive Demand](#), and other load reduction measures. The Office of the Interconnection shall abide by appropriate requirements for the non-disclosure and protection of any confidential or proprietary information given to the Office of the Interconnection by a Market Participant. Each Market Participant shall maintain or cause to be maintained compatible information and communications systems, as specified by the Office of the Interconnection, required to transmit scheduling, dispatch, or other time-sensitive information to the Office of the Interconnection in a timely manner.

(e) Subject to the requirements for Economic Load Response Participants in section 1.5A above, each Market Participant shall install and operate, or shall otherwise arrange for, metering and related equipment capable of recording and transmitting all voice and data communications reasonably necessary for the Office of the Interconnection and PJMSettlement to perform the services specified in this Agreement. A Market Participant that elects to be separately billed for its PJM Interchange shall, to the extent necessary, be individually metered in accordance with Section 14 of this Agreement, or shall agree upon an allocation of PJM Interchange between it and the Market Participant through whose meters the unmetered Market Participant's PJM Interchange is delivered. The Office of the Interconnection shall be notified of the allocation by the foregoing Market Participants.

(f) Each Market Participant shall operate, or shall cause to be operated, any generating resources owned or controlled by such Market Participant that are within the PJM Region or otherwise supplying energy to or through the PJM Region in a manner that is consistent with the standards, requirements or directions of the Office of the Interconnection and

that will permit the Office of the Interconnection to perform its obligations under this Agreement; provided, however, no Market Participant shall be required to take any action that is inconsistent with Good Utility Practice or applicable law.

(g) Each Market Participant shall follow the directions of the Office of the Interconnection to take actions to prevent, manage, alleviate or end an Emergency in a manner consistent with this Agreement and the procedures of the PJM Region as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(h) Each Market Participant shall obtain and maintain all permits, licenses or approvals required for the Market Participant to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the manner contemplated by this Agreement.

(i) Consistent with Section 36.1.1 of the PJM Tariff, to the extent its generating facility is dispatchable, a Market Participant shall submit an Economic Minimum in the Real-time Energy Market that is no greater than the higher of its physical operating minimum or its Capacity Interconnection Rights, as that term is defined in the PJM Tariff, associated with such generating facility under its Interconnection Service Agreement under Attachment O of the PJM Tariff or a wholesale market participation agreement.

#### **1.7.5 Market Operations Center.**

Each Market Participant shall maintain a Market Operations Center, or shall make appropriate arrangements for the performance of such services on its behalf. A Market Operations Center shall meet the performance, equipment, communications, staffing and training standards and requirements specified in this Agreement for the scheduling and completion of transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market and the maintenance of the reliable operation of the PJM Region, and shall be sufficient to enable (i) a Market Seller or an Economic Load Response Participant to perform all terms and conditions of its offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, and (ii) a Market Buyer or an Economic Load Response Participant to conform to the requirements for purchasing from the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

#### **1.7.6 Scheduling and Dispatching.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule and dispatch in real-time generation resources and/or Demand Resources economically on the basis of least-cost, security-constrained dispatch and the prices and operating characteristics offered by Market Sellers, continuing until sufficient generation resources and/or Demand Resources are dispatched to serve the PJM Interchange Energy Market energy purchase requirements under normal system conditions of the Market Buyers (taking into account any reductions to such requirements in accordance with PRD Curves properly submitted by PRD Providers), as well as the requirements of the PJM Region for ancillary services provided by generation resources and/or Demand Resources, in accordance with this Agreement. Such scheduling and dispatch shall recognize transmission constraints on coordinated flowgates external to the Transmission System in accordance with Appendix A to the Joint Operating Agreement between the Midwest

Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 38) and on other such flowgates that are coordinated in accordance with agreements between the LLC and other entities. Scheduling and dispatch shall be conducted in accordance with this Agreement.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall undertake to identify any conflict or incompatibility between the scheduling or other deadlines or specifications applicable to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, and any relevant procedures of another Control Area, or any tariff (including the PJM Tariff). Upon determining that any such conflict or incompatibility exists, the Office of the Interconnection shall propose tariff or procedural changes, and undertake such other efforts as may be appropriate, to resolve any such conflict or incompatibility.

(c) To protect its generation or distribution facilities, or local Transmission Facilities not under the monitoring responsibility and dispatch control of the Office of the Interconnection, an entity may request that the Office of the Interconnection schedule and dispatch generation or reductions in demand to meet a limit on Transmission Facilities different from that which the Office of the Interconnection has determined to be required for reliable operation of the Transmission System. To the extent consistent with its other obligations under this Agreement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule and dispatch generation and reductions in demand in accordance with such request. An entity that makes a request pursuant to this section 1.7.6(c) shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred by operating the Transmission System and scheduling and dispatching generation in the manner that the Office of the Interconnection otherwise has determined to be required for reliable operation of the Transmission System.

#### **1.7.7 Pricing.**

The price paid for energy bought and sold in the PJM Interchange Energy Market and for demand reductions will reflect the hourly Locational Marginal Price at each load and generation bus, determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Agreement. Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, which shall be determined by differences in Congestion Prices and Loss Prices in an hour, shall be calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and collected by PJMSettlement, and the revenues therefrom shall be disbursed by PJMSettlement in accordance with this Schedule.

#### **1.7.8 Generating Market Buyer Resources.**

A Generating Market Buyer may elect to self-schedule its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer's Equivalent Load, in accordance with and subject to the procedures specified in this Schedule, and the accounting and billing requirements specified in Section 3 to this Schedule. PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party with respect to such self-scheduled or self-supplied transactions.

#### **1.7.9 Delivery to an External Market Buyer.**

A purchase of Spot Market Energy by an External Market Buyer shall be delivered to a bus or busses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region specified by the Office of the Interconnection, or to load in such area that is not served by Network Transmission Service, using Point-to-Point Transmission Service paid for by the External Market Buyer. Further delivery of such energy shall be the responsibility of the External Market Buyer.

#### **1.7.10 Other Transactions.**

(a) Bilateral Transactions.

(i) In addition to transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Market Participants may enter into bilateral contracts for the purchase or sale of electric energy to or from each other or any other entity, subject to the obligations of Market Participants to make Generation Capacity Resources available for dispatch by the Office of the Interconnection. Such bilateral contracts shall be for the physical transfer of energy to or from a Market Participant and shall be reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules relating to its eSchedules and Enhanced Energy Scheduler tools.

(ii) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral contracts for the physical transfer of energy to a Market Participant inside the PJM Region, title to the energy that is the subject of the bilateral contract shall pass to the buyer at the source specified for the bilateral contract, and the further transmission of the energy or further sale of the energy into the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall be transacted by the buyer under the bilateral contract. With respect to all bilateral contracts for the physical transfer of energy to an entity outside the PJM Region, title to the energy shall pass to the buyer at the border of the PJM Region and shall be delivered to the border using transmission service. In no event shall the purchase and sale of energy between Market Participants under a bilateral contract constitute a transaction in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or be construed to define PJMSettlement as a contracting party to any bilateral transactions between Market Participants.

(iii) Market Participants that are parties to bilateral contracts for the purchase and sale and physical transfer of energy reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, to limit the megawatt hours of such reported transactions to amounts reflecting the expected load and other physical delivery obligations of the buyer under the bilateral contract.

(iv) All payments and related charges for the energy associated with a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to the bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by the Office of the Interconnection or PJMSettlement. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under a bilateral contract reported and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.



(v) A buyer under a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the costs of any Spot Market Backup used to meet the bilateral contract seller's obligation to deliver energy under the bilateral contract and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the seller under the bilateral contract, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection. Upon any default in obligations to the LLC or PJMSettlement by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall (i) not accept any new eSchedules or Enhanced Energy Scheduler reporting by the Market Participant and (ii) terminate all of the Market Participant's eSchedules and Enhanced Energy Schedules associated with its bilateral contracts previously reported to the Office of the Interconnection for all days where delivery has not yet occurred. All claims regarding a buyer's default to a seller under a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller. In such circumstances, the seller may instruct the Office of the Interconnection to terminate all of the eSchedules and Enhanced Energy Schedules associated with bilateral contracts between buyer and seller previously reported to the Office of the Interconnection. PJMSettlement shall assign its claims against a seller with respect to a seller's nonpayment for Spot Market Backup to a buyer to the extent that the buyer has made an indemnification payment to PJMSettlement with respect to the seller's nonpayment.

(vi) Bilateral contracts that do not contemplate the physical transfer of energy to or from a Market Participant are not subject to this Schedule, shall not be reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection, and shall not in any way constitute a transaction in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(b) Market Participants shall have Spot Market Backup with respect to all bilateral transactions that contemplate the physical transfer of energy to or from a Market Participant, that are not dynamically scheduled pursuant to Section 1.12 and that are curtailed or interrupted for any reason (except for curtailments or interruptions through active load management for load located within the PJM Region).

(c) To the extent the Office of the Interconnection dispatches a Generating Market Buyer's generation resources, such Generating Market Buyer may elect to net the output of such resources against its hourly Equivalent Load. Such a Generating Market Buyer shall be deemed a buyer from the PJM Interchange Energy Market to the extent of its PJM Interchange Imports, and shall be deemed a seller to the PJM Interchange Energy Market to the extent of its PJM Interchange Exports.

(d) A Market Seller may self-supply Station Power for its generation facility in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) A Market Seller may self-supply Station Power for its generation facility during any month (1) when the net output of such facility is positive, or (2) when the net output of such facility is negative and the Market Seller during the same month has available at other of its generation facilities positive net output in an amount at least sufficient to offset fully such negative net output. For purposes of this subsection (d), "net output" of a generation facility during any month means the facility's gross energy

output, less the Station Power requirements of such facility, during that month. The determination of a generation facility's or a Market Seller's monthly net output under this subsection (d) will apply only to determine whether the Market Seller self-supplied Station Power during the month and will not affect the price of energy sold or consumed by the Market Seller at any bus during any hour during the month. For each hour when a Market Seller has positive net output and delivers energy into the Transmission System, it will be paid the LMP at its bus for that hour for all of the energy delivered. Conversely, for each hour when a Market Seller has negative net output and has received Station Power from the Transmission System, it will pay the LMP at its bus for that hour for all of the energy consumed.

(ii) Transmission Provider will determine the extent to which each affected Market Seller during the month self-supplied its Station Power requirements or obtained Station Power from third-party providers (including affiliates) and will incorporate that determination in its accounting and billing for the month. In the event that a Market Seller self-supplies Station Power during any month in the manner described in subsection (1) of subsection (d)(i) above, Market Seller will not use, and will not incur any charges for, transmission service. In the event, and to the extent, that a Market Seller self-supplies Station Power during any month in the manner described in subsection (2) of subsection (d)(i) above (hereafter referred to as "remote self-supply of Station Power"), Market Seller shall use and pay for transmission service for the transmission of energy in an amount equal to the facility's negative net output from Market Seller's generation facility(ies) having positive net output. Unless the Market Seller makes other arrangements with Transmission Provider in advance, such transmission service shall be provided under Part II of the PJM Tariff and shall be charged the hourly rate under Schedule 8 of the PJM Tariff for Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service with an election to pay congestion charges, provided, however, that no reservation shall be necessary for such transmission service and the terms and charges under Schedules 1, 1A, 2 through 6, 9 and 10 of the PJM Tariff shall not apply to such service. The amount of energy that a Market Seller transmits in conjunction with remote self-supply of Station Power will not be affected by any other sales, purchases, or transmission of capacity or energy by or for such Market Seller under any other provisions of the PJM Tariff.

(iii) A Market Seller may self-supply Station Power from its generation facilities located outside of the PJM Region during any month only if such generation facilities in fact run during such month and Market Seller separately has reserved transmission service and scheduled delivery of the energy from such resource in advance into the PJM Region.

#### **1.7.11 Emergencies.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection, with the assistance of the Members' dispatchers as it may request, shall be responsible for monitoring the operation of the PJM Region, for declaring the existence of an Emergency, and for directing the operations of Market Participants as necessary to manage, alleviate or end an Emergency. The standards, policies and procedures of the Office of the Interconnection for declaring the existence of an Emergency,

including but not limited to a Minimum Generation Emergency, and for managing, alleviating or ending an Emergency, shall apply to all Members on a non-discriminatory basis. Actions by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Participants shall be carried out in accordance with this Agreement, the NERC Operating Policies, Applicable Regional Reliability Council reliability principles and standards, Good Utility Practice, and the PJM Manuals. A declaration that an Emergency exists or is likely to exist by the Office of the Interconnection shall be binding on all Market Participants until the Office of the Interconnection announces that the actual or threatened Emergency no longer exists. Consistent with existing contracts, all Market Participants shall comply with all directions from the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of managing, alleviating or ending an Emergency. The Market Participants shall authorize the Office of the Interconnection and PJM Settlement to purchase or sell energy on their behalf to meet an Emergency, and otherwise to implement agreements with other Control Areas interconnected with the PJM Region for the mutual provision of service to meet an Emergency, in accordance with this Agreement.

(b) To the extent load must be shed to alleviate an Emergency in a Control Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the maximum extent practicable, direct the shedding of load within such Control Zone. The Office of the Interconnection may shed load in one Control Zone to alleviate an Emergency in another Control Zone under its control only as necessary after having first shed load to the maximum extent practicable in the Control Zone experiencing the Emergency and only to the extent that PJM supports other control areas (not under its control) in those situations where load shedding would be necessary, such as to prevent isolation of facilities within the Eastern Interconnection, to prevent voltage collapse, or to restore system frequency following a system collapse; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection may not order a manual load dump in a Control Zone solely to address capacity deficiencies in another Control Zone. This section shall be implemented consistent with the North American Electric Reliability Council and applicable reliability council standards.

#### **1.7.12 Fees and Charges.**

Each Market Participant, except for Special Members, shall pay all fees and charges of the Office of the Interconnection for operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market as determined by and allocated to the Market Participant by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Schedule 3.

#### **1.7.13 Relationship to the PJM Region.**

The PJM Interchange Energy Market operates within and subject to the requirements for the operation of the PJM Region.

#### **1.7.14 PJM Manuals.**

The Office of the Interconnection shall be responsible for maintaining, updating, and promulgating the PJM Manuals as they relate to the operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market. The PJM Manuals, as they relate to the operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market, shall conform and comply with this Agreement, NERC operating policies, and

Applicable Regional Reliability Council reliability principles, guidelines and standards, and shall be designed to facilitate administration of an efficient energy market within industry reliability standards and the physical capabilities of the PJM Region.

**1.7.15 Corrective Action.**

Consistent with Good Utility Practice, the Office of the Interconnection shall be authorized to direct or coordinate corrective action, whether or not specified in the PJM Manuals, as necessary to alleviate unusual conditions that threaten the integrity or reliability of the PJM Region, or the regional power system.

**1.7.16 Recording.**

Subject to the requirements of applicable State or federal law, all voice communications with the Office of the Interconnection Control Center may be recorded by the Office of the Interconnection and any Market Participant communicating with the Office of the Interconnection Control Center, and each Market Participant hereby consents to such recording.

**1.7.17 Operating Reserves.**

(a) The following procedures shall apply to any generation unit subject to the dispatch of the Office of the Interconnection for which construction commenced before July 9, 1996, or any Demand Resource subject to the dispatch of the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule to the Operating Reserve and load-following objectives of the Control Zones of the PJM Region and the PJM Interchange Energy Market in scheduling generation resources and/or Demand Resources pursuant to this Schedule. A table of Operating Reserve objectives for each Control Zone is calculated and published annually in the PJM Manuals. Reserve levels are probabilistically determined based on the season's historical load forecasting error and forced outage rates.

(c) Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output, in which case, such units shall be compensated in accordance with section 3.2.3(f) of this Schedule; or 2) the resource submits a request for a risk premium to the Market Monitoring Unit under the procedures specified in Section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. A nuclear generation resource (i) must submit a risk premium consistent with its agreement under such process, or, (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on an appropriate risk premium, may submit its own determination of an appropriate risk premium to the Office of the Interconnection, subject to acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection, with or without prior approval from the Commission.

(d) PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Operating Reserve in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**1.7.18 Regulation.**

(a) Regulation to meet the Regulation objective of each Regulation Zone shall be supplied from generation resources and/or Demand Resources located within the metered electrical boundaries of such Regulation Zone. Generating Market Buyers, and Market Sellers offering Regulation, shall comply with applicable standards and requirements for Regulation capability and dispatch specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall obtain and maintain for each Regulation Zone an amount of Regulation equal to the Regulation objective for such Regulation Zone as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Regulation range of a generation unit or Demand Resource shall be at least twice the amount of Regulation assigned.

(d) A generation unit capable of automatic energy dispatch that is also providing Regulation shall have its energy dispatch range reduced by twice the amount of the Regulation provided. The amount of Regulation provided by a generation unit shall serve to redefine the Normal Minimum Generation and Normal Maximum Generation energy limits of that generation unit, in that the amount of Regulation shall be added to the generation unit's Normal Minimum Generation energy limit, and subtracted from its Normal Maximum Generation energy limit.

(e) Qualified Regulation must satisfy the verification tests described in the PJM Manuals.

#### **1.7.19 Ramping.**

A generator dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to a control signal appropriate to increase or decrease the generator's megawatt output level shall be able to change output at the ramping rate specified in the Offer Data submitted to the Office of the Interconnection for that generator.

#### **1.7.19A Synchronized Reserve.**

(a) Synchronized Reserve shall be supplied from generation resources and/or Demand Resources located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region. Generating Market Buyers, and Market Sellers offering Synchronized Reserve shall comply with applicable standards and requirements for Synchronized Reserve capability and dispatch specified in the PJM Manuals

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall obtain and maintain for each Synchronized Reserve Zone an amount of Synchronized Reserve equal to the Synchronized Reserve objective for such Synchronized Reserve Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve capability of a generation resource and Demand Resource shall be the increase in energy output or load reduction achievable by the generation resource and Demand Resource within a continuous 10-minute period.

(d) A generation unit capable of automatic energy dispatch that also is providing Synchronized Reserve shall have its energy dispatch range reduced by the amount of the Synchronized Reserve provided. The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by a generation unit shall serve to redefine the Normal Maximum Generation energy limit of that generation unit in that the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided shall be subtracted from its Normal Maximum Generation energy limit.

**1.7.19B Bilateral Transactions Regarding Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.**

(a) In addition to transactions in the Regulation market, Synchronized Reserve market, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market, Market Participants may enter into bilateral contracts for the purchase or sale of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves to or from each other or any other entity. Such bilateral contracts shall be for the physical transfer of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves to or from a Market Participant and shall be reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules relating to its eMarket tools.

(b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral contracts for the physical transfer of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves to a Market Participant in the PJM Region, title to the product that is the subject of the bilateral contract shall pass to the buyer at the source specified for the bilateral contract, and any further transactions associated with such products or further sale of such Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the markets for Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves, respectively, shall be transacted by the buyer under the bilateral contract. In no event shall the purchase and sale of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves between Market Participants under a bilateral contract constitute a transaction in PJM's markets for Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves, or otherwise be construed to define PJMSettlement as a contracting party to any bilateral transactions between Market Participants.

(c) Market Participants that are parties to bilateral contracts for the purchase and sale and physical transfer of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, to limit the amounts of such reported transactions to amounts reflecting the expected requirements for Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves of the buyer pursuant to such bilateral contracts.

(d) All payments and related charges for the Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves associated with a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to the bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under a

bilateral contract reported and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(e) A buyer under a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the costs of any purchases by the seller under the bilateral contract in the markets for Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves used to meet the bilateral contract seller's obligation to deliver Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves under the bilateral contract and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the seller under the bilateral contract, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection. Upon any default in obligations to the LLC or PJMSettlement by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall (i) not accept any new eMarket reporting by the Market Participant and (ii) terminate all of the Market Participant's reporting of eMarkets schedules associated with its bilateral contracts previously reported to the Office of the Interconnection for all days where delivery has not yet occurred. All claims regarding a buyer's default to a seller under a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller. In such circumstances, the seller may instruct the Office of the Interconnection to terminate all of the reported eMarkets schedules associated with bilateral contracts between buyer and seller previously reported to the Office of the Interconnection.

(f) Market Participants shall purchase Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves from PJM's markets for Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves, in quantities sufficient to complete the delivery or receipt obligations of a bilateral contract that has been curtailed or interrupted for any reason, with respect to all bilateral transactions that contemplate the physical transfer of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves to or from a Market Participant.

#### **1.7.20 Communication and Operating Requirements.**

(a) Market Participants. Each Market Participant shall have, or shall arrange to have, its transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market subject to control by a Market Operations Center, with staffing and communications systems capable of real-time communication with the Office of the Interconnection during normal and Emergency conditions and of control of the Market Participant's relevant load or facilities sufficient to meet the requirements of the Market Participant's transactions with the PJM Interchange Energy Market, including but not limited to the following requirements as applicable.

(b) Market Sellers selling from generation resources and/or Demand Resources within the PJM Region shall: report to the Office of the Interconnection sources of energy and Demand Resources available for operation; supply to the Office of the Interconnection all applicable Offer Data; report to the Office of the Interconnection generation resources that are self-scheduled; with respect to generation resources, report to the Office of the Interconnection bilateral sales transactions to buyers not within the PJM Region; confirm to the Office of the Interconnection bilateral sales to Market Buyers within the PJM Region; respond to the Office of the Interconnection's directives to start, shutdown or change output levels of generation units, or change scheduled voltages or reactive output levels of generation units, or reduce load from

Demand Resources; continuously maintain all Offer Data concurrent with on-line operating information; and ensure that, where so equipped, generating equipment and Demand Resources are operated with control equipment functioning as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) Market Sellers selling from generation resources outside the PJM Region shall: provide to the Office of the Interconnection all applicable Offer Data, including offers specifying amounts of energy available, hours of availability and prices of energy and other services; respond to Office of the Interconnection directives to schedule delivery or change delivery schedules; and communicate delivery schedules to the Market Seller's Control Area.

(d) Market Participants that are Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities shall: respond to Office of the Interconnection directives for load management steps; report to the Office of the Interconnection Generation Capacity Resources to satisfy capacity obligations that are available for pool operation; report to the Office of the Interconnection all bilateral purchase transactions; respond to other Office of the Interconnection directives such as those required during Emergency operation.

(e) Market Participants that are not Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities shall: provide to the Office of the Interconnection requests to purchase specified amounts of energy for each hour of the Operating Day during which it intends to purchase from the PJM Interchange Energy Market, along with Dispatch Rate levels above which it does not desire to purchase; respond to other Office of the Interconnection directives such as those required during Emergency operation.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants are responsible for maintaining demand reduction information, including the amount and price at which demand may be reduced. The Economic Load Response Participant shall provide this information to the Office of the Interconnection by posting it on the Load Response Program Registration link of the PJM website as required by the PJM Manuals. The Economic Load Response Participant shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of a demand reduction concurrent with, or prior to, the beginning of such demand reduction in accordance with the PJM Manuals. In the event that an Economic Load Response Participant chooses to measure load reductions using a Customer Baseline Load, the Economic Load Response Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of a change in its operations or the operations of the end-use customer that would affect a relevant Customer Baseline Load as required by the PJM Manuals.

(g) PRD Providers shall be responsible for ensuring automated reductions to their Price Responsive Demand in response to price in accordance with their PRD Curves submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.



**1.10 Scheduling.**

**1.10.1 General.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer's self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer's Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-To Congestion transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales, or Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection's forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in

accordance with the Market Sellers' offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM Manuals.

#### **1.10.1A Day-Ahead Energy Market Scheduling.**

The following actions shall occur not later than 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load-Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand load at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. Price Responsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load-Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand load at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.

(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection: (i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such self-scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer's intent not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection schedules for any bilateral transactions involving use of generation or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether the transaction is to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any Market Participant that elects to include a bilateral transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed the maximum price that may be specified in the PJM Manuals), if any, at which it will be wholly or partially curtailed rather than pay Transmission Congestion Charges. The foregoing

price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified bilateral transaction source and sink points in the day-ahead scheduling process only. Any Market Participant that elects not to include its bilateral transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the transaction are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market in order to complete any such scheduled bilateral transaction. Scheduling of bilateral transactions shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following requirements:

i) Internal Market Buyers shall submit schedules for all bilateral purchases for delivery within the PJM Region, whether from generation resources inside or outside the PJM Region;

ii) Market Sellers shall submit schedules for bilateral sales to entities outside the PJM Region from generation within the PJM Region that is not dynamically scheduled to such entities pursuant to Section 1.12; and

iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for bilateral transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of each scheduled bilateral transaction from each other party to the transaction in addition to the party submitting the schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(d) Market Sellers wishing to sell into the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy (including energy from hydropower units), demand reductions, Regulation, Operating Reserves or other services for the following Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. The submission of offers for resource increments that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that have not cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region. The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each hour in the offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) If based on energy from a specific generating unit, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such unit on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day; and

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of \$1,000/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the megawatt of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.5 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the offer in dollars per MWh, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed \$100 per MWh in the case of Regulation offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

- i. The costs (in \$/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the heat rate increase resulting from operating a unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation;
- ii. The cost increase (in \$/MW) in variable operating and maintenance costs resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation; and
- iii. An adder of up to \$12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with start-up and no-load fees, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours.

(g) Each offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM Open Access Same-time Information System the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Increment Bids and/or Decrement Bids that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such bids must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount, location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of 3000 bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Bid or Decrement Bid.

(j) A Market Seller that wishes to make a generation resource or Demand Resource available to sell Synchronized Reserve shall submit an offer for Synchronized Reserve that shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.5 megawatts, the price of the offer in dollars per megawatt hour, and such other information

specified by the Office of Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the energy used by the generation resource to provide the Synchronized Reserve and the generation resource's unit specific opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed the variable operating and maintenance costs for providing Synchronized Reserve plus seven dollars and fifty cents.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the Interconnection. The offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, and the offer shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, start-up costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs).

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied or offered and cleared in the Base Residual Auction or one of the Incremental Auctions, or owning or controlling the output of an ILR resource which was certified as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Demand Resource or ILR resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for resource increments that have not cleared in the Base Residual Auction or in one of the Incremental Auctions, or for ILR resources that were not certified, or were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program to be included in such bids. A Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity plan, self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program, provided however, that in the event of an Emergency, PJM shall require Demand Resources and ILR resources to reduce load notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) Market Sellers that wish to make Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources available to sell Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves shall submit offers, each of which must equal or exceed 0.5 megawatts, in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market specifying: 1) the price of the offer in dollars per megawatt hour; and 2) such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to determine any relevant opportunity costs for the resource(s). The foregoing notwithstanding, to qualify to submit offers pursuant to this section, the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit energy offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market including start-up and shut-down costs for generation resource and Demand Resources, respectively, and all generation resources that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide that service. The MW quantity of Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide in a given hour will be

determined based on the energy Offer Data submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as detailed in the PJM Manuals.

### **1.10.2 Pool-Scheduled Resources.**

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to Sections 1.10.9 or 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, start-up, no-load and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A.

(b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.

(c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.

(d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for start-up and no-load fees, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Section 3 of this Schedule 1. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of start-up and no-load fees, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource's start-up cost, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.

(e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce

demand in the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

### **1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.**

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

- (a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.
- (b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled, or otherwise not following the dispatch orders of the Office of the Interconnection, shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.
- (c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.
- (d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

### **1.10.4 Capacity Resources.**

- (a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.
- (b) Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the



Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

(c) A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for start-up or no-load fees.

#### **1.10.5 External Resources.**

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of dynamic dispatch shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller's Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data. If a Market Seller submits more than one offer on an aggregated resource basis, the withdrawal of any such offer shall be deemed a withdrawal of all higher priced offers for the same period.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

#### **1.10.6 External Market Buyers.**

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to dynamic dispatch by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the load bus or busses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market Buyer's load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged or credited at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing load bus or busses.

(b) An External Market Buyer's hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

#### **1.10.6A Transmission Loading Relief Customers.**

(a) An entity that desires to elect to pay Transmission Congestion Charges in order to continue its energy schedules during an Operating Day over contract paths outside the PJM Region in the event that PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief that otherwise would cause PJM to request security coordinators to curtail such Member's energy schedules shall:

(i) enter its election on OASIS by 12:00 p.m. of the day before the Operating Day, in accordance with procedures established by PJM, which election shall be applicable for the entire Operating Day; and

(ii) if PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief, provide to PJM, at such time and in accordance with procedures established by PJM, the hourly integrated energy schedules that impacted the PJM Region (as indicated from the NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator) during the Transmission Loading Relief.

(b) If an entity has made the election specified in Section (a), then PJM shall not request security coordinators to curtail such entity's energy transactions, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

(c) In order to make elections under this Section 1.10.6A, an entity must (i) have met the creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection or provided a letter of credit or other form of security acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection, and (ii) have executed either the Agreement, a Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, or other agreement committing to pay all Transmission Congestion Charges incurred under this Section.

#### **1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.**

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

### 1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection's forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand loads they serve; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) Not later than 4:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, or such earlier deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in Section 1.10.8(b), the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM Open Access Same-time Information System at times specified in the PJM Manuals a revised forecast of the location and duration of any expected transmission congestion, and of the range of differences in Locational Marginal Prices between major subareas of the PJM Region expected to result from such transmission congestion.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJM Settlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJM Settlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Section 3.3A of this Schedule.

(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, Ancillary Services Markets or Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and Day-ahead Energy Market.

After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and the Day-ahead Energy Market. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets, Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Section 18.17.1 of the PJM Operating Agreement, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants' non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

#### **1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.**

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, a generation rebidding period shall exist from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for any generation resource

that was not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Adjustments to Day-ahead Energy Markets shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 10:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows:

i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or

iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or

iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any start-up fee.

(c) With respect to a pool-scheduled resource that is included in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller may not change or otherwise modify its offer to sell energy.

(d) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(e) For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this Section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

*OATT OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF - OATT VI. ADMINISTRATION AND STUDY OF NEW SERVICE R - OATT ATTACHMENT K – APPENDIX - OATT 2. CALCULATION OF LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES - OATT 2.5 Calculation of Real-time Prices.*

**2.5 Calculation of Real-time Prices.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the least costly means of obtaining energy to serve the next increment of load (taking account of any applicable and available load reductions indicated on PRD Curves properly submitted by any PRD Provider) at each bus in the PJM Region represented in the State Estimator and each Interface Pricing Point between PJM and an adjacent Control Area, based on the system conditions described by the most recent power flow solution produced by the State Estimator program and the energy offers that are the basis for the Day-ahead Energy Market, or that are determined to be eligible for consideration under Section 2.4 in connection with the real-time dispatch, as applicable. This calculation shall be made by applying an incremental linear optimization method to minimize energy costs, given actual system conditions, a set of energy offers, and any binding transmission constraints that may exist. In performing this calculation, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the cost of serving an increment of load at each bus from each resource associated with an eligible energy offer as the sum of the following components of Locational Marginal Price: (1) System Energy Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a generation resource or decrease an increment of energy being consumed by a Demand Resource, (2) Congestion Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from the resource on transmission line loadings, and (3) Loss Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission losses. The energy offer or offers that can serve an increment of load at a bus at the lowest cost, calculated in this manner, shall determine the Real-time Price at that bus.

(b) During the Operating Day, the calculation set forth in (a) shall be performed every five minutes, using the Office of the Interconnection's Locational Marginal Price program, producing a set of Real-time Prices based on system conditions during the preceding interval. The prices produced at five-minute intervals during an hour will be integrated to determine the Real-time Prices for that hour.

**OATT OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF - OATT VI. ADMINISTRATION AND STUDY OF NEW SERVICE R - OATT ATTACHMENT K – APPENDIX - OATT 2. CALCULATION OF LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES - OATT 2.6 Calculation of Day-ahead Prices.**

**2.6 Calculation of Day-ahead Prices.**

For the Day-ahead Energy Market, day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices shall be determined on the basis of the least-cost, security-constrained dispatch, model flows and system conditions resulting from the load specifications (including PRD Curves properly submitted by Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand loads that they serve), offers for generation, dispatchable load, Increment Bids, Decrement Bids, offers for demand reductions, and bilateral transactions submitted to the Office of the Interconnection and scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such prices shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Section applicable to the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall be the basis for purchases and sales of energy and Transmission Congestion Charges resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market. This calculation shall be made for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market by applying a linear optimization method to minimize energy costs, given scheduled system conditions, scheduled transmission outages, and any transmission limitations that may exist. In performing this calculation, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the cost of serving an increment of load at each bus from each resource associated with an eligible energy offer as the sum of the following components of Locational Marginal Price: (1) System Energy Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a resource, (2) Congestion Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from the resource on transmission line loadings, and (3) Loss Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line losses. The energy offeror offers that can serve an increment of load at a bus at the lowest cost, calculated in this manner, shall determine the Day-ahead Price at that bus.

***OATT OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF - OATT VI. ADMINISTRATION AND STUDY OF NEW SERVICE R - OATT ATTACHMENT K – APPENDIX - OATT 3. ACCOUNTING AND BILLING - OATT 3.2 Market Buyers***

**3.2 Market Buyers.**

**3.2.1 Spot Market Energy Charges.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule

(b) Market Buyers shall be charged for all load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served from the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price .

(c) Generating Market Buyers shall be paid for all energy scheduled to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(d) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of net hourly PJM Interchange for each Market Buyer, including Generating Market Buyers, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. For Internal Market Buyers that are Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall include determination of the net energy flows from: (i) tie lines; (ii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by the Market Buyer but delivered to it over another entity's Transmission Facilities; (iii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by another entity but which is directly interconnected with the Market Buyer's transmission system; (iv) deliveries pursuant to bilateral energy sales; (v) receipts pursuant to bilateral energy purchases; and (vi) an adjustment to account for the day-ahead PJM Interchange, calculated as the difference between scheduled withdrawals and injections by that Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market. For External Market Buyers and Internal Market Buyers that are not Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall determine the energy scheduled hourly for delivery to the Market Buyer net of the amounts scheduled by the External Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) An Internal Market Buyer shall be charged for Spot Market Energy purchases to the extent of its hourly net purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. An External Market Buyer shall be charged for its Spot Market Energy purchases based on the energy delivered to it, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total charge shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Imports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Buyer.

(f) A Generating Market Buyer shall be paid as a Market Seller for sales of Spot Market Energy to the extent of its hourly net sales into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total payment shall be determined by the



product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Exports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Seller.

### **3.2.2 Regulation.**

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation shall be charged for Regulation dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (c) of this section, plus the amounts, if any, described in subsection (f) of this section.

(b) A Generating Market Buyer supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection in excess of its hourly Regulation obligation shall be credited for each increment of such Regulation at the higher of (i) the Regulation market-clearing price in such Regulation Zone or (ii) the sum of the regulation offer and the unit-specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Regulation, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined at a time to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection which shall be no earlier than the day before the Operating Day. The market-clearing price for each regulating hour shall be equal to the highest sum of a resource's Regulation offer plus its estimated unit-specific opportunity costs, determined as described in subsection (d) below from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.3.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.

(d) In determining the Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour shall be equal to the sum of the unit-specific opportunity costs (i) incurred during the hour in which the obligation is fulfilled, plus costs (ii) associated with uneconomic operation during the hour preceding the initial regulating hour ("preceding shoulder hour"), plus costs (iii) associated with uneconomic operation during the hour after the final regulating hour ("following shoulder hour").

The unit-specific opportunity costs incurred during the hour in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the

generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the preceding shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (a) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output during the preceding shoulder hour, times (b) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource during the preceding shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (c) the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the following shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (a) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in the following shoulder hour, times (b) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the following shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (c) the percentage of the following shoulder hour that the deviation was incurred.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Generating Market Buyer selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and for the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour and the following shoulder hour during which the Generating Market Buyer or Market Seller provided Regulation. The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the hour in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the preceding shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the lesser of the resource's actual or expected output in the preceding shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a lower output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, or, the higher of the resource's actual or expected output in the preceding shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a higher output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the preceding shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the following shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the lesser of the resource's actual or expected output in the following shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a lower output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, or, the higher of the resource's actual or expected output in the following shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a higher output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the following shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the following shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Internal Market Buyer in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

### **3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.**

#### **3.2.2A.1 Applicability.**

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the

three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

(i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region for which the cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).

(ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

### **3.2.3 Operating Reserves.**

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller. The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT

Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7 and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection and that is not committed solely for the purpose of providing Synchronized Reserve: For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy as determined by the Real-time Energy Market and the real-time

LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) plus the resource's opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3.B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each period the unit operates in condensing and generation mode for one or more contiguous hours.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to  $\{(LMP_{DMW} - AG) \times (URTLMP - UB)\}$ , where:

LMP<sub>DMW</sub> equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where  $URTLMP - UB$  shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i)  $\{(URTLMP - UDALMP) \times DAG\}$ , or (ii)  $\{(URTLMP - UB) \times DAG\}$  where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where  $URTLMP - UDALMP$  and  $URTLMP - UB$  shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2A(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific



circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d) such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its ~~(#1)~~ load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, except as noted in subsection (h)(5) below and in the PJM Manuals; ~~(#2)~~ generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; ~~(#3)~~ deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (iv) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Regions, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at interfaces and hubs shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the busses that define all interfaces or all hubs are located in the region. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by busses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

(4) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.

(5) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of an Operating Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for load reductions in real-time in order to avoid an Operating Reserve shortage as described in this Schedule, Section 6A, Scarcity Pricing.

(6) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each Control Zone of the PJM Region based on the Control Zone to which the resource was synchronized to provide synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such Control Zone pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a

Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared (“Maximum Generation Emergency Alert”); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as “MaxGen Conditions”). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the hours that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the hours that the offer is economic. The hours that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the hours that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the hours in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any hours required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours

shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource’s day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

(i) real-time economic minimum  $\leq$  105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

(ii) real-time economic maximum  $\geq$  95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\text{Ramp\_Request}_t = \frac{(\text{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1})}{(\text{UDSLAtime}_{t-1})}$$

$$\text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \left( \text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \right)$$

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit’s output at case solution time

3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL\_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is  $\leq 10$ , or its hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is  $\leq 20\%$ , balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time Mwh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is  $> 20\%$ , balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh and Day-Ahead MWh.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

(i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve

requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

(C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.

(ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

(A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton ATSI transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

### **3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.**

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Synchronized Reserve Zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Synchronized Reserve Zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, plus the amounts if any, described in subsections (g), (h) and (i) of this section.

(b) A Generating Market Buyer supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:



i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation units that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event (“Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price.

ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions (“Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a synchronized Reserve Event initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is the average of the five-minute Locational Marginal Prices calculated during the Synchronized Reserve Event plus an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Synchronized Reserve Zone by the Office of the Interconnection prior to the operating hour and such market-clearing price shall be equal to, from among the generation resources or Demand Resources selected to provide Synchronized Reserve for such Synchronized Reserve Zone, the highest sum of either (i) a generation resource’s Synchronized Reserve offer and opportunity cost or (ii) a demand response resource’s Synchronized Reserve offer.

(e) In determining the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource times (B) the megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource’s expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (B) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the

resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Generating Market Buyer selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource, and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Seller in excess of that Market Seller's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the remainder of the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Seller's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during an hour than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that hour due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled by the owner to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Synchronized Reserve in response to an actual Synchronized Reserve Event, the owner of the resource shall incur an additional Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the amount of the shortfall for a period of three consecutive days with the same peak classification (on-peak or off-peak) as the day of

the Synchronized Reserve Event at least three business days following the Synchronized Reserve Event. The overall Synchronized Reserve requirement for each Synchronized Reserve Zone of the PJM Region on which the Synchronized Reserve Obligations, except for the additional obligations set forth in this section, are based shall be reduced by the amount of this shortfall for the applicable three-day period.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l) is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

#### **3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the

PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the MW obligation in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.

(c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

(i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

(ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shut-down times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.

(iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if,

at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The cost of credits allocated to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources pursuant to this section shall be charged to Load-Serving Entities in the PJM Region based on load ratio share (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero), provided that a Load-Serving Entity may satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation, which is equal to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the Load-Serving Entity's load ratio share for the PJM Region, through one or any combination of the following: 1) the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market; 2) and bilateral arrangements. The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve charges allocated pursuant to this section shall reflect any portion of a Load-Serving Entity's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation that is met by bilateral arrangement(s).

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

### **3.2.3B Reactive Services.**

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit hourly in an amount equal to  $\{(LMP_{DMW} - AG) \times (URTLMP - UB)\}$

where:

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URLMPP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where  $URLMPP - UB$  shall not be negative.

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i)  $\{(URLMPP - UDALMP) \times DAG\}$ , or (ii)  $\{(URLMPP - UB) \times DAG\}$  where:

URLMPP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the

cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where  $URTLMP - UDALMP$  and  $URTLMP - UB$  shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to  $\{(AG - LMPDMW) \times (UB - URTLMP)\}$  where:

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where  $UB - URTLMP$  shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2A(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the

Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to paragraph (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating



Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

### **3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.**

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same

requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to section (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

#### **3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.**

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

#### **3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.**

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

### **3.2.6 Emergency Energy.**

(a) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each hour of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(b) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each hour of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(c) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of hourly energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each hour of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

### **3.2.7 Billing.**

(a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Buyer in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Buyer. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Buyer's internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Buyer that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Buyer, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Buyer and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

**ATTACHMENT Q**

**PJM CREDIT POLICY**

**POLICY STATEMENT:**

It is the policy of PJM Interconnection, LLC (“PJM”) that prior to an entity participating in the PJM Markets, or in order to take Transmission Service, the entity must demonstrate its ability to meet PJMSettlement’s credit requirements.

Prior to becoming a Market Participant, Transmission Customer, and/or Member of PJM, PJMSettlement must accept and approve a Credit Application (including Credit Agreement) from such entity and establish a Working Credit Limit with PJMSettlement. PJMSettlement shall approve or deny an accepted Credit Application on the basis of a complete credit evaluation including, but not be limited to, a review of financial statements, rating agency reports, and other pertinent indicators of credit strength.

**POLICY INTENT:**

This credit policy describes requirements for: (1) the establishment and maintenance of credit by Market Participants, Transmission Customers, and entities seeking either such status (collectively “Participants”), pursuant to one or more of the Agreements, and (2) forms of security that will be deemed acceptable (hereinafter the “Financial Security”) in the event that the Participant does not satisfy the financial or other requirements to establish Unsecured Credit.

This policy also sets forth the credit limitations that will be imposed on Participants in order to minimize the possibility of failure of payment for services rendered pursuant to the Agreements, and conditions that will be considered an event of default pursuant to this policy and the Agreements.

These credit rules may establish certain set-asides of credit for designated purposes (such as for FTR or RPM activity). Such set-asides shall be construed to be applicable to calculation of credit requirements only, and shall not restrict PJMSettlement’s ability to apply such designated credit to any obligation(s) in case of a default.

PJMSettlement may post on PJM's web site, and may reference on OASIS, a supplementary document which contains additional business practices (such as algorithms for credit scoring) that are not included in this document. Changes to the supplementary document will be subject to stakeholder review and comment prior to implementation. PJMSettlement will notify any individual Participant that will have its Unsecured Credit Allowance reduced by 25% or more, or its Financial Security requirement increased by 25% or more by such change. PJMSettlement may specify a required compliance date, not less than 15 days from notification, by which time all Participants must comply with provisions that have been revised in the supplementary document.

## **APPLICABILITY:**

This policy applies to all Participants.

## **IMPLEMENTATION:**

### **I. CREDIT EVALUATION**

Each Participant will be subject to a complete credit evaluation in order for PJMSettlement to determine creditworthiness and to establish an **Unsecured Credit Allowance**, if applicable; provided, however, that a Participant need not provide the information specified in section I.A or I.B if it notifies PJMSettlement in writing that it does not seek any Unsecured Credit Allowance. PJMSettlement will identify any necessary Financial Security requirements and establish a Working Credit Limit for each Participant. In addition, PJMSettlement will perform follow-up credit evaluations on at least an annual basis.

If a **Corporate Guaranty** is being utilized to establish credit for a Participant, the guarantor will be evaluated and the Unsecured Credit Allowance or Financial Security requirement will be based on the financial strength of the Guarantor.

PJMSettlement will provide a Participant, upon request, with a written explanation for any change in credit levels or collateral requirements. PJMSettlement will provide such explanation within ten Business Days.

If a Participant believes that either its level of unsecured credit or its collateral requirement has been incorrectly determined, according to this credit policy, then the Participant may send a request for reconsideration in writing to PJMSettlement. Such a request should include:

- A citation to the applicable section(s) of the PJMSettlement credit policy along with an explanation of how the respective provisions of the credit policy were not carried out in the determination as made
- A calculation of what the Participant believes should be the correct credit level or collateral requirement, according to terms of the credit policy

PJMSettlement will reconsider the determination and will provide a written response as promptly as practical, but no longer than ten Business Days of receipt of the request. If the Participant still feels that the determination is incorrect, then the Participant may contest that determination. Such contest should be in written form, addressed to PJMSettlement, and should contain:

- ◆ A complete copy of the Participant's earlier request for reconsideration, including citations and calculations
- ◆ A copy of PJMSettlement's written response to its request for reconsideration

- ◆ An explanation of why it believes that the determination still does not comply with the credit policy

PJMSettlement will investigate and will respond to the Participant with a final determination on the matter as promptly as practical, but no longer than 20 Business Days.

Neither requesting reconsideration nor contesting the determination following such request shall relieve or delay Participant's responsibility to comply with all provisions of this credit policy.

#### **A. Initial Credit Evaluation**

In completing the initial credit evaluation, PJMSettlement will consider:

##### **1) Rating Agency Reports**

In evaluating credit strength, PJMSettlement will review rating agency reports from Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service, Fitch Ratings, or other nationally known rating agencies. The focus of the review will be on senior unsecured debt ratings; however, PJMSettlement will consider other ratings if senior unsecured debt ratings are not available.

##### **2) Financial Statements and Related Information**

Each Participant must submit with its application audited financial statements for the most recent fiscal quarter, as well as the most recent three fiscal years, or the period of existence of the Participant, if shorter. All financial and related information considered for a Credit Score must be audited by an outside entity, and must be accompanied by an unqualified audit letter acceptable to PJMSettlement.

The information should include, but not be limited to, the following:

- a. If publicly traded:
  - i. Annual and quarterly reports on Form 10-K and Form 10-Q, respectively.
  - ii. Form 8-K reports disclosing Material changes, if any.
- b. If privately held:
  - i. Management's Discussion & Analysis
  - ii. Report of Independent Accountants
  - iii. Financial Statements, including:
    - Balance Sheet
    - Income Statement
    - Statement of Cash Flows
    - Statement of Stockholder's Equity
  - iv. Notes to Financial Statements

If the above information is available on the Internet, the Participant may provide a letter stating where such statements may be located and retrieved by PJMSettlement. For certain Participants, some of the above financial submittals may not be applicable, and alternate requirements may be specified by PJMSettlement.

In its credit evaluation of Cooperatives and Municipalities, PJMSettlement may request additional information as part of the overall financial review process and may also consider qualitative factors in determining financial strength and creditworthiness. For Cooperatives and Municipalities, PJMSettlement will consider qualitative factors such as the following in its credit evaluation: taxing authority, independent ratemaking authority, financial strength of members that have contractual commitments to pay a cooperative's expenses, and other measures of size besides Tangible Net Worth.

### **3) References**

PJMSettlement may request Participants to provide with their applications at least one (1) bank and three (3) utility credit references. In the case where a Participant does not have the required utility references, trade payable vendor references may be substituted.

### **4) Litigation, Commitments and Contingencies**

Each Participant is also required to provide with its application information as to any known Material litigation, commitments or contingencies as well as any prior bankruptcy declarations or Material defalcations by the Participant or its predecessors, subsidiaries or Affiliates, if any. These disclosures shall be made upon application, upon initiation or change, and at least annually thereafter, or as requested by PJMSettlement.

### **5) Other Disclosures**

Each Participant is required to disclose any Affiliates that are currently Members of PJMSettlement or are applying for membership with PJMSettlement. Each Participant is also required to disclose the existence of any ongoing investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), or any other governing, regulatory, or standards body. These disclosures shall be made upon application, upon initiation or change, and at least annually thereafter, or as requested by PJMSettlement.

## **B. Ongoing Credit Evaluation**

On at least an annual basis, PJMSettlement will perform follow-up credit evaluations on all Participants. In completing the credit evaluation, PJMSettlement will consider:

### **1) Rating Agency Reports**

In evaluating credit strength, PJMSettlement will review rating agency reports from Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service, Fitch Ratings, or other nationally known rating agencies.

The focus of the review will be on senior unsecured debt ratings; however, PJMSettlement will consider other ratings if senior unsecured debt ratings are not available.

## **2) Financial Statements and Related Information**

Each Participant must submit audited annual financial statements as soon as they become available and no later than 120 days after fiscal year end. Each Participant is also required to provide PJMSettlement with quarterly financial statements promptly upon their issuance, but no later than 60 days after the end of each quarter. All financial and related information considered for a Credit Score must be audited by an outside entity, and must be accompanied by an unqualified audit letter acceptable to PJMSettlement. If financial statements are not provided within the timeframe required, the Participant may not be granted an Unsecured Credit Allowance.

The information should include, but not be limited to, the following:

- a. If publicly traded:
  - i. Annual and quarterly reports on Form 10-K and Form 10-Q, respectively.
  - ii. Form 8-K reports disclosing Material changes, if any, immediately upon issuance.
- b. If privately held:
  - i. Management's Discussion & Analysis
  - ii. Report of Independent Accountants
  - iii. Financial Statements, including:
    - Balance Sheet
    - Income Statement
    - Statement of Cash Flows
    - Statement of Stockholder's Equity
  - iv. Notes to Financial Statements

If the above information is available on the Internet, the Participant may provide a letter stating where such statements may be located and retrieved by PJMSettlement. For certain Participants, some of the above financial submittals may not be applicable, and alternate requirements may be specified by PJMSettlement.

In its credit evaluation of Cooperatives and Municipalities, PJMSettlement may request additional information as part of the overall financial review process and may also consider qualitative factors in determining financial strength and creditworthiness. For Cooperatives and Municipalities, PJMSettlement will consider qualitative factors such as the following in its credit evaluation: taxing authority, independent ratemaking authority, financial strength of members that have contractual commitments to pay a cooperative's expenses, and other measures of size besides Tangible Net Worth.

## **3) Material Changes**



Each Participant is responsible for informing PJMSettlement immediately, in writing, of any Material change in its financial condition. However, PJMSettlement may also independently establish from available information that a Participant has experienced a Material change in its financial condition without regard to whether such Participant has informed PJMSettlement of the same.

For the purpose of this policy, a Material change in financial condition may include, but not be limited to, any of the following:

- a. a downgrade of any debt rating by any rating agency;
- b. being placed on a credit watch with negative implications by any rating agency;
- c. a bankruptcy filing;
- d. insolvency;
- e. a report of a quarterly or annual loss or a decline in earnings of ten percent or more compared to the prior period;
- f. restatement of prior financial statements;
- g. the resignation of key officer(s);
- h. the filing of a lawsuit that could adversely impact any current or future financial results by ten percent or more;
- i. financial default in another organized wholesale electric market futures exchange or clearing house;
- j. revocation of a license or other authority by any Federal or State regulatory agency; where such license or authority is necessary or important to the Participants continued business for example, FERC market-based rate authority, or State license to serve retail load; or
- k. a significant change in credit default spreads, market capitalization, or other market-based risk measurement criteria, such as a recent increase in Moody's KMV Expected Default Frequency (EDF<sup>tm</sup>) that is noticeably greater than the increase in its peers' EDF<sup>tm</sup> rates, or a collateral default swap (CDS) premium normally associated with an entity rated lower than investment grade.

If PJMSettlement determines that a Material change in the financial condition of the Participant has occurred, it may require the Participant to provide Financial Security within two Business Days, in an amount and form approved by PJMSettlement. If the Participant fails to provide the required Financial Security, the Participant shall be in default under this credit policy.

In the event that PJMSettlement determines that a Material change in the financial condition of a Participant warrants a requirement to provide Financial Security, PJMSettlement shall provide the Participant with a written explanation of why such determination was made. However, under no circumstances shall the requirement that a Participant provide the requisite Financial Security be deferred pending the issuance of such written explanation.

#### **4) Litigation, Commitments, and Contingencies**

Each Participant is also required to provide information as to any known Material litigation, commitments or contingencies as well as any prior bankruptcy declarations or Material

defalcations by the Participant or its predecessors, subsidiaries or Affiliates, if any. These disclosures shall be made upon initiation or change or as requested by PJMSettlement.

#### **5) Other Disclosures**

Each Participant is required to disclose any Affiliates that are currently Members of PJM or are applying for membership within PJM. Each Participant is also required to disclose the existence of any ongoing investigations by the SEC, FERC, CFTC or any other governing, regulatory, or standards body. These disclosures shall be made upon initiation or change, or as requested by PJMSettlement.

#### **C. Corporate Guaranty**

If a Corporate Guaranty is being utilized to establish credit for a Participant, the Guarantor will be evaluated and the Unsecured Credit Allowance or Financial Security requirement will be based on the financial strength of the Guarantor.

An irrevocable and unconditional Corporate Guaranty may be utilized as part of the credit evaluation process, but will not be considered a form of Financial Security. The Corporate Guaranty will be considered a transfer of credit from the Guarantor to the Participant. The Corporate Guaranty must guarantee the (i) full and prompt payment of all amounts payable by the Participant under the Agreements, and (ii) performance by the Participant under this policy.

The Corporate Guaranty should clearly state the identities of the “Guarantor,” “Beneficiary” (PJMSettlement) and “Obligor” (Participant). The Corporate Guaranty must be signed by an officer of the Guarantor, and must demonstrate that it is duly authorized in a manner acceptable to PJMSettlement. Such demonstration may include either a Corporate Seal on the Guaranty itself, or an accompanying executed and sealed Secretary’s Certificate noting that the Guarantor was duly authorized to provide such Corporate Guaranty and that the person signing the Corporate Guaranty is duly authorized, or other manner acceptable to PJMSettlement.

A Participant supplying a Corporate Guaranty must provide the same information regarding the Guarantor as is required in the “Initial Credit Evaluation” §I.A. and the “Ongoing Evaluation” §I.B. of this policy, including providing the Rating Agency Reports, Financial Statements and Related Information, References, Litigation Commitments and Contingencies, and Other Disclosures. A Participant supplying a Foreign or Canadian Guaranty must also satisfy the requirements of §I.C.1 or §I.C.2, as appropriate.

If there is a Material change in the financial condition of the Guarantor or if the Corporate Guaranty comes within 30 days of expiring without renewal, the Participant will be required to provide Financial Security either in the form of a cash deposit or a letter of credit. Failure to provide the required Financial Security within two Business Days after request by PJMSettlement will constitute an event of default under this credit policy. A Participant may request PJMSettlement to perform a credit evaluation in order to determine creditworthiness and to establish an Unsecured Credit Allowance, if applicable. If PJMSettlement determines that a

Participant does qualify for a sufficient Unsecured Credit Allowance, then Financial Security will not be required.

The PJMSettlement Credit Application contains an acceptable form of Corporate Guaranty that should be utilized by a Participant choosing to establish its credit with a Corporate Guaranty. If the Corporate Guaranty varies in any way from the PJMSettlement format, it must first be reviewed and approved by PJMSettlement. All costs associated with obtaining and maintaining a Corporate Guaranty and meeting the policy provisions are the responsibility of the Participant.

**1) Foreign Guaranties**

A Foreign Guaranty is a Corporate Guaranty that is provided by an Affiliate entity that is domiciled in a country other than the United States or Canada. The entity providing a Foreign Guaranty on behalf of a Participant is a Foreign Guarantor. A Participant may provide a Foreign Guaranty in satisfaction of part of its credit obligations or voluntary credit provision at PJMSettlement provided that all of the following conditions are met:

PJMSettlement reserves the right to deny, reject, or terminate acceptance of any Foreign Guaranty at any time, including for material adverse circumstances or occurrences.

- a. A Foreign Guaranty:
  - i. Must contain provisions equivalent to those contained in PJMSettlement’s standard form of Foreign Guaranty with any modifications subject to review and approval by PJMSettlement counsel.
  - ii. Must be denominated in US currency.
  - iii. Must be written and executed solely in English, including any duplicate originals.
  - iv. Will not be accepted towards a Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance for more than the following limits, depending on the Foreign Guarantor’s credit rating:

Rating of Foreign Guarantor	Maximum Accepted Guaranty if Country Rating is AAA	Maximum Accepted Guaranty if Country Rating is AA+
A- and above	USD50,000,000	USD30,000,000
BBB+	USD30,000,000	USD20,000,000
BBB	USD10,000,000	USD10,000,000
BBB- or below	USD 0	USD 0

- v. May not exceed 50% of the Participant’s total credit, if the Foreign Grantor is rated less than BBB+.

- b. A Foreign Guarantor:

- i. Must satisfy all provisions of the PJM credit policy applicable to domestic Guarantors.
- ii. Must be an Affiliate of the Participant.
- iii. Must maintain an agent for acceptance of service of process in the United States; such agent shall be situated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, absent legal constraint.
- iv. Must be rated by at least one Rating Agency acceptable to PJMSettlement; the credit strength of a Foreign Guarantor may not be determined based on an evaluation of its financials without an actual credit rating as well.
- v. Must have a Senior Unsecured (or equivalent, in PJMSettlement's sole discretion) rating of BBB (one notch above BBB-) or greater by any and all agencies that provide rating coverage of the entity.
- vi. Must provide financials in GAAP format or other format acceptable to PJMSettlement with clear representation of net worth, intangible assets, and any other information PJMSettlement may require in order to determine the entity's Unsecured Credit Allowance
- vii. Must provide a Secretary's Certificate certifying the adoption of Corporate Resolutions:
  - 1. Authorizing and approving the Guaranty; and
  - 2. Authorizing the Officers to execute and deliver the Guaranty on behalf of the Guarantor.
- viii. Must be domiciled in a country with a minimum long-term sovereign (or equivalent) rating of AA+/Aa1, with the following conditions:
  - 1. Sovereign ratings must be available from at least two rating agencies acceptable to PJMSettlement (e.g. S&P, Moody's, Fitch, DBRS).
  - 2. Each agency's sovereign rating for the domicile will be considered to be the lowest of: country ceiling, senior unsecured government debt, long-term foreign currency sovereign rating, long-term local currency sovereign rating, or other equivalent measures, at PJMSettlement's sole discretion.
  - 3. Whether ratings are available from two or three agencies, the lowest of the two or three will be used.
- ix. Must be domiciled in a country that recognizes and enforces judgments of US courts.
- x. Must demonstrate financial commitment to activity in the United States as evidenced by one of the following:
  - 1. American Depository Receipts (ADR) are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ.
  - 2. Equity ownership worth over USD100,000,000 in the wholly-owned or majority owned subsidiaries in the United States.
- xi. Must satisfy all other applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff and/or Operating Agreement, including this credit policy.
- xii. Must pay for all expenses incurred by PJMSettlement related to reviewing and accepting a foreign guaranty beyond nominal in-house credit and legal review.
- xiii. Must, at its own cost, provide PJMSettlement with independent legal opinion from an attorney/solicitor of PJMSettlement's choosing and licensed to practice

law in the United States and/or Guarantor's domicile, in form and substance acceptable to PJMSettlement in its sole discretion, confirming the enforceability of the Foreign Guaranty, the Guarantor's legal authorization to grant the Guaranty, the conformance of the Guaranty, Guarantor, and Guarantor's domicile to all of these requirements, and such other matters as PJMSettlement may require in its sole discretion.

## **2) Canadian Guaranties**

A Canadian Guaranty is a Corporate Guaranty that is provided by an Affiliate entity that is domiciled in Canada and satisfies all of the provisions below. The entity providing a Canadian Guaranty on behalf of a Participant is a Canadian Guarantor. A Participant may provide a Canadian Guaranty in satisfaction of part of its credit obligations or voluntary credit provision at PJMSettlement provided that all of the following conditions are met.

PJMSettlement reserves the right to deny, reject, or terminate acceptance of any Canadian Guaranty at any time for reasonable cause, including adverse material circumstances.

- a. A Canadian Guaranty:
  - i. Must contain provisions equivalent to those contained in PJMSettlement's standard form of Foreign Guaranty with any modifications subject to review and approval by PJMSettlement counsel.
  - ii. Must be denominated in US currency.
  - iii. Must be written and executed solely in English, including any duplicate originals.
  
- b. A Canadian Guarantor:
  - i. Must satisfy all provisions of the PJM credit policy applicable to domestic Guarantors.
  - ii. Must be an Affiliate of the Participant.
  - iii. Must maintain an agent for acceptance of service of process in the United States; such agent shall be situated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, absent legal constraint.
  - iv. Must be rated by at least one Rating Agency acceptable to PJMSettlement; the credit strength of a Canadian Guarantor may not be determined based on an evaluation of its financials without an actual credit rating as well.
  - v. Must provide financials in GAAP format or other format acceptable to PJMSettlement with clear representation of net worth, intangible assets, and any other information PJMSettlement may require in order to determine the entity's Unsecured Credit Allowance.
  
  - vi. Must satisfy all other applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff and/or Operating Agreement, including this Credit Policy.

### **Ia. MINIMUM PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS**

#### **A. Risk Management and Verification**

All Participants shall provide to PJMSettlement an executed copy of the annual certification set forth in Appendix 1 to this Attachment Q. This certification shall be provided before an entity is eligible to participate in the PJM Markets and shall be initially submitted to PJMSettlement together with the entity's Credit Application. Thereafter, it shall be submitted each calendar year by all Participants during a period beginning on January 1 and ending April 30, except that new Participants who became eligible to participate in PJM markets during the period of January through April shall not be required to resubmit such certification until the following calendar year. Except for certain FTR Participants (discussed below) or in cases of manifest error, PJMSettlement will accept such certifications as a matter of course and Participants will not need further notice from PJMSettlement before commencing or maintaining their eligibility to participate in PJM markets. A Participant that fails to provide its annual certification by April 30 shall be ineligible to transact in the PJM markets and PJM will disable the Participant's access to the PJM markets until such time as PJMSettlement receives the Participant's certification.

Participants acknowledge and understand that the annual certification constitutes a representation upon which PJMSettlement will rely. Such representation is additionally made under the PJM Tariff, filed with and accepted by FERC, and any inaccurate or incomplete statement may subject the Participant to action by FERC. Failure to comply with any of the criteria or requirements listed herein or in the certification may result in suspension of a Participant's transaction rights in the PJM markets.

Certain FTR Participants (those providing representations found in paragraph 3.b of the annual certification set forth in Appendix 1 to this Attachment Q) are additionally required to submit to PJMSettlement (at the time they make their annual certification) a copy of their current governing risk control policies, procedures and controls applicable to their FTR trading activities. PJMSettlement will review such documentation to verify that it appears generally to conform to prudent risk management practices for entities trading in FTR-type markets. If principles or best practices relating to risk management in FTR-type markets are published, as may be modified from time to time, by a third-party industry association, such as the Committee of Chief Risk Officers, PJMSettlement will apply such principles or best practices in determining the fundamental sufficiency of the FTR Participant's risk controls. Those FTR Participants subject to this provision shall make a one-time payment of \$1,000.00 to PJMSettlement to cover costs associated with review and verification. Thereafter, if such FTR Participant's risk policies, procedures and controls applicable to its FTR trading activities change substantively, it shall submit such modified documentation, without charge, to PJMSettlement for review and verification at the time it makes its annual certification. Such FTR Participant's eligibility to participate in the PJM FTR markets is conditioned on PJMSettlement notifying such FTR Participant that its annual certification, including the submission of its risk policies, procedures and controls, has been accepted by PJMSettlement. PJMSettlement may retain outside expertise to perform the review and verification function described in this paragraph, however, in all circumstances, PJMSettlement and any third-party it may retain will treat as confidential the documentation provided by an FTR Participant under this paragraph, consistent with the applicable provisions of PJM's Operating Agreement.

An FTR Participant that makes the representation in paragraph 3.a of the annual certification understand that PJMSettlement, given the visibility it has over a Participant's overall market activity in performing billing and settlement functions, may at any time request the FTR Participant provide additional information demonstrating that it is in fact eligible to make the representation in paragraph 3.a of the annual certification. If such additional information is not provided or does not, in PJMSettlement's judgment, demonstrate eligibility to make the representation in paragraph 3.a of the annual certification, PJMSettlement will require the FTR Participant to instead make the representations required in paragraph 3.b of the annual certification, including representing that it has submitted a copy of its current governing risk control policies, procedures and controls applicable to its FTR trading activities. If the FTR Participant cannot or does not make those representations as required in paragraph 3.b of the annual certification, then PJM will terminate the FTR Participant's rights to purchase FTRs in the FTR market and may terminate the FTR Participant's rights to sell FTRs in the PJM FTR market.

Participants are solely responsible for the positions they take and the obligations they assume in PJM markets. PJMSettlement hereby disclaims any and all responsibility to any Participant or PJM Member associated with Participant's submitting or failure to submit its annual certification or PJMSettlement's review and verification of an FTR Participant's risk policies, procedures and controls. Such review and verification is limited to demonstrating basic compliance by an FTR Participant with the representation it makes under paragraph 3.b of its annual certification showing the existence of written policies, procedures and controls to limit its risk in PJM's FTR markets and does not constitute an endorsement of the efficacy of such policies, procedures or controls.

## **B. Capitalization**

In addition to the Annual Certification requirements in Appendix 1 to this Attachment Q, a Participant must demonstrate that it meets the minimum financial requirements appropriate for the PJM market(s) in which it transacts by satisfying either the Minimum Capitalization or the Provision of Collateral requirements listed below:

### **1. Minimum Capitalization**

FTR Participants must demonstrate a tangible net worth in excess of \$1 million or tangible assets in excess of \$10 million. Other Participants must demonstrate a tangible net worth in excess of \$500,000 or tangible assets in excess of \$5 million.

- a. In either case, consideration of "tangible" assets and net worth shall exclude assets (net of any matching liabilities, assuming the result is a positive value) which PJMSettlement reasonably believes to be restricted, highly risky, or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of default. Examples include, but are not limited to, restricted assets and Affiliate assets, derivative assets, goodwill, and other intangible assets.

b. Demonstration of “tangible” assets and net worth may be satisfied through presentation of an acceptable Corporate Guaranty, provided that both:

(i) the guarantor is an affiliate company that satisfies the tangible net worth or tangible assets requirements herein, and;

(ii) the Corporate Guaranty is either unlimited or at least \$500,000.

If the Corporate Guaranty presented by the Participant to satisfy these Capitalization requirements is limited in value, then the Participant’s resulting Unsecured Credit Allowance shall be the lesser of:

(1) the applicable Unsecured Credit Allowance available to the Participant by the Corporate Guaranty pursuant to the creditworthiness provisions of this Credit Policy, or:

(2) the face value of the Corporate Guaranty, reduced by \$500,000 and further reduced by 10%. (For example, a \$10.5 million Corporate Guaranty would be reduced first by \$500,000 to \$10 million and then further reduced 10% more to \$9 million. The resulting \$9 million would be the Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance available through the Corporate Guaranty).

In the event that a Participant provides collateral in addition to a limited Corporate Guaranty to increase its available credit, the value of such collateral shall be reduced by 10%. This reduced value shall be deemed Financial Security and available to satisfy the requirements of this Credit Policy.

Demonstrations of capitalization must be presented in the form of audited financial statements for the Participant’s most recent fiscal year.

## 2. Provision of Collateral

If a Participant does not demonstrate compliance with its applicable Minimum Capitalization Requirements above, it may still qualify to participate in PJM’s markets by posting additional collateral, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein.

Any collateral provided by a Participant unable to satisfy the Minimum Capitalization Requirements above will be restricted in the following manner:

- i. Collateral provided by FTR Participants shall be reduced by \$500,000 and then further reduced by 10%. This reduced amount shall be considered



the Financial Security provided by the Participant and available to satisfy requirements of this Credit Policy.

- ii. Collateral provided by other Participants that engage in virtual bidding shall be reduced by \$200,000 and then further reduced by 10%. This reduced value shall be considered Financial Security available to satisfy requirements of this Credit Policy.
- iii. Collateral provided by other Participants that do not engage in virtual bidding shall be reduced by 10%, and this reduced value shall be considered Financial Security available to satisfy requirements of this Credit Policy.

In the event a Participant that satisfies the Minimum Participation Requirements through provision of collateral also provides a Corporate Guaranty to increase its available credit, then the Participant's resulting Unsecured Credit Allowance conveyed through such Guaranty shall be the lesser of:

- (1) the applicable Unsecured Credit Allowance available to the Participant by the Corporate Guaranty pursuant to the creditworthiness provisions of this credit policy, or,
- (2) the face value of the Guaranty, reduced by 10%.

## **II. CREDIT ALLOWANCE AND WORKING CREDIT LIMIT**

PJMSettlement's credit evaluation process will include calculating a Credit Score for each Participant. The credit score will be utilized to determine a Participant's Unsecured Credit Allowance.

Participants who do not qualify for an Unsecured Credit Allowance will be required to provide Financial Security based on their Peak Market Activity, as provided below.

A corresponding Working Credit Limit will be established based on the Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or the Financial Security provided.

Where Participant of PJM are considered Affiliates, Unsecured Credit Allowances and Working Credit Limits will be established for each individual Participant, subject to an aggregate maximum amount for all Affiliates as provided for in §II.F of this policy.

In its credit evaluation of Cooperatives and Municipalities, PJMSettlement may request additional information as part of the overall financial review process and may also consider qualitative factors in determining financial strength and creditworthiness. For Cooperatives and Municipalities, PJMSettlement will consider qualitative factors such as the following in its credit evaluation: taxing authority, independent ratemaking authority, financial strength of members that have contractual commitments to pay a cooperative's expenses, and other measures of size besides Tangible Net Worth.

**A. Credit Score**

For participants with credit ratings, a Credit Score will be assigned based on their senior unsecured credit rating and credit watch status as shown in the table below. If an explicit senior unsecured rating is not available, PJMSettlement may impute an equivalent rating from other ratings that are available. For Participants without a credit rating, but who wish to be considered for unsecured Credit, a Credit Score will be generated from PJMSettlement’s review and analysis of various factors that are predictors of financial strength and creditworthiness. Key factors in the scoring process include, financial ratios, and years in business. PJMSettlement will consistently apply the measures it uses in determining Credit Scores. The credit scoring methodology details are included in a supplementary document available on OASIS.

**Rated Entities Credit Scores**

Rating	Score	Score Modifier	
		Credit Watch Negative	Credit Watch Positive
AAA	100	-1.0	0.0
AA+	99	-1.0	0.0
AA	99	-1.0	0.0
AA-	98	-1.0	0.0
A+	97	-1.0	0.0
A	96	-2.0	0.0
A-	93	-3.0	1.0
BBB+	88	-4.0	2.0
BBB	78	-4.0	2.0
BBB-	65	-4.0	2.0
BB+ and below	0	0.0	0.0

**B. Unsecured Credit Allowance**

PJMSettlement will determine a Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance based on its Credit Score and the parameters in the table below. The maximum Unsecured Credit Allowance is the lower of:

- 1) A percentage of the Participant’s Tangible Net Worth, as stated in the table below, with the percentage based on the Participant’s credit score; and
- 2) A dollar cap based on the credit score, as stated in the table below:

<b>Credit Score</b>	<b>Tangible Net Worth Factor</b>	<b>Maximum Unsecured Credit Allowance</b> <b>(\$ Million)</b>
91-100	2.125 – 2.50%	\$50
81-90	1.708 – 2.083%	\$42
71-80	1.292 – 1.667%	\$33
61-70	0.875 – 1.25%	\$7
51-60	0.458 – 0.833%	\$0-\$2
50 and Under	0%	\$0

If a Corporate Guaranty is utilized to establish an Unsecured Credit Allowance for a Participant, the value of a Corporate Guaranty will be the lesser of:

- The limit imposed in the Corporate Guaranty;
- The Unsecured Credit Allowance calculated for the Guarantor; and
- A portion of the Unsecured Credit Allowance calculated for the Guarantor in the case of Affiliated Participants.

PJMSettlement has the right at any time to modify any Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or require additional Financial Security as may be deemed reasonably necessary to support current market activity. Failure to pay the required amount of additional Financial Security within two Business Days shall be an event of default.

PJMSettlement will maintain a posting of each Participant’s unsecured Credit Allowance, along with certain other credit related parameters, on the PJM web site in a secure, password-protected location. Such information will be updated at least weekly. Each Participant will be responsible for monitoring such information and recognizing small changes that may occur. However, in case of a reduction in Unsecured Credit Allowance of greater than 25% within a 30-day period, PJMSettlement will notify the Participant. PJMSettlement’s responsibility to notify the Participant will be satisfied if it sends an email notification to either a primary or secondary Members Committee Representative for the Participant. It is the Participant’s responsibility to ensure that such a representative exists, and that contact information is correct.

**C. Seller Credit**

Participants that have maintained a Net Sell Position for each of the prior 12 months are eligible for Seller Credit, which is an additional form of Unsecured Credit. A Participant’s Seller Credit will be equal to sixty percent of the Participant’s thirteenth smallest weekly Net Sell Position invoiced in the past 52 weeks.

Each Participant receiving Seller Credit must maintain both its Seller Credit and its Total Net Sell Position equal to or greater than the Participant’s aggregate credit requirements, less any Financial Security or other sources of credit provided.

For every participant receiving Seller Credit, PJMSettlement will maintain a forecast of the Participant's Total Net Sell Position considering the Participant's current Total Net Sell Position, recent trends in the Participant's Total Net Sell Position, and other information available to PJMSettlement, such as, but not limited to, known generator outages, changes in load responsibility, and bilateral transactions impacting the Participant. If PJMSettlement's forecast ever indicates that the Participant's Total Net Sell Position may in the future be less than the Participant's aggregate credit requirements, less any Financial Security or other sources of credit provided, then PJMSettlement may require Financial Security as needed to cover the difference. Failure to pay the required amount of additional Financial Security within two Business Days shall be an event of default.

Any Financial Security required by PJMSettlement pursuant to these provisions for Seller Credit will be returned once the requirement for such Financial Security has ended. Seller Credit may not be conveyed to another entity through use of a guaranty.

#### **D. Peak Market Activity and Financial Security Requirement**

A PJM Participant or Applicant that has an insufficient Unsecured Credit Allowance to satisfy its Peak Market Activity will be required to provide Financial Security such that its Unsecured Credit Allowance and Financial Security together are equal to its Peak Market Activity in order to secure its transactional activity in the PJM Market.

Peak Market Activity for Participants will be determined semi-annually beginning in the first complete billing week in the months of April and October. Peak Market Activity shall be the greater of the initial Peak Market Activity, as explained below, or the greatest amount invoiced for the Participant's transaction activity for all PJM markets and services, excluding FTR Net Activity, in any rolling one, two, or three week period, ending within a respective semi-annual period. However, Peak Market Activity shall not exceed the greatest amount invoiced for the Participant's transaction activity for all PJM markets and services, excluding FTR Net Activity, in any rolling one, two or three week period in the prior 52 weeks.

The initial Peak Market Activity for Applicants will be determined by PJMSettlement based on a review of an estimate of their transactional activity for all PJM markets and services, excluding FTR Net Activity, over the next 52 weeks, which the Applicant shall provide to PJMSettlement.

The initial Peak Market Activity for Participants, calculated at the beginning of each respective semi-annual period, shall be the three-week average of all non-zero invoice totals, excluding FTR Net Activity, over the previous 52 weeks. This calculation shall be performed and applied within three business days following the day the invoice is issued for the first full billing week in the current semi-annual period.

Prepayments shall not affect Peak Market Activity unless otherwise agreed to in writing pursuant to this Credit Policy.

All Peak Market Activity calculations shall take into account reductions of invoice values effectuated by early payments which are applied to reduce a Participant's Peak Market Activity as contemplated by other terms of the Credit Policy; provided that the initial Peak Market Activity shall not be less than the average value calculated using the weeks for which no early payment was made.

A Participant may reduce its Financial Security Requirement by agreeing in writing (in a form acceptable to PJMSettlement) to make additional payments, including prepayments, as and when necessary to ensure that such Participant's Total Net Obligation at no time exceeds such reduced Financial Security Requirement.

PJMSettlement may, at its discretion, adjust a Participant's Financial Security Requirement if PJMSettlement determines that the Peak Market Activity is not representative of such Participant's expected activity, as a consequence of known, measurable, and sustained changes. Such changes may include the loss (without replacement) of short-term load contracts, when such contracts had terms of three months or more and were acquired through state-sponsored retail load programs, but shall not include short-term buying and selling or virtual bidding.

PJMSettlement may waive the Financial Security Requirement for a Participant that agrees in writing that it shall not, after the date of such agreement, incur obligations under any of the Agreements. Such entity's access to all electronic transaction systems administered by PJM shall be terminated.

PJMSettlement will maintain a posting of each Participant's Financial Security Requirement on the PJM web site in a secure, password-protected location. Such information will be updated at least weekly. Each Participant will be responsible for monitoring such information and recognizing changes that may occur. However, in case of an increase in the Financial Security Requirement of greater than 25% within a 30-day period, PJMSettlement will notify the Participant. PJMSettlement's responsibility to notify the Participant will be satisfied if it sends an email notification to either a primary or secondary Members Committee Representative for the Participant. It is the Participant's responsibility to ensure that such a representative exists, and that contact information is correct. This notification does not restrict or in any way affect PJMSettlement's authority to require Financial Security under other provisions of the credit policy.

#### **E. Working Credit Limit**

PJMSettlement will establish a Working Credit Limit for each Participant against which its **Total Net Obligation** will be monitored. The Working Credit Limit is defined as 75% of the Financial Security provided to PJMSettlement and/or 75% of the Unsecured Credit Allowance determined by PJMSettlement based on a credit evaluation. A Participant's Total Net Obligation should not exceed its Working Credit Limit.

#### **F. Credit Limit Setting For Affiliates**

If two or more Participants are Affiliates and each is being granted an Unsecured Credit Allowance and a corresponding Working Credit Limit, PJMSettlement will consider the overall creditworthiness of the Affiliated Participants when determining the Unsecured Credit Allowances and Working Credit Limits in order not to grant more Unsecured Credit than the overall corporation could support.

**Example:** Participants A and B each have a \$10.0 million Corporate Guaranty from their common parent, a holding company with an Unsecured Credit Allowance calculation of \$12.0 million. PJMSettlement may limit the Unsecured Credit Allowance for each Participant to \$6.0 million, so the total Unsecured Credit Allowance does not exceed the corporate total of \$12.0 million.

PJMSettlement will work with Affiliated Participants to allocate the total Unsecured Credit Allowance among the Affiliates while assuring that no individual Participant, nor common guarantor, exceeds the Unsecured Credit Allowance appropriate for its credit strength. The aggregate Unsecured Credit Allowance for a Participant, including Unsecured Credit Allowance granted based on its own creditworthiness and any Unsecured Credit Allowance conveyed through a Guaranty shall not exceed \$50 million. The aggregate Unsecured Credit Allowance for a group of Affiliates shall not exceed \$50 million. A group of Affiliates subject to this cap shall request PJMSettlement to allocate the maximum Unsecured Credit Allowance and Working Credit Limit amongst the group, assuring that no individual Participant, nor common guarantor, shall exceed the Unsecured Credit Allowance appropriate for its credit strength.

## **G. Working Credit Limit Violations**

### **1) Notification**

A Participant is subject to notification when its Total Net Obligation to PJMSettlement approaches the Participant's established Working Credit Limit.

### **2) Suspension**

A Participant that exceeds its Working Credit Limit is subject to suspension from participation in the PJM markets and from scheduling any future Transmission Service unless and until Participant's credit standing is brought within acceptable limits. A Participant will have two Business Days from notification to remedy the situation in a manner deemed acceptable by PJMSettlement. Additionally, PJMSettlement, in coordination with PJM, will take such actions as may be required or permitted under the Agreements, including but not limited to the termination of the Participant's ongoing Transmission Service and participation in PJM Markets. Failure to comply with this policy will be considered an event of default under this credit policy.

## **H. PJM Administrative Charges**

Financial Security held by PJMSettlement shall also secure obligations to PJM for PJM administrative charges.

## **I. Pre-existing Financial Security**

PJMSettlement's credit requirements are applicable as of the effective date of the filing on May 5, 2010 by PJM and PJMSettlement of amendments to Attachment Q. Financial Security held by PJM prior to the effective date of such amendments shall be held by PJM for the benefit of PJMSettlement.

## **III. VIRTUAL BID SCREENING**

### **A. Credit and Financial Security**

PJMSettlement does not require a Participant to establish separate or additional credit for virtual bidding. A Participant's ability to submit virtual bids into the spot market will be governed, however, by the terms of this section, so a Participant may choose to establish such additional credit in order to expand its ability to undertake virtual bidding in the PJM spot market.

If a Participant chooses to provide additional Financial Security in order to increase its **Credit Available for Virtual Bidding PJMSettlement** may establish a reasonable timeframe, not to exceed three months, for which such Financial Security must be maintained. PJMSettlement will not impose such restriction on a deposit unless a Participant is notified prior to making the deposit. Such restriction, if applied, shall be applied to all future deposits by all virtual bidding participants.

A Participant wishing to increase its Credit Available for Virtual Bidding by providing additional Financial Security may make the appropriate arrangements with PJMSettlement. PJMSettlement will make a good faith effort to make new Financial Security available as Credit Available for Virtual Bidding as soon as practicable after confirmation of receipt. In any event, however, Financial Security received and confirmed by noon on a business day will be applied (as provided under this policy) to Credit Available for Virtual Bidding no later than 10:00 am on the following business day. Receipt and acceptance of wired funds for cash deposit shall mean actual receipt by PJMSettlement's bank, deposit into PJMSettlement's customer deposit account, and confirmation by PJMSettlement that such wire has been received and deposited. Receipt and acceptance of letters of credit shall mean receipt of the original letter of credit or amendment thereto, and confirmation from PJMSettlement's credit and legal staffs that such letter of credit or amendment thereto conforms to PJMSettlement's requirements, which confirmation shall be made in a reasonable and practicable timeframe. To facilitate this process, bidders wiring funds for the purpose of increasing their Credit Available for Virtual Bidding are advised to specifically notify PJMSettlement that a wire is being sent for such purpose.

### **B. Market Activity Review**

Each month, PJMSettlement will update the **Nodal Reference Price** for each node and each aggregated price point based on a rank ordering of historical price differentials. The Nodal Reference Price at each location will be the 97th percentile price differential between hourly Day-ahead and Real-time prices experienced over the corresponding two-month reference period in the prior calendar year. In order to capture seasonality effects and maintain a two-month

reference period, reference months will be grouped by two, starting with January (e.g., Jan-Feb, Mar-Apr, ... , Jul-Aug, ... Nov-Dec). For any given current-year month, the reference period months will be the set of two months in the prior calendar year that include the month corresponding to the current month. For example, July and August 2003 would each use July-August 2002 as their reference period.

On a daily basis, PJMSettlement will perform an analysis for each market participant to determine if **Virtual Bid Screening** is required for bidding in the Day-ahead market. This analysis will be performed as follows:

1. For each participant account, PJMSettlement will calculate an **Uncleared Bid Exposure**.  $\text{Uncleared Bid Exposure} = \text{sum of (not-cleared bids and offers} \times \text{the Nodal Reference Price)}$  summed over all nodes for the prior two days of actual bids. If a participant submits uncleared bids and uncleared offers at the same node or aggregated price point, only the higher of the two megawatt quantities (i.e., either the sum of all of the participant's bids at such node or the sum of all of the participant's offers at such node) shall be considered for purposes of this calculation.

2. If the Uncleared Bid Exposure exceeds the Participant's Unsecured Credit and/or Financial Security, less any credit required for FTR or other credit requirement determinants as defined in this policy, then Virtual Bid Screening will be required.

3. PJMSettlement will initially look at historical activity beginning May 1, 2003 to determine which participants will require Virtual Bid Screening upon implementation of this procedure.

### C. **Virtual Bid Screening Process**

If it is determined that Virtual Bid Screening is required for a market participant, the screening process will be conducted in the PJM eMKT web interface. The process will automatically reject all virtual bids and offers submitted by the PJM market participant if the participant's Credit Available for Virtual Bidding is exceeded by the **Virtual Credit Exposure** that is calculated based on the participant's submitted bids and offers as described below.

A Participant's Virtual Credit Exposure will be calculated on a daily basis for all virtual bids submitted by the market participant for the next operating day using the following equation:

Virtual Credit Exposure = the lesser of:

(i)  $((\text{total MWh bid or offered, whichever is greater, hourly at each node}) \times \text{Nodal Reference Price} \times 2 \text{ days})$  summed over all nodes and all hours; or

(ii) (a)  $((\text{the total MWh bid or offered, whichever is greater, hourly at each node}) \times \text{the Nodal Reference Price} \times 1 \text{ day})$  summed over all nodes and all hours; plus (b)  $((\text{the difference between the total bid MWh cleared and total offered MWh cleared hourly at each$



node) x Nodal Reference Price) summed over all nodes and all hours for the previous three cleared day-ahead markets.

A Participant's Credit Available for Virtual Bidding will be the Participant's Working Credit Limit less any unpaid billed and unbilled amounts owed to PJMSettlement, plus any current period unbilled amounts owed by PJMSettlement to the Participant, less any credit required for FTR or other credit requirement determinants as defined in this policy.

Each PJM Market Participant that is identified as requiring Virtual Bid Screening based on bidding history will be screened in the following manner: If the participant's Virtual Credit Exposure exceeds its Credit Available for Virtual Bidding, the Market Participant will be notified via an eMKT error message, and the submitted bids will be rejected. Upon such notification, the Market Participant may alter its virtual bids and offers so that its Virtual Credit Exposure does not exceed its Credit Available for Virtual Bidding, and may resubmit them. Bids may be submitted in one or more groups during a day. If one or more groups of bids is submitted and accepted, and a subsequent group of submitted bids causes the total submitted bids to exceed the Virtual Credit Exposure, then only that subsequent set of bids will be rejected. Previously accepted bids will not be affected, though the Market Participant may choose to withdraw them voluntarily.

#### **IV. RELIABILITY PRICING MODEL AUCTION AND PRICE RESPONSIVE DEMAND CREDIT REQUIREMENTS**

Settlement during any Delivery Year of cleared positions resulting or expected to result from any Reliability Pricing Model Auction shall be included as appropriate in Peak Market Activity, and the provisions of this Attachment Q shall apply to any such activity and obligations arising therefrom. In addition, the provisions of this section shall apply to any entity seeking to participate in any RPM Auction, to address credit risks unique to such auctions. The provisions of this section also shall apply under certain circumstances to PRD Providers that seek to commit Price Responsive Demand pursuant to the provisions of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

##### **A. Applicability**

A Market Seller seeking to submit a Sell Offer in any Reliability Pricing Model Auction based on any Capacity Resource for which there is a materially increased risk of non-performance must satisfy the credit requirement specified in section IV.B before submitting such Sell Offer. A PRD Provider seeking to commit Price Responsive Demand for which there is a materially increased risk of non-performance must satisfy the credit requirement specified in section IV.B before it may commit the Price Responsive Demand. Credit must be maintained until such risk of non-performance is substantially eliminated, but may be reduced commensurate with the reduction in such risk, as set forth in Section IV.C.

For purposes of this provision, a resource for which there is a materially increased risk of non-performance shall mean: (i) a Planned Generation Capacity Resource; (ii) a Planned Demand Resource or an Energy Efficiency Resource; (iii) a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade; ~~or~~ (iv) an existing or Planned Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region that at the

time it is submitted in a Sell Offer has not secured firm transmission service to the border of the PJM Region sufficient to satisfy the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement; or (v) Price Responsive Demand to the extent the responsible PRD Provider has not registered PRD-eligible load at a PRD Substation level to satisfy its Nominal PRD Value commitment, in accordance with Schedule 6.1 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**B. Reliability Pricing Model Auction and Price Responsive Demand Credit Requirement**

Except as provided for Credit-Limited Offers below, for any resource specified in Section IV.A, other than Price Responsive Demand, the credit requirement shall be the RPM Auction Credit Rate, as provided in Section IV.D, times the megawatts to be offered for sale from such resource in a Reliability Pricing Model Auction. The RPM Auction Credit Requirement for each Market Seller shall be the sum of the credit requirements for all such resources to be offered by such Market Seller in the auction or, as applicable, cleared by such Market Seller from the relevant auctions. For Price Responsive Demand specified in section IV.A, the credit requirement shall be based on the Nominal PRD Value (stated in Unforced Capacity terms) times the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate as set forth in section IV.E.

Except for Credit-Limited Offers, the RPM Auction Credit Requirement for a Market Seller will be reduced for any Delivery Year to the extent less than all of such Market Seller's offers clear in the Base Residual Auction or any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year. Such reduction shall be proportional to the quantity, in megawatts, that failed to clear in such Delivery Year.

A Sell Offer based on a Planned Generation Capacity Resource, Planned Demand Resource, or Energy Efficiency Resource may be submitted as a Credit-Limited Offer. A Market Seller electing this option shall specify a maximum amount of Unforced Capacity, in megawatts, and a maximum credit requirement, in dollars, applicable to the Sell Offer. A Credit-Limited Offer shall clear the RPM Auction in which it is submitted (to the extent it otherwise would clear based on the other offer parameters and the system's need for the offered capacity) only to the extent of the lesser of: (i) the quantity of Unforced Capacity that is the quotient of the division of the specified maximum credit requirement by the Auction Credit Rate resulting from section IV.D.b.; and (ii) the maximum amount of Unforced Capacity specified in the Sell Offer. For a Market Seller electing this alternative, the RPM Auction Credit Requirement applicable prior to the posting of results of the auction shall be the maximum credit requirement specified in its Credit-Limited Offer, and the RPM Auction Credit Requirement subsequent to posting of the results will be the Auction Credit Rate, as provided in Section IV.D.b, c. or d., as applicable, times the amount of Unforced Capacity from such Sell Offer that cleared in the auction. The availability and operational details of Credit-Limited Offers shall be as described in the PJM Manuals.

As set forth in Section IV.D, a Market Seller's Auction Credit Requirement shall be determined separately for each Delivery Year.

**C. Reduction in Credit Requirement**

As specified in Section IV.D, the RPM Auction Credit Rate may be reduced under certain circumstances after the auction has closed.

The Price Responsive Demand credit requirement shall be reduced as and to the extent the PRD Provider registers PRD-eligible load at a PRD Substation level to satisfy its Nominal PRD Value commitment, in accordance with Schedule 6.1 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

In addition, the RPM Auction Credit Requirement for a Participant for any given Delivery Year shall be reduced periodically, provided the Participant successfully meets progress milestones that reduce the risk of non-performance, as follows:

- a. For Planned Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, the RPM Auction Credit Requirement will be reduced in direct proportion to the megawatts of such Demand Resource or ILR that the Resource Provider qualifies as a Capacity Resource, in accordance with the procedures established under the Reliability Assurance Agreement.
- b. For Existing Generation Capacity Resources located outside the PJM Region that have not secured sufficient firm transmission to the border of the PJM Region prior to the auction in which such resource is first offered, the RPM Credit Requirement shall be reduced in direct proportion to the megawatts of firm transmission service secured by the Market Seller that qualify such resource under the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.
- c. For Planned Generation Capacity Resources, the RPM Credit Requirement shall be reduced to 50% of the amount calculated under Section IV.B beginning as of the effective date of an Interconnection Service Agreement, and shall be reduced to zero on the date of commencement of Interconnection Service.
- d. For Planned Generation Capacity Resources located outside the PJM Region, the RPM Credit Requirement shall be reduced once the conditions in both b and c above are met, i.e., the RPM Credit Requirement shall be reduced to 50% of the amount calculated under Section IV.B when 1) beginning as of the effective date of the equivalent Interconnection Service Agreement, and 2) when 50% or more megawatts of firm transmission service have been secured by the Market Seller that qualify such resource under the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement. The RPM Credit Requirement for a Planned Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region shall be reduced to zero when 1) the resource commences Interconnection Service and 2) 100% of the megawatts of firm transmission service have been secured by the Market Seller that qualify such resource under the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.
- e. For Qualifying Transmission Upgrades, the RPM Credit Requirement shall be reduced to 50% of the amount calculated under Section IV.B beginning as of the effective date of the latest associated Interconnection Service Agreement (or, when a project will have no such agreement, an Upgrade Construction Service Agreement), and shall be reduced to zero on the date the Qualifying Transmission Upgrade is placed in service. In addition, a Qualifying Transmission

Upgrade will be allowed a reduction in its RPM Credit Requirement equal to the amount of collateral currently posted with PJM for the facility construction when the Qualifying Transmission Upgrade meets the following requirements: the Upgrade Construction Service Agreement has been fully executed, the full estimated cost to complete as most recently determined or updated by PJM has been fully paid or collateralized, and all regulatory and other required approvals (except those that must await construction completion) have been obtained. Such reduction in RPM Credit Requirement may not be transferred across different projects.

#### **D. RPM Auction Credit Rate**

As set forth in the PJM Manuals, a separate Auction Credit Rate shall be calculated for each Delivery year prior to each Reliability Pricing Model Auction for such Delivery Year, as follows:

For Delivery Years through the Delivery Year that ends on May 31, 2012, the Auction Credit Rate for any resource for a Delivery Year shall be (the greater of \$20/MW-day or 0.24 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located) times the number of days in such Delivery Year.

For Delivery Years beginning with the Delivery Year that commences on June 1, 2012:

a. Prior to the posting of the results of a Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, the Auction Credit Rate shall be (the greater of (i) 0.3 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year, in MW-day or (ii) \$20 per MW-day) times the number of days in such Delivery Year.

b. Subsequent to the posting of the results from a Base Residual Auction, the Auction Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for supply committed in such auction shall be (the greater of (i) \$20/MW-day or (ii) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located) times the number of days in such Delivery Year; provided, however, that the Auction Credit Rate for Capacity Resources to the extent committed in the Base Residual Auction for the 2012-2013 Delivery Year shall be as determined under the provisions of this Attachment Q in effect at the time of such Base Residual Auction.

c. For any resource not previously committed for a Delivery Year that seeks to participate in an Incremental Auction, the Auction Credit Rate shall be (the greater of (i) 0.3 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year, in MW-day or (ii) 0.24 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located or (iii) \$20 per MW-day) times the number of days in such Delivery Year.

d. Subsequent to the posting of the results of an Incremental Auction, the Auction Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for supply committed in such auction shall be (the greater of (i) \$20/MW-day or (ii) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction

for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located) times the number of days in such Delivery Year, but no greater than the Auction Credit Rate previously established for such resource's participation in such Incremental Auction pursuant to subsection (c) above) times the number of days in such Delivery Year.

**E. Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate**

a. Prior to the posting of the results of a Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be (the greater of (i) 0.3 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year, in MW-day or (ii) \$20 per MW-day) times the number of days in such Delivery Year;

b. Subsequent to the posting of the results from a Base Residual Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for Price Responsive Demand registered prior to such auction shall be (the greater of (i) \$20/MW-day or (ii) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the PRD load is located) times the number of days in such Delivery Year times a final price uncertainty factor of 1.05;

c. For any additional Price Responsive Demand that seeks to commit in a Third Incremental Auction in response to a qualifying change in the final LDA load forecast, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be the same as the rate for Price Responsive Demand that had cleared in the Base Residual Auction;

d. Subsequent to the posting of the results of the Third Incremental Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for all Price Responsive Demand, shall be (the greater of (i) \$20/MW-day or (ii) 0.2 times the Final Zonal Capacity Price for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand is located) times the number of days in such Delivery Year, but no greater than the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate previously established under subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section for such Delivery Year.

**EF. Additional Form of Unsecured Credit for RPM**

In addition to the forms of credit specified elsewhere in this Attachment Q, the following form of Unsecured Credit shall be available to Market Sellers, but solely for purposes of satisfying RPM Auction Credit Requirements. If a supplier has a history of being a net seller into PJM markets, on average, over the past 12 months, then PJMSettlement will count as available Unsecured Credit twice the average of that participant's total net monthly PJMSettlement bills over the past 12 months.

**FG. Credit Responsibility for Traded Planned RPM Capacity Resources**

PJMSettlement may require that credit and financial responsibility for planned RPM Capacity Resources that are traded remain with the original party (which for these purposes, means the party bearing credit responsibility for the planned RPM Capacity Resource immediately prior to

trade) unless the receiving party independently establishes consistent with the PJM credit policy, that it has sufficient credit with PJMSettlement and agrees by providing written notice to PJMSettlement that it will fully assume the credit responsibility associated with the traded planned RPM Capacity Resource.

## **V. FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHT AUCTIONS**

### **A. FTR Credit Limit.**

PJMSettlement will establish an FTR Credit Limit for each Participant. Participants must maintain their FTR Credit Limit at a level equal to or greater than their FTR Credit Requirement. FTR Credit Limits will be established only by a Participant providing Financial Security or qualifying for Seller Credit as provided for in §II.C of this policy.

### **B. FTR Credit Requirement.**

For each Participant with FTR activity, PJMSettlement shall calculate an FTR Credit Requirement based on FTR cost less a discounted historical value. FTR Credit Requirements shall be further adjusted by ARR credits available and by an amount based on portfolio diversification, if applicable. The requirement will be based on individual monthly exposures which are then used to derive a total requirement.

The FTR Credit Requirement shall be calculated by first adding for each month the FTR Monthly Credit Requirement Contribution for each submitted, accepted, and cleared FTR and then subtracting the prorated value of any ARRs held by the Participant for that month. The resulting twelve monthly subtotals represent the expected value of net payments between PJMSettlement and the Participant for FTR activity each month during the Planning Period. Subject to later adjustment by an amount based on portfolio diversification, if applicable, the FTR Credit Requirement shall be the sum of the individual positive monthly subtotals, representing months in which net payments to PJMSettlement are expected.

### **C. Rejection of FTR Bids.**

Bids submitted into an auction will be rejected if the Participant's FTR Credit Requirement including such submitted bids would exceed the Participant's FTR Credit Limit, or if the Participant fails to establish additional credit as required pursuant to provisions related to portfolio diversification.

### **D. FTR Credit Collateral Returns.**

A Market Participant may request from PJMSettlement the return of any collateral no longer required for the FTR auctions. PJMSettlement is permitted to limit the frequency of such requested collateral returns, provided that collateral returns shall be made by PJMSettlement at least once per calendar quarter, if requested by a Market Participant.

### **E. Effective Period for Credit for Multi-Month FTR Auction Products.**

Credit for all FTR auction products must remain in effect for the entire duration of the FTR auction product. If a Corporate Guaranty or Financial Security provided for FTR credit has a termination date, such termination date must be at least 10 days after the date upon which payment is due for the last month of the FTR auction product.

**F. Credit Responsibility for Traded FTRs.**

PJMSettlement may require that credit responsibility associated with an FTR traded within PJM's eFTR system remain with the original party (which for these purposes, means the party bearing credit responsibility for the FTR immediately prior to trade) unless and until the receiving party independently establishes, consistent with the PJM credit policy, sufficient credit with PJMSettlement and agrees through confirmation of the FTR trade within the eFTR system that it will meet in full the credit requirements associated with the traded FTR.

**G. Portfolio Diversification.**

Subsequent to calculating a tentative cleared solution for an FTR auction (or auction round), PJM shall both:

1. Determine the FTR Portfolio Auction Value, including the tentative cleared solution. Any Participants with such FTR Portfolio Auction Values that are negative shall be deemed FTR Flow Undiversified.
2. Measure the geographic concentration of the FTR Flow Undiversified portfolios by testing such portfolios using a simulation model including, one at a time, each planned transmission outage or other network change which would substantially affect the network for the specific auction period. A list of such planned outages or changes anticipated to be modeled shall be posted prior to commencement of the auction (or auction round). Any FTR Flow Undiversified portfolio that experiences a net reduction in calculated congestion credits as a result of any one or more of such modeled outages or changes shall be deemed FTR Geographically Undiversified.

For portfolios that are FTR Flow Undiversified but not FTR Geographically Undiversified, PJMSettlement shall increment the FTR Credit Requirement by an amount equal to twice the absolute value of the FTR Portfolio Auction Value, including the tentative cleared solution. For Participants with portfolios that are both FTR Flow Undiversified and FTR Geographically Undiversified, PJMSettlement shall increment the FTR Credit Requirement by an amount equal to three times the absolute value of the FTR Portfolio Auction Value, including the tentative cleared solution. For portfolios that are FTR Flow Undiversified in months subsequent to the current planning year, these incremental amounts, calculated on a monthly basis, shall be reduced (but not below zero) by an amount up to 25% of the monthly value of ARR credits that are held by a Participant. Subsequent to the ARR allocation process preceding an annual FTR auction, such ARR credits shall be reduced to zero for months associated with that ARR allocation process. PJMSettlement may recalculate such ARR credits at any time, but at a minimum shall do so subsequent to each annual FTR auction. If a reduction in such ARR credits

at any time increases the amount of credit required for the Participant beyond its credit available for FTR activity, the Participant must increase its credit to eliminate the shortfall.

If the FTR Credit Requirement for any Participant exceeds its credit available for FTRs as a result of these diversification requirements for the tentatively cleared portfolio of FTRs, PJMSettlement shall immediately issue a demand for additional credit, and such demand must be fulfilled before 4:00 p.m. on the business day following the demand. If any Participant does not timely satisfy such demand, PJMSettlement, in coordination with PJM, shall cause the removal that Participant's entire set of bids for that FTR auction (or auction round) and a new cleared solution shall be calculated for the entire auction (or auction round).

If necessary, PJM shall repeat the auction clearing calculation. PJM shall repeat these portfolio diversification calculations subsequent to any such secondary clearing calculation, and PJMSettlement shall require affected Participants to establish additional credit.

#### **H. FTR Administrative Charge Credit Requirement**

In addition to any other credit requirements, PJMSettlement may apply a credit requirement to cover the maximum administrative fees that may be charged to a Participant for its bids and offers.

#### **I. Long-Term FTR Credit Recalculation**

Long-term FTR Credit Requirement calculations shall be updated annually for known history, consistent with updating of historical values used for FTR Credit Requirement calculations in the annual auctions.

### **VI. FORMS OF FINANCIAL SECURITY**

Participants that provide Financial Security must provide the security in a PJMSettlement approved form and amount according to the guidelines below.

Financial Security which is no longer required to be maintained under provisions of the Agreements shall be returned at the request of a participant no later than two Business Days following determination by PJMSettlement within a commercially reasonable period of time that such collateral is not required.

Except when an event of default has occurred, a Participant may substitute an approved PJMSettlement form of Financial Security for another PJMSettlement approved form of Financial Security of equal value. The Participant must provide three (3) Business Days notice to PJMSettlement of its intent to substitute the Financial Security. PJMSettlement will release the replaced Financial Security with interest, if applicable, within (3) Business Days of receiving an approved form of substitute Financial Security.

#### **A. Cash Deposit**



Cash provided by a Participant as Financial Security will be held in a depository account by PJMSettlement with interest earned at PJMSettlement's overnight bank rate, and accrued to the Participant. Interest shall be paid to the Participant upon written request, but not more often than quarterly. PJMSettlement also may establish an array of investment options among which a Participant may choose to invest its cash deposited as Financial Security. Such investment options shall be comprised of high quality debt instruments, as determined by PJMSettlement, and may include obligations issued by the federal government and/or federal government sponsored enterprises. These investment options will reside in accounts held in PJMSettlement's name in a banking or financial institution acceptable to PJMSettlement. Where practicable, PJMSettlement may establish a means for the Participant to communicate directly with the bank or financial institution to permit the Participant to direct certain activity in the PJMSettlement account in which its Financial Security is held. PJMSettlement will establish and publish procedural rules, identifying the investment options and respective discounts in collateral value that will be taken to reflect any liquidation, market and/or credit risk presented by such investments. PJMSettlement has the right to liquidate all or a portion of the account balances at its discretion to satisfy a Participant's Total Net Obligation to PJMSettlement in the event of default under this credit policy or one or more of the Agreements.

#### **B. Letter Of Credit**

An unconditional, irrevocable standby letter of credit can be utilized to meet the Financial Security requirement. As stated below, the form, substance, and provider of the letter of credit must all be acceptable to PJMSettlement.

- The letter of credit will only be accepted from U.S.-based financial institutions or U.S. branches of foreign financial institutions ("financial institutions") that have a minimum corporate debt rating of "A" by Standard & Poor's or Fitch Ratings, or "A2" from Moody's Investors Service, or an equivalent short term rating from one of these agencies. PJMSettlement will consider the lowest applicable rating to be the rating of the financial institution. If the rating of a financial institution providing a letter of credit is lowered below A/A2 by any rating agency, then PJMSettlement may require the Participant to provide a letter of credit from another financial institution that is rated A/A2 or better, or to provide a cash deposit. If a letter of credit is provided from a U.S. branch of a foreign institution, the U.S. branch must itself comply with the terms of this credit policy, including having its own acceptable credit rating.
- The letter of credit shall state that it shall renew automatically for successive one-year periods, until terminated upon at least ninety (90) days prior written notice from the issuing financial institution. If PJM or PJMSettlement receives notice from the issuing financial institution that the current letter of credit is being cancelled, the Participant will be required to provide evidence, acceptable to PJMSettlement, that such letter of credit will be replaced with appropriate Financial Security, effective as of the cancellation date of the letter of credit, no later than thirty (30) days before the cancellation date of the letter of credit. Failure to do so will constitute a default under this credit policy and one of more of the Agreements.

- The letter of credit must clearly state the full names of the "Issuer", "Account Party" and "Beneficiary" (PJMSettlement), the dollar amount available for drawings, and shall specify that funds will be disbursed upon presentation of the drawing certificate in accordance with the instructions stated in the letter of credit. The letter of credit should specify any statement that is required to be on the drawing certificate, and any other terms and conditions that apply to such drawings.
- The PJMSettlement Credit Application contains an acceptable form of a letter of credit that should be utilized by a Participant choosing to meet its Financial Security requirement with a letter of credit. If the letter of credit varies in any way from the PJMSettlement format, it must first be reviewed and approved by PJMSettlement. All costs associated with obtaining and maintaining a letter of credit and meeting the policy provisions are the responsibility of the Participant
- PJMSettlement may accept a letter of credit from a Financial Institution that does not meet the credit standards of this policy provided that the letter of credit has third-party support, in a form acceptable to PJMSettlement, from a financial institution that does meet the credit standards of this policy.

## **VII. POLICY BREACH AND EVENTS OF DEFAULT**

A Participant will have two Business Days from notification of Breach (including late payment notice) or notification of a Collateral Call to remedy the Breach or satisfy the Collateral Call in a manner deemed acceptable by PJMSettlement. Failure to remedy the Breach or satisfy such Collateral Call within such two Business Days will be considered an event of default. If a Participant fails to meet the requirements of this policy but then remedies the Breach or satisfies a Collateral Call within the two Business Day cure period, then the Participant shall be deemed to have complied with the policy. Any such two Business Day cure period will expire at 4:00 p.m. eastern prevailing time on the final day.

Only one cure period shall apply to a single event giving rise to a breach or default. Application of Financial Security towards a non-payment Breach shall not be considered a satisfactory cure of the Breach if the Participant fails to meet all requirements of this policy after such application.

Failure to comply with this policy (except for the responsibility of a Participant to notify PJMSettlement of a Material change) shall be considered an event of default. Pursuant to § 15.1.3(a) of the Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and § 1.7.3 of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, non-compliance with the PJMSettlement credit policy is an event of default under those respective Agreements. In event of default under this credit policy or one or more of the Agreements, PJMSettlement, in coordination with PJM, will take such actions as may be required or permitted under the Agreements, including but not limited to the termination of the Participant's ongoing Transmission Service and participation in PJM Markets. PJMSettlement has the right to liquidate all or a portion of a Participant's Financial Security at its discretion to satisfy Total Net Obligations to PJMSettlement in the event of default under this credit policy or one or more of the Agreements.

PJMSettlement may hold a defaulting Participant's Financial Security for as long as such party's positions exist and consistent with the PJM credit policy in this Attachment Q, in order to protect PJM's membership from default.

No payments shall be due to a Participant, nor shall any payments be made to a Participant, while the Participant is in default or has been declared in Breach of this policy or the Agreements, or while a Collateral Call is outstanding. PJMSettlement may apply towards an ongoing default any amounts that are held or later become available or due to the defaulting Participant through PJM's markets and systems.

In order to cover Obligations, PJMSettlement may hold a Participant's Financial Security through the end of the billing period which includes the 90th day following the last day a Participant had activity, open positions, or accruing obligations (other than reconciliations and true-ups), and until such Participant has satisfactorily paid any obligations invoiced through such period. Obligations incurred or accrued through such period shall survive any withdrawal from PJM. In event of non-payment, PJMSettlement may apply such Financial Security to such Participant's Obligations, even if Participant had previously announced and effected its withdrawal from PJM.

#### **VIII. DEFINITIONS:**

##### **Affiliate**

Affiliate is defined in the PJM Operating Agreement, §1.2.

##### **Agreements**

Agreements are the Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, the Reliability Assurance Agreement, the Reliability Assurance Agreement – West, and/or other agreements between PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and its Members.

##### **Applicant**

Applicant is an entity desiring to become a PJM Member, or to take Transmission Service that has submitted the PJMSettlement Credit Application, PJMSettlement Credit Agreement and other required submittals as set forth in this policy.

##### **Breach**

Breach is the status of a Participant that does not currently meet the requirements of this policy or other provisions of the Agreements.

##### **Business Day**

A Business Day is a day in which the Federal Reserve System is open for business and is not a scheduled PJM holiday.

##### **Canadian Guaranty**

Canadian Guaranty is a Corporate Guaranty provided by an Affiliate of a Participant that is domiciled in Canada, and meets all of the provisions of this credit policy.

##### **Capacity**

Capacity is the installed capacity requirement of the Reliability Assurance Agreement or similar such requirements as may be established.

**Collateral Call**

Collateral Call is a notice to a Participant that additional Financial Security, or possibly early payment, is required in order to remain in, or to regain, compliance with this policy.

**Corporate Guaranty**

Corporate Guaranty is a legal document used by one entity to guaranty the obligations of another entity.

**Credit Available for Virtual Bidding**

Credit Available for Virtual Bidding is a Participant's Working Credit Limit, less its Total Net Obligation.

**Credit-Limited Offer**

Credit-Limited Offer shall mean a Sell Offer that is submitted by a Market Seller in an RPM Auction subject to a maximum credit requirement specified by such Market Seller.

**Credit Score**

Credit Score is a composite numerical score scaled from 0-100 as calculated by PJMSettlement that incorporates various predictors of creditworthiness.

**Financial Security**

Financial Security is a cash deposit or letter of credit in an amount and form determined by and acceptable to PJMSettlement, provided by a Participant to PJMSettlement as security in order to participate in the PJM Markets or take Transmission Service.

**Foreign Guaranty**

Foreign Guaranty is a Corporate Guaranty provided by an Affiliate of a Participant that is domiciled in a foreign country, and meets all of the provisions of this credit policy.

**FTR Credit Limit**

FTR Credit Limit will be equal to the amount of credit established with PJMSettlement that a Participant has specifically designated to PJMSettlement to be set aside and used for FTR activity. Any such credit so set aside shall not be considered available to satisfy any other credit requirement the Participant may have with PJMSettlement.

**FTR Credit Requirement**

FTR Credit Requirement is the amount of credit that a Participant must provide in order to support the FTR positions that it holds and/or is bidding for. The FTR Credit Requirement shall not include months for which the invoicing has already been completed, provided that PJMSettlement shall have up to two Business Days following the date of the invoice completion to make such adjustments in its credit systems.

**FTR Flow Undiversified**

FTR Flow Undiversified shall have the meaning established in section V.G of this Attachment Q.

**FTR Geographically Undiversified**

FTR Geographically Undiversified shall have the meaning established in section V.G of this Attachment Q.

**FTR Historical Value**

FTR Historical Value – For each FTR for each month, this is the historical weighted average value over three years for the FTR path using the following weightings: 50% - most recent year; 30% - second year; 20% - third year. FTR Historical Values shall be calculated separately for on-peak, off-peak, and 24-hour FTRs for each month of the year. FTR Historical Values shall be adjusted by plus or minus ten percent (10%) for cleared counterflow or normal flow FTRs, respectively, in order to mitigate exposure due to uncertainty and fluctuations in actual FTR value.

**FTR Monthly Credit Requirement Contribution**

FTR Monthly Credit Requirement Contribution - For each FTR for each month, this is the total FTR cost for the month, prorated on a daily basis, less the FTR Historical Value for the month. For cleared FTRs, this contribution may be negative; prior to clearing, FTRs with negative contribution shall be deemed to have zero contribution.

**FTR Net Activity**

FTR Net Activity shall mean the aggregate net value of the billing line items for auction revenue rights credits, FTR auction charges, FTR auction credits, and FTR congestion credits, and shall also include day-ahead and balancing/real-time congestion charges up to a maximum net value of the sum of the foregoing auction revenue rights credits, FTR auction charges, FTR auction credits and FTR congestion credits.

**FTR Participant**

FTR Participant shall mean any Market Participant that is required to provide Financial Security or to utilize Seller Credit in order to participate in PJM's FTR auctions.

**FTR Portfolio Auction Value**

FTR Portfolio Auction Value shall mean for each Participant (or Participant account), the sum, calculated on a monthly basis, across all FTRs, of the FTR price times the FTR volume in MW.

**Market Participant**

Market Participant shall have the meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Material**

For these purposes, material is defined in §I.B.3, Material Changes. For the purposes herein, the use of the term "material" is not necessarily synonymous with use of the term by governmental agencies and regulatory bodies.

**Member**

Member shall have the meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Minimum Participation Requirements**

A set of minimum training, risk management, communication and capital or collateral requirements required for Participants in the PJM markets, as set forth herein and in the Form of Annual Certification set forth as Appendix 1 to this Attachment Q. Participants transacting in FTRs in certain circumstances will be required to demonstrate additional risk management procedures and controls as further set forth in the Annual Certification found in Appendix 1 to this Attachment Q.

**Net Obligation**

Net Obligation is the amount owed to PJMSettlement and PJM for purchases from the PJM Markets, Transmission Service, (under both Part II and Part III of the O.A.T.T.), and other services pursuant to the Agreements, after applying a deduction for amounts owed to a Participant by PJMSettlement as it pertains to monthly market activity and services. Should other markets be formed such that Participants may incur future Obligations in those markets, then the aggregate amount of those Obligations will also be added to the Net Obligation.

**Net Sell Position**

Net Sell Position is the amount of Net Obligation when Net Obligation is negative.

**Nodal Reference Price**

Nodal Reference Price is a probabilistic (97%) maximum price differential historically experienced between day-ahead and real-time market prices at a given location as defined in this policy period. This number is used in Virtual Bid Screening.

**Obligation**

Obligation is all amounts owed to PJMSettlement for purchases from the PJM Markets, Transmission Service, (under both Part II and Part III of the O.A.T.T.), and other services or obligations pursuant to the Agreements. In addition, aggregate amounts that will be owed to PJMSettlement in the future for Capacity purchases within the PJM Capacity markets will be added to this figure. Should other markets be formed such that Participants may incur future Obligations in those markets, then the aggregate amount of those Obligations will also be added to the Net Obligation.

**Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., (“Operating Agreement”)**

The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., dated as of June 2, 1997, on file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and as revised from time to time.

**Participant**

A Participant is a Market Participant and/or Transmission Customer and/or Applicant.

**Peak Market Activity**

Peak Market Activity is a measure of exposure for which credit is required, involving peak exposures in rolling three-week periods over a year timeframe, with two semi-annual reset points, pursuant to provisions of section II.D of this Credit Policy.

**PJM Markets**

The PJM Markets are the PJM Interchange Energy Market and the PJM Capacity markets as established by the Operating Agreement. Also any other markets that exist or may be established in the future wherein Participants may incur Obligations to PJMSettlement.

**PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (“O.A.T.T.”)**

The Open Access Transmission Tariff of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., on file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and as revised from time to time.

**Reliability Assurance Agreement (“R.A.A.”)**

See the definition of the Reliability Assurance Agreement (“R.A.A.”) in the Operating Agreement.

**Seller Credit**

A Seller Credit is a form of Unsecured Credit extended to Participants that have a consistent long-term history of selling into PJM Markets, as defined in this document.

**Tangible Net Worth**

Tangible Net Worth is all assets (not including any intangible assets such as goodwill) less all liabilities. Any such calculation may be reduced by PJMSettlement upon review of the available financial information.

**Total Net Obligation**

Total Net Obligation is all unpaid billed Net Obligations plus any unbilled Net Obligation incurred to date, as determined by PJMSettlement on a daily basis, plus any other Obligations owed to PJMSettlement at the time.

**Total Net Sell Position**

Total Net Sell Position is all unpaid billed Net Sell Positions plus any unbilled Net Sell Positions accrued to date, as determined by PJMSettlement on a daily basis.

**Transmission Customer**

Transmission Customer is a Transmission Customer is an entity taking service under Part II or Part III of the O.A.T.T.

**Transmission Service**

Transmission Service is any or all of the transmission services provided by PJM pursuant to Part II or Part III of the O.A.T.T.

**Uncleared Bid Exposure**

Uncleared Bid Exposure is a measure of exposure from virtual bidding activity relative to a Participant’s established credit as defined in this policy. It is used only as a pre-screen to determine whether a Participant’s virtual bids should be subject to Virtual Bid Screening.

**Unsecured Credit**

Unsecured Credit is any credit granted by PJMSettlement to a Participant that is not secured by a form of Financial Security.

**Unsecured Credit Allowance**

Unsecured Credit Allowance is Unsecured Credit extended by PJMSettlement in an amount determined by PJMSettlement’s evaluation of the creditworthiness of a Participant. This is also defined as the amount of credit that a Participant qualifies for based on the strength of its own financial condition without having to provide Financial Security, except that only the Seller Credit form of Unsecured Credit may be utilized to establish a Participant’s FTR Credit Limit. See also: “Working Credit Limit.”

**Virtual Bid Screening**

Virtual Bid Screening is the process of reviewing the Virtual Credit Exposure of submitted Day-Ahead market bids, as defined in this policy, against the Credit Available for Virtual Bidding. If the credit required is greater than credit available, then the bids will not be accepted.

**Virtual Credit Exposure**


Virtual Credit Exposure is the amount of potential credit exposure created by a market participant’s bid submitted into the Day-ahead market, as defined in this policy.

**Working Credit Limit**

Working Credit Limit amount is 75% of the Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or 75% of the Financial Security provided by the Participant to PJMSettlement. The Working Credit Limit establishes the maximum amount of Total Net Obligation that a Participant may have outstanding at any time.



**Appendix 1 to Attachment Q**



**PJM MINIMUM PARTICIPATION CRITERIA  
OFFICER CERTIFICATION FORM**

**Participant Name:** \_\_\_\_\_ ("**Participant**")

I, \_\_\_\_\_, a duly authorized officer of Participant, understanding that PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and PJM Settlement, Inc. ("PJMSettlement") are relying on this certification as evidence that Participant meets the minimum participation requirements set forth in Attachment Q to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("PJM Tariff"), hereby certify that I have full authority to represent on behalf of Participant and further represent as follows, as evidenced by my initialing each representation in the space provided below:

1. All employees or agents transacting in markets or services provided pursuant to the PJM Tariff or PJM Amended and Restated Operating Agreement ("PJM Operating Agreement") on behalf of the Participant have received appropriate<sup>1</sup> training and are authorized to transact on behalf of Participant. \_\_\_\_\_
2. Participant has written risk management policies, procedures, and controls, approved by Participant's independent risk management function<sup>2</sup> and applicable to transactions in the PJM markets in which it participates and for which employees or agents transacting in markets or services provided pursuant to the PJM Tariff or PJM Operating Agreement have been trained, that provide an appropriate, comprehensive risk management framework that, at a minimum, clearly identifies and documents the range of risks to which Participant is exposed, including, but not limited to credit risks, liquidity risks and market risks. \_\_\_\_\_
3. An FTR Participant (as defined in Attachment Q to the PJM Tariff) must make either the following 3.a. or 3.b. additional representations, evidenced by the undersigned officer initialing either the one 3.a. representation or the five 3.b. representations in the spaces provided below:
  - 3.a. Participant transacts in the FTR markets solely to hedge the congestion risk related to the Participant's physical transactions as a load serving entity or generation provider and monitors all of the Participant's FTR market activity to ensure its FTR positions, considering both the level and pathways, are generally

<sup>1</sup> As used in this representation, the term "appropriate" as used with respect to training means training that is (i) comparable to generally accepted practices in the energy trading industry, and (ii) commensurate and proportional in sophistication, scope and frequency to the volume of transactions and the nature and extent of the risk taken by the participant.

<sup>2</sup> As used in this representation, a Participant's "independent risk management function" can include appropriate corporate persons or bodies that are independent of the Participant's trading functions, such as a risk management committee, a risk officer, a Participant's board or board committee, or a board or committee of the Participant's parent company.

proportionate to and appropriate for the Participant's physical transactions as a load serving entity or generation provider. \_\_\_\_\_

- 3.b. On no less than a weekly basis, Participant values its FTR positions and engages in a probabilistic assessment of the hypothetical risk of such positions using analytically based methodologies, predicated on the use of industry accepted valuation methodologies. \_\_\_\_\_

Such valuation and risk assessment functions are performed either by persons within Participant's organization independent from those trading in PJM's FTR markets or by an outside firm qualified and with expertise in this area of risk management. \_\_\_\_\_

Having valued its FTR positions and quantified their hypothetical risks, Participant applies its written policies, procedures and controls to limit its risks using industry recognized practices, such as value-at-risk limitations, concentration limits, or other controls designed to prevent Participant from purposefully or unintentionally taking on risk that is not commensurate or proportional to Participant's financial capability to manage such risk. \_\_\_\_\_

Exceptions to Participant's written risk policies, procedures and controls applicable to Participant's FTR positions are documented and explain a reasoned basis for the granting of any exception. \_\_\_\_\_

Participant has provided to PJMSettlement, in accordance with Section II A. of Attachment Q to the PJM Tariff, a copy of its current governing risk management policies, procedures and controls applicable to its FTR trading activities. \_\_\_\_\_


4. Participant has appropriate personnel resources, operating procedures and technical abilities to promptly and effectively respond to all PJM communications and directions. \_\_\_\_\_
5. Participant has demonstrated compliance with the Minimum Capitalization criteria set forth in Attachment Q of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff that are applicable to the PJM market(s) in which Participant transacts, and is not aware of any change having occurred or being imminent that would invalidate such compliance. \_\_\_\_\_
6. I acknowledge that I have read and understood the provisions of Attachment Q of the PJM Tariff applicable to Participant's business in the PJM markets, including those provisions describing PJM's minimum participation requirements and the enforcement actions available to PJMSettlement of a Participant not satisfying those requirements. In addition, by signing this Certification, I acknowledge the potential consequences of making incomplete or false statements in this Certification. \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ (Signature)

Print Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Subscribed and sworn before me \_\_\_\_\_, a notary public of the State  
of \_\_\_\_\_, in and for the County of \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_\_  
day of \_\_\_\_\_, 20\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Notary Public Signature)  
My commission expires: \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_



**OATT OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF - OATT VI. ADMINISTRATION AND STUDY OF NEW SERVICE R - OATT ATTACHMENT DD - OATT ATTACHMENT DD.2. DEFINITIONS**

**2. DEFINITIONS**

Definitions specific to this Attachment are set forth below. In addition, any capitalized terms used in this Attachment not defined herein shall have the meaning given to such terms elsewhere in this Tariff or in the RAA. References to section numbers in this Attachment DD refer to sections of this attachment, unless otherwise specified.

**2.1A Annual Demand Resource**

“Annual Demand Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**2.1B Annual Resource**

“Annual Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource, an Energy Efficiency Resource or an Annual Demand Resource.

**2.1C Annual Resource Price Adder**

“Annual Resource Price Adder” shall mean an addition to the marginal value of Unforced Capacity and the Extended Summer Resource Price Adder as necessary to reflect the price of Annual Resources required to meet the applicable Minimum Annual Resource Requirement.

**2.1D Annual Revenue Rate**

“Annual Revenue Rate” shall mean the rate employed to assess a compliance penalty charge on a Demand Resource Provider or ILR Provider under section 11.

**2.2 Avoidable Cost Rate**

“Avoidable Cost Rate” shall mean a component of the Market Seller Offer Cap calculated in accordance with section 6.

**2.3 Base Load Generation Resource**

“Base Load Generation Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that operates at least 90 percent of the hours that it is available to operate, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**2.4 Base Offer Segment**

“Base Offer Segment” shall mean a component of a Sell Offer based on an existing Generation Capacity Resource, equal to the Unforced Capacity of such resource, as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals. If the Sell Offers of multiple Market Sellers are based on a

single existing Generation Capacity Resource, the Base Offer Segments of such Market Sellers shall be determined pro rata based on their entitlements to Unforced Capacity from such resource.

## **2.5 Base Residual Auction**

“Base Residual Auction” shall mean the auction conducted three years prior to the start of the Delivery Year to secure commitments from Capacity Resources as necessary to satisfy any portion of the Unforced Capacity Obligation of the PJM Region not satisfied through Self-Supply.

## **2.6 Buy Bid**

“Buy Bid” shall mean a bid to buy Capacity Resources in any Incremental Auction.

## **2.7 Capacity Credit**

“Capacity Credit” shall have the meaning specified in Schedule 11 of the Operating Agreement, including Capacity Credits obtained prior to the termination of such Schedule applicable to periods after the termination of such Schedule.

## **2.8 Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit**

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit” or “CETL” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

## **2.9 Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective**

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective” or “CETO” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

## **2.9A Capacity Export Transmission Customer**

“Capacity Export Transmission Customer” shall mean a customer taking point to point transmission service under Part II of this Tariff to export capacity from a generation resource located in the PJM Region that is delisted from Capacity Resource status as described in section 5.6.6(d).

## **2.10 Capacity Market Buyer**

“Capacity Market Buyer” shall mean a Member that submits bids to buy Capacity Resources in any Incremental Auction.

## **2.11 Capacity Market Seller**

“Capacity Market Seller” shall mean a Member that owns, or has the contractual authority to control the output or load reduction capability of, a Capacity Resource, that has not transferred

such authority to another entity, and that offers such resource in the Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction.

## **2.12 Capacity Resource**

“Capacity Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

## **2.13 Capacity Resource Clearing Price**

“Capacity Resource Clearing Price” shall mean the price calculated for a Capacity Resource that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, in accordance with Section 5.

## **2.14 Capacity Transfer Right**

“Capacity Transfer Right” shall mean a right, allocated to LSEs serving load in a Locational Deliverability Area, to receive payments, based on the transmission import capability into such Locational Deliverability Area, that offset, in whole or in part, the charges attributable to the Locational Price Adder, if any, included in the Zonal Capacity Price calculated for a Locational Delivery Area.

## **2.14A Conditional Incremental Auction**

“Conditional Incremental Auction” shall mean an Incremental Auction conducted for a Delivery Year if and when necessary to secure commitments of additional capacity to address reliability criteria violations arising from the delay in a Backbone Transmission upgrade that was modeled in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

## **2.15 CONE Area**

“CONE Area” shall mean the areas listed in section 5.10(a)(iv)(A) and any LDAs established as CONE Areas pursuant to section 5.10(a)(iv)(B).

## **2.16 Cost of New Entry**

“Cost of New Entry” or “CONE” shall mean the nominal levelized cost of a Reference Resource, as determined in accordance with section 5.

## **2.16A Credit-Limited Offer**

“Credit-Limited Offer” shall have the meaning provided in Attachment Q to this Tariff.

## **2.17 Daily Deficiency Rate**

“Daily Deficiency Rate” shall mean the rate employed to assess certain deficiency charges under sections 7, 8, 9, or 13.

### **2.18 Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation**

“Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation” shall mean the capacity obligation of a Load Serving Entity during the Delivery Year, determined in accordance with Schedule 8 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.19 Delivery Year**

Delivery Year shall mean the Planning Period for which a Capacity Resource is committed pursuant to the auction procedures specified in Section 5.

### **2.20 Demand Resource**

“Demand Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.21 Demand Resource Factor**

“Demand Resource Factor” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.22 Demand Resource Provider**

“Demand Resource Provider” shall mean a PJM Member that has the capability to reduce load, or that aggregates customers capable of reducing load. The Demand Resource Provider shall notify the Office of the Interconnection whether such load reduction is provided by a Limited Demand Resource, Extended Summer Demand Resource or an Annual Demand Resource. A Curtailment Service Provider, as defined in the Operating Agreement, may be a Demand Resource Provider, provided it qualifies its load reduction capability as a Limited Demand Resource, Extended Summer Demand Resource, or Annual Demand Resource.

### **2.23 EFORD**

“EFORD” shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.24 Energy Efficiency Resource**

“Energy Efficiency Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.24A Extended Summer Demand Resource**

“Extended Summer Demand Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.24B Extended Summer Resource Price Adder**

“Extended Summer Resource Price Adder” shall mean an addition to the marginal value of Unforced Capacity as necessary to reflect the price of Annual Resources and Extended Summer



Demand Resources required to meet the applicable Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement.

#### **2.24C Extended Summer Demand Resource Reliability Target**

“Extended Summer Demand Resource Reliability Target” for the PJM Region or an LDA, shall mean the maximum amount of the combination of Extended Summer Demand Resources and Limited Demand Resources in Unforced Capacity determined by PJM to be consistent with the maintenance of reliability, stated in Unforced Capacity, that shall be used to calculate the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM calculates the Extended Summer DR Reliability Target, by first determining a reference annual loss of load expectation (“LOLE”) assuming no Demand Resources. The calculation for the unconstrained portion of the PJM Region uses a daily distribution of loads under a range of weather scenarios (based on the most recent load forecast and iteratively shifting the load distributions to result in the Installed Reserve Margin established for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). The calculation for each relevant LDA uses a daily distribution of loads under a range of weather scenarios (based on the most recent load forecast for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective study for the Delivery Year in question). For the relevant LDA calculation, the weekly capacity distributions are adjusted to reflect the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for the Delivery Year in question.

For both the PJM Region and LDA analyses, PJM then models the commitment of varying amounts of DR (displacing otherwise committed generation) as interruptible from May 1 through October 31 and unavailable from November 1 through April 30 and calculates the LOLE at each DR level. The Extended Summer DR Reliability Target is the DR amount, stated as a percentage of the unrestricted peak load, that produces no more than a ten percent increase in the LOLE, compared to the reference value. The Extended Summer Demand Resource Reliability Target shall be expressed as a percentage of the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA and is converted to Unforced Capacity by multiplying [the reliability target percentage] times [the Forecast Pool Requirement] times [the DR Factor] times [the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA, reduced by the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative].

#### **2.25 [Reserved]**

#### **2.26 Final RTO Unforced Capacity Obligation**

“Final RTO Unforced Capacity Obligation” shall mean the capacity obligation for the PJM Region, determined in accordance with Schedule 8 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

#### **2.26A Final Zonal ILR Price**

“Final Zonal ILR Price” shall mean the Adjusted Zonal Capacity Price after the Second Incremental Auction, less the amount paid in CTR credits per MW of load in the Zone in which the ILR is to be certified.

### **2.27 First Incremental Auction**

“First Incremental Auction” shall mean an Incremental Auction conducted 20 months prior to the start of the Delivery Year to which it relates.

### **2.28 Forecast Pool Requirement**

“Forecast Pool Requirement” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.29 Forecast RTO ILR Obligation**

“Forecast RTO ILR Obligation” shall mean, in unforced capacity terms, the ILR Forecast for the PJM Region times the DR Factor, times the Forecast Pool Requirement, less the Unforced Capacity of all Demand Resources committed in FRR Capacity Plans by all FRR Entities in the PJM Region, for use in Delivery Years through May 31, 2012.

### **2.30 Forecast Zonal ILR Obligation**

“Forecast Zonal ILR Obligation” shall mean, in unforced capacity terms, the ILR Forecast for the Zone times the DR Factor, times the Forecast Pool Requirement, less the Unforced Capacity of all Demand Resources committed in FRR Capacity Plans by all FRR Entities in such Zone, for use in Delivery Years through May 31, 2012.

### **2.31 Generation Capacity Resource**

“Generation Capacity Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.32 ILR Forecast**

“ILR Forecast” shall mean, for any Delivery Year ending on or before May 31, 2012, the average annual megawatt quantity of ILR certified for the five Planning Periods preceding the date of the forecast; provided, however, that before such data becomes available for five Delivery Years under the Reliability Pricing Model, comparable data on Active Load Management (as defined in the preexisting reliability assurance agreements) from up to five prior Planning Periods shall be substituted as necessary; and provided further that, for transmission zones that were integrated into the PJM Region less than five years prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the Delivery Year, data on incremental load subject to mandatory interruption by Electric Distribution Companies within such zones shall be substituted as necessary.

### **2.33 ILR Provider**

“ILR Provider” shall mean a Member that has the capability to reduce load, or that aggregates customers capable of reducing load. A Curtailment Service Provider, as such term is defined in

the PJM Operating Agreement, may be an ILR Provider, provided it obtains certification of its load reduction capability as ILR.

### **2.34 Incremental Auction**

“Incremental Auction” shall mean any of several auctions conducted for a Delivery Year after the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and before the first day of such Delivery Year, including the First Incremental Auction, Second Incremental Auction, Third Incremental Auction or Conditional Incremental Auction. Incremental Auctions (other than the Conditional Incremental Auction), shall be held for the purposes of:

(i) allowing Market Sellers that committed Capacity Resources in the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, which subsequently are determined to be unavailable to deliver the committed Unforced Capacity in such Delivery Year (due to resource retirement, resource cancellation or construction delay, resource derating, EFORD increase, a decrease in the Nominated Demand Resource Value of a Planned Demand Resource, delay or cancellation of a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade, or similar occurrences) to submit Buy Bids for replacement Capacity Resources; and

(ii) allowing the Office of the Interconnection to reduce or increase the amount of committed capacity secured in prior auctions for such Delivery Year if, as a result of changed circumstances or expectations since the prior auction(s), there is, respectively, a significant excess or significant deficit of committed capacity for such Delivery Year, for the PJM Region or for an LDA.

### **2.35 Incremental Capacity Transfer Right**

“Incremental Capacity Transfer Right” shall mean a Capacity Transfer Right allocated to a Generation Interconnection Customer or Transmission Interconnection Customer obligated to fund a transmission facility or upgrade, to the extent such upgrade or facility increases the transmission import capability into a Locational Deliverability Area, or a Capacity Transfer Right allocated to a Responsible Customer in accordance with Schedule 12A of the Tariff.

### **2.36 Interruptible Load for Reliability (ILR)**

“Interruptible Load for Reliability” or “ILR” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

#### **2.36A Limited Demand Resource**

“Limited Demand Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

#### **2.36B Limited Demand Resource Reliability Target**

“Limited Demand Resource Reliability Target” for the PJM Region or an LDA, shall mean the maximum amount of Limited Demand Resources determined by PJM to be consistent with the

maintenance of reliability, stated in Unforced Capacity that shall be used to calculate the Minimum Extended Summer Demand Resource Requirement for the PJM Region or such LDA. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM calculates the Limited Demand Resource Reliability Target by first: i) testing the effects of the ten-interruption requirement by comparing possible loads on peak days under a range of weather conditions (from the daily load forecast distributions for the Delivery Year in question) against possible generation capacity on such days under a range of conditions (using the cumulative capacity distributions employed in the Installed Reserve Margin study for the PJM Region and in the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective study for the relevant LDAs for such Delivery Year) and, by varying the assumed amounts of DR that is committed and displaces committed generation, determines the DR penetration level at which there is a ninety percent probability that DR will not be called (based on the applicable operating reserve margin for the PJM Region and for the relevant LDAs) more than ten times over those peak days; and ii) testing the six-hour duration requirement by calculating the MW difference between the highest hourly unrestricted peak load and seventh highest hourly unrestricted peak load on certain high peak load days (e.g., the annual peak, loads above the weather normalized peak, or days where load management was called) in recent years, then dividing those loads by the forecast peak for those years and averaging the result. Second, PJM adopts the lower result from these two tests as the Limited Demand Resource Reliability Target. The Limited Demand Resource Reliability Target shall be expressed as a percentage of the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA and is converted to Unforced Capacity by multiplying [the reliability target percentage] times [the Forecast Pool Requirement] times [the DR Factor] times [the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA, reduced by the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative].

### **2.37 Load Serving Entity (LSE)**

“Load Serving Entity” or “LSE” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.38 Locational Deliverability Area (LDA)**

“Locational Deliverability Area” or “LDA” shall mean a geographic area within the PJM Region that has limited transmission capability to import capacity to satisfy such area’s reliability requirement, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in connection with preparation of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, and as specified in Schedule 10.1 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.39 Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement**

“Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement” shall mean the projected internal capacity in the Locational Deliverability Area plus the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective for the Delivery Year, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in connection with preparation of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, less the minimum internal resources required for all FRR Entities in such Locational Deliverability Area, and less any necessary adjustment for Price Responsive Demand proposed in a PRD Plan or committed following an

RPM Auction for the Zones comprising such Locational Deliverability Area for such Delivery Year.

#### **2.40 Locational Price Adder**

“Locational Price Adder” shall mean an addition to the marginal value of Unforced Capacity within an LDA as necessary to reflect the price of Capacity Resources required to relieve applicable binding locational constraints.

#### **2.41 Locational Reliability Charge**

“Locational Reliability Charge” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

#### **2.41A Locational UCAP**

“Locational UCAP” shall mean unforced capacity that a Member with available uncommitted capacity sells in a bilateral transaction to a Member that previously committed capacity through an RPM Auction but now requires replacement capacity to fulfill its RPM Auction commitment. The Locational UCAP Seller retains responsibility for performance of the resource providing such replacement capacity.

#### **2.41B Locational UCAP Seller**

“Locational UCAP Seller” shall mean a Member that sells Locational UCAP.

#### **2.41C Market Seller Offer Cap**

“Market Seller Offer Cap” shall mean a maximum offer price applicable to certain Market Sellers under certain conditions, as determined in accordance with section 6 of Attachment DD and section I.E of Attachment M - Appendix.

#### **2.41D Minimum Annual Resource Requirement**

“Minimum Annual Resource Requirement” shall mean the minimum amount of capacity that PJM will seek to procure from Annual Resources for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. For the PJM Region, the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement shall be equal to the RTO Reliability Requirement minus [the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for the PJM Region in Unforced Capacity] minus [the Extended Summer Demand Resource Reliability Target for the RTO in Unforced Capacity]. For an LDA, the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement shall be equal to the LDA Reliability Requirement minus [the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for such LDA in Unforced Capacity] minus [the LDA CETL] minus [the Extended Summer Demand Resource Reliability Target for such LDA in Unforced Capacity]. The LDA CETL may be adjusted pro rata for the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative.

#### **2.41E Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement**

“Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement” shall mean the minimum amount of capacity that PJM will seek to procure from Extended Summer Demand Resources and Annual Resources for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. For the PJM Region, the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement shall be equal to the RTO Reliability Requirement minus [the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for the RTO in Unforced Capacity] minus [the Limited Demand Resource Reliability Target for the PJM Region in Unforced Capacity]. For an LDA, the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement shall be equal to the LDA Reliability Requirement minus [the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for the LDA in Unforced Capacity] minus [the LDA CETL] minus [the Limited Demand Resource Reliability Target for such LDA in Unforced Capacity]. The LDA CETL may be adjusted pro rata for the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative.

#### **2.42 Net Cost of New Entry**

“Net Cost of New Entry” shall mean the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset, as defined in Section 5.

#### **2.43 Nominated Demand Resource Value**

“Nominated Demand Resource Value” shall mean the amount of load reduction that a Demand Resource commits to provide either through direct load control, firm service level or guaranteed load drop programs. For existing Demand Resources, the maximum Nominated Demand Resource Value is limited, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, to the value appropriate for the method by which the load reduction would be accomplished, at the time the Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction is being conducted.

#### **2.43A Nominated Energy Efficiency Value**

“Nominated Energy Efficiency Value” shall mean the amount of load reduction that an Energy Efficiency Resource commits to provide through installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems.

#### **2.44 Nominated ILR Value**

“Nominated ILR Value” shall mean the amount of load reduction that an ILR resource commits to provide either through direct load control, firm service level or guaranteed load drop programs. For ILR, the maximum Nominated ILR Capacity Value is limited, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, to the value appropriate for the method by which the load reduction would be accomplished, at the time the ILR is certified.

#### **2.45 Opportunity Cost**

“Opportunity Cost” shall mean a component of the Market Seller Offer Cap calculated in accordance with section 6.

**2.46 Peak-Hour Dispatch**

“Peak-Hour Dispatch” shall mean, for purposes of calculating the Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset under section 5 of this Attachment, an assumption, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, that the Reference Resource is dispatched in four distinct blocks of four hours of continuous output for each block from the peak-hour period beginning with the hour ending 0800 EPT through to the hour ending 2300 EPT for any day when the average real-time LMP for the area for which the Net Cost of New Entry is being determined is greater than, or equal to, the cost to generate (including the cost for a complete start and shutdown cycle) for at least two hours during each four-hour block, where such blocks shall be assumed to be dispatched independently; provided that, if there are not at least two economic hours in any given four-hour block, then the Reference Resource shall be assumed not to be dispatched for such block.

**2.47 Peak Season**

“Peak Season” shall mean the weeks containing the 24th through 36th Wednesdays of the calendar year. Each such week shall begin on a Monday and end on the following Sunday, except for the week containing the 36th Wednesday, which shall end on the following Friday.

**2.48 Percentage Internal Resources Required**

“Percentage Internal Resources Required” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**2.49 Planned Demand Resource**

“Planned Demand Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**2.50 Planned External Generation Capacity Resource**

“Planned External Generation Capacity Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**2.50A Planned Generation Capacity Resource**

“Planned Generation Capacity Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**2.51 Planning Period**

“Planning Period” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

## **2.52 PJM Region**

“PJM Region” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

## **2.53 PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin**

“PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

## **2.54 PJM Region Peak Load Forecast**

“PJM Region Peak Load Forecast” shall mean the peak load forecast used by the Office of the Interconnection in determining the PJM Region Reliability Requirement, and shall be determined on both a preliminary and final basis as set forth in section 5.

## **2.55 PJM Region Reliability Requirement**

“PJM Region Reliability Requirement” shall mean, for purposes of the Base Residual Auction, the Forecast Pool Requirement multiplied by the Preliminary PJM Region Peak Load Forecast, less the sum of all Preliminary Unforced Capacity Obligations of FRR Entities in the PJM Region; and, for purposes of the Incremental Auctions, the Forecast Pool Requirement multiplied by the updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecast, less the sum of all updated Unforced Capacity Obligations of FRR Entities in the PJM Region, and less any necessary adjustment for Price Responsive Demand proposed in a PRD Plan or committed following an RPM Auction (as applicable) for such Delivery Year.

## **2.56 Projected PJM Market Revenues**

“Projected PJM Market Revenues” shall mean a component of the Market Seller Offer Cap calculated in accordance with section 6.

## **2.57 Qualifying Transmission Upgrade**

“Qualifying Transmission Upgrade” shall mean a proposed enhancement or addition to the Transmission System that: (a) will increase the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit into an LDA by a megawatt quantity certified by the Office of the Interconnection; (b) the Office of the Interconnection has determined will be in service on or before the commencement of the first Delivery Year for which such upgrade is the subject of a Sell Offer in the Base Residual Auction; (c) is the subject of a Facilities Study Agreement executed before the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and (d) a New Service Customer is obligated to fund through a rate or charge specific to such facility or upgrade.

## **2.58 Reference Resource**

“Reference Resource” shall mean a combustion turbine generating station, configured with two General Electric Frame 7FA turbines with inlet air cooling to 50 degrees, Selective Catalytic Reduction technology, dual fuel capability, and a heat rate of 10,500 Mmbtu/ MWh.



### **2.59 Reliability Assurance Agreement**

“Reliability Assurance Agreement” shall mean that certain “Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load-Serving Entities in the PJM Region,” on file with FERC as PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. Rate Schedule FERC No.44.

### **2.60 Reliability Pricing Model Auction**

“Reliability Pricing Model Auction” or “RPM Auction” shall mean the Base Residual Auction or any Incremental Auction.

### **2.61 Resource Substitution Charge**

“Resource Substitution Charge” shall mean a charge assessed on Capacity Market Buyers in an Incremental Auction to recover the cost of replacement Capacity Resources.

### **2.61A Scheduled Incremental Auctions**

“Scheduled Incremental Auctions” shall refer to the First, Second, or Third Incremental Auction.

### **2.62 Second Incremental Auction**

“Second Incremental Auction” shall mean an Incremental Auction conducted ten months before the Delivery Year to which it relates.

### **2.63 Sell Offer**

“Sell Offer” shall mean an offer to sell Capacity Resources in a Base Residual Auction, Incremental Auction, or Reliability Backstop Auction.

### **2.64 [Reserved for Future Use]**

### **2.65 Self-Supply**

“Self-Supply” shall mean Capacity Resources secured by a Load-Serving Entity, by ownership or contract, outside a Reliability Pricing Model Auction, and used to meet obligations under this Attachment or the Reliability Assurance Agreement through submission in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction of a Sell Offer indicating such Market Seller’s intent that such Capacity Resource be Self-Supply. Self-Supply may be either committed regardless of clearing price or submitted as a Sell Offer with a price bid. A Load Serving Entity’s Sell Offer with a price bid for an owned or contracted Capacity Resource shall not be deemed “Self-Supply,” unless it is designated as Self-Supply and used by the LSE to meet obligations under this Attachment or the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **2.65A Short-Term Resource Procurement Target**

“Short-Term Resource Procurement Target” shall mean, as to the PJM Region, for purposes of the Base Residual Auction, 2.5% of the PJM Region Reliability Requirement determined for such Base Residual Auction, for purposes of the First Incremental Auction, 2% of the of the PJM Region Reliability Requirement as calculated at the time of the Base Residual Auction; and, for purposes of the Second Incremental Auction, 1.5% of the of the PJM Region Reliability Requirement as calculated at the time of the Base Residual Auction; and, as to any Zone, an allocation of the PJM Region Short-Term Resource Procurement Target based on the Preliminary Zonal Forecast Peak Load, reduced by the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative. For any LDA, the LDA Short-Term Resource Procurement Target shall be the sum of the Short-Term Resource Procurement Targets of all Zones in the LDA.

#### **2.65B Short-Term Resource Procurement Target Applicable Share**

“Short-Term Resource Procurement Target Applicable Share” shall mean: (i) for the PJM Region, as to the First and Second Incremental Auctions, 0.2 times the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target used in the Base Residual Auction and, as to the Third Incremental Auction for the PJM Region, 0.6 times such target; and (ii) for an LDA, as to the First and Second Incremental Auctions, 0.2 times the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target used in the Base Residual Auction for such LDA and, as to the Third Incremental Auction, 0.6 times such target.

#### **2.66 Third Incremental Auction**

“Third Incremental Auction” shall mean an Incremental Auction conducted three months before the Delivery Year to which it relates.

#### **2.67 Transition Adder**

“Transition Adder” shall mean a component of a Sell Offer permitted for certain Capacity Market Sellers for the Transition Period, as set forth in section 17.

#### **2.68 Transition Period**

“Transition Period” shall mean the four-year period consisting of the Delivery Years commencing June 1, 2007, June 1, 2008, June 1, 2009, and June 1, 2010.

#### **2.69 Unforced Capacity**

“Unforced Capacity” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

#### **2.69A Updated VRR Curve**

“Updated VRR Curve” shall mean the Variable Resource Requirement Curve as defined in section 5.10(a) of this Attachment for use in the Base Residual Auction of the relevant Delivery Year, updated to reflect the Short-term Resource Procurement Target applicable to the relevant

Incremental Auction and any change in the Reliability Requirement from the Base Residual Auction to such Incremental Auction.

**2.69B Updated VRR Curve Increment**

“Updated VRR Curve Increment” shall mean the portion of the Updated VRR Curve to the right of a vertical line at the level of Unforced Capacity on the x-axis of such curve equal to the net Unforced Capacity committed to the PJM Region as a result of all prior auctions conducted for such Delivery Year.

**2.69C Updated VRR Curve Decrement**

“Updated VRR Curve Decrement” shall mean the portion of the Updated VRR Curve to the left of a vertical line at the level of Unforced Capacity on the x-axis of such curve equal to the net Unforced Capacity committed to the PJM Region as a result of all prior auctions conducted for such Delivery Year.

**2.70 Variable Resource Requirement Curve**

“Variable Resource Requirement Curve” shall mean a series of maximum prices that can be cleared in a Base Residual Auction for Unforced Capacity, corresponding to a series of varying resource requirements based on varying installed reserve margins, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the PJM Region and for certain Locational Deliverability Areas in accordance with the methodology provided in Section 5.

**2.71 Zonal Capacity Price**

“Zonal Capacity Price” shall mean the clearing price required in each Zone to meet the demand for Unforced Capacity and satisfy Locational Deliverability Requirements for the LDA or LDAs associated with such Zone. If the Zone contains multiple LDAs with different Capacity Resource Clearing Prices, the Zonal Capacity Price shall be a weighted average of the Capacity Resource Clearing Prices for such LDAs, weighted by the Unforced Capacity of Capacity Resources cleared in each such LDA.

#### **5.4 Reliability Pricing Model Auctions**

The Office of the Interconnection shall conduct the following Reliability Pricing Model Auctions:

a) Base Residual Auction.

PJM shall conduct for each Delivery Year a Base Residual Auction to secure commitments of Capacity Resources as needed to satisfy the portion of the RTO Unforced Capacity Obligation not satisfied through Self-Supply of Capacity Resources for such Delivery Year. All Self-Supply Capacity Resources must be offered in the Base Residual Auction. As set forth in section 6.6, all other Capacity Resources, and certain other existing generation resources, must be offered in the Base Residual Auction. The Base Residual Auction shall be conducted in the month of May that is three years prior to the start of such Delivery Year. The cost of payments to Capacity Market Sellers for Capacity Resources that clear such auction shall be paid by PJMSettlement from amounts collected by PJMSettlement from Load Serving Entities through the Locational Reliability Charge during such Delivery Year. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the sales that clear in such auction and to the obligations to pay, and the payments, by Load Serving Entities; provided, however, that PJMSettlement shall not be a Counterparty to committed Self-Supply Capacity Resources.

b) Scheduled Incremental Auctions.

PJM shall conduct for each Delivery Year a First, a Second, and a Third Incremental Auction for the purposes set forth in section 2.34. The First Incremental Auction shall be conducted in the month of September that is twenty months prior to the start of the Delivery Year; the Second Incremental Auction shall be conducted in the month of July that is ten months prior to the start of the Delivery Year; and the Third Incremental Auction shall be conducted in the month of February that is three months prior to the start of the Delivery Year.

c) Adjustment through Scheduled Incremental Auctions of Capacity Previously Committed.

The Office of the Interconnection shall recalculate the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and each LDA Reliability Requirement prior to each Scheduled Incremental Auction, based on an updated peak load forecast, updated Installed Reserve Margin and an updated Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective; shall update such reliability requirements for the Third Incremental Auction to reflect any change from such recalculation; and shall update such reliability requirements for the First Incremental Auction or Second Incremental Auction only if the change is greater than or equal to the lesser of: (i) 500 MW or (ii) one percent of the applicable prior reliability requirement. Based on such update, the Office of the Interconnection shall, under certain conditions, seek through the Scheduled Incremental Auction to secure

additional commitments of capacity or release sellers from prior capacity commitments. Specifically, the Office of the Interconnection shall:

1) seek additional capacity commitments to serve the PJM Region or an LDA if the PJM Region Reliability Requirement or LDA Reliability Requirement utilized in the most recent prior auction conducted for the Delivery Year (including any reductions to such reliability requirements as a result of any Price Responsive Demand with a PRD Reservation Price equal to or lower than the clearing price in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year) is less than, respectively, the updated PJM Region Reliability Requirement or updated LDA Reliability Requirement; provided, however, that in the First Incremental Auction or Second Incremental Auction the Office of the Interconnection shall seek such additional capacity commitments only if such shortfall is in an amount greater than or equal to the lesser of: (i) 500 MW or (ii) one percent of the applicable prior reliability requirement;

LDA if:

2) seek additional capacity commitments to serve the PJM Region or an

i) the updated PJM Region Reliability Requirement less the PJM Region Short-Term Resource Procurement Target utilized in the most recent auction conducted for the Delivery Year, or if the LDA Reliability Requirement less the LDA Short Term Resource Procurement Target applicable to such auction, exceeds the total capacity committed in all prior auctions in such region or area, respectively, for such Delivery Year by an amount greater than or equal to the lesser of: (A) 500 MW or (B) one percent of the applicable prior reliability requirement; or

ii) PJM conducts a Conditional Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year and does not obtain all additional commitments of Capacity Resources sought in such Conditional Incremental Auction, in which case, PJM shall seek in the Incremental Auction the commitments that were sought in the Conditional Incremental Auction but not obtained.

3) seek agreements to release prior capacity commitments to the PJM Region or to an LDA if:

i) the PJM Region Reliability Requirement or LDA Reliability Requirement utilized in the most recent prior auction conducted for the Delivery Year (including any reductions to such reliability requirements as a result of any Price Responsive Demand with a PRD Reservation Price equal to or lower than the clearing price in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year) exceeds, respectively, the updated PJM Region Reliability Requirement or updated LDA Reliability Requirement; provided, however, that in the First Incremental Auction or Second Incremental Auction the Office of the Interconnection shall seek such agreements only if such excess is in an amount greater than or equal to the lesser of: (A) 500 MW or (B) one percent of the applicable prior reliability requirement; or

ii) PJM obtains additional commitments of Capacity Resources in a Conditional Incremental Auction, in which case PJM shall seek release of an equal number of megawatts (comparing the total purchase amount for all LDAs and the PJM Region related to the delay in Backbone Transmission with the total sell amount for all LDAs and the PJM Region related to the delay in Backbone Transmission) of prior committed capacity that would not have been committed had the delayed Backbone Transmission upgrade that prompted the Conditional Incremental Auction not been assumed, at the time of the Base Residual Auction, to be in service for the relevant Delivery Year; and if PJM obtains additional commitments of capacity in an incremental auction pursuant to subsection c.2.ii above, PJM shall seek in such Incremental Auction to release an equal amount of capacity (in total for all LDAs and the PJM Region related to the delay in Backbone Transmission) previously committed that would not have been committed absent the Backbone Transmission upgrade.

4) The cost of payments to Market Sellers for additional Capacity Resources cleared in such auctions, and the credits from payments from Market Sellers for the release of previously committed Capacity Resources, shall be apportioned to Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region or LDA, as applicable, through adjustments to the Locational Reliability Charge for such Delivery Year.

5) PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the sales (including releases) of Capacity Resources that clear in such auctions and to the obligations to pay, and the payments, by Load Serving Entities, provided, however, that PJMSettlement shall not be a Counterparty to committed Self-Supply Capacity Resources.

d) Commitment of Replacement Capacity through Scheduled Incremental Auctions.

Each Scheduled Incremental Auction for each Delivery Year shall allow Capacity Market Sellers that committed Capacity Resources in any prior Reliability Pricing Model Auction for such Delivery Year to submit Buy Bids for replacement Capacity Resources. Capacity Market Sellers that submit Buy Bids into an Incremental Auction must specify the type of Unforced Capacity desired, i.e., Annual Resource, Extended Summer Demand Resource, or Limited Demand Resource. The need to purchase replacement Capacity Resources may arise for any reason, including but not limited to resource retirement, resource cancellation or construction delay, resource derating, EFORd increase, a decrease in the Nominated Demand Resource Value of a Planned Demand Resource, delay or cancellation of a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade, or similar occurrences. The cost of payments to Capacity Market Sellers for Capacity Resources that clear such auction shall be paid by PJMSettlement from amounts collected by PJMSettlement from Capacity Market Buyers that purchase replacement Capacity Resources in such auction. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the sales and purchases that clear in such auction, provided, however, PJMSettlement shall not be a Counterparty to committed Self-Supply Capacity Resources.

e) Conditional Incremental Auction.

PJM shall conduct for any Delivery Year a Conditional Incremental Auction if the in service date of a Backbone Transmission Upgrade that was modeled in the Base Residual Auction is announced as delayed by the Office of the Interconnection beyond July 1 of the Delivery Year for which it was modeled and if such delay causes a reliability criteria violation. If conducted, the Conditional Incremental Auction shall be for the purpose of securing commitments of additional capacity for the PJM Region or for any LDA to address the identified reliability criteria violation. If PJM determines to conduct a Conditional Incremental Auction, PJM shall post on its website the date and parameters for such auction (including whether such auction is for the PJM Region or for an LDA) at least one month prior to the start of such auction. The cost of payments to Market Sellers for Capacity Resources cleared in such auction shall be collected by PJMSettlement from Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region or LDA, as applicable, through an adjustment to the Locational Reliability Charge for such Delivery Year. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the sales that clear in such auction and to the obligations to pay, and payments, by Load Serving Entities, provided, however, that PJMSettlement shall not be a Counterparty to committed Self-Supply Capacity Resources.

### 5.10 Auction Clearing Requirements

The Office of the Interconnection shall clear each Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auction for a Delivery Year in accordance with the following:

a) Variable Resource Requirement Curve

The Office of the Interconnection shall determine Variable Resource Requirement Curves for the PJM Region and for such Locational Deliverability Areas as determined appropriate in accordance with subsection (a)(iii) for such Delivery Year to establish the level of Capacity Resources that will provide an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards. It is recognized that the variable resource requirement reflected in the Variable Resource Requirement Curve can result in an optimized auction clearing in which the level of Capacity Resources committed for a Delivery Year exceeds the PJM Region Reliability Requirement (less the Forecast RTO ILR Obligation for Delivery Years through May 31, 2012, or less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for Delivery Years thereafter) or Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement (less the Forecast Zonal ILR Obligation for Delivery Years through May 31, 2012, or less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for Delivery Years thereafter for the Zones associated with such LDA) for such Delivery Year. For any auction, the Updated Forecast Peak Load, and Short-Term Resource Procurement Target applicable to such auction, shall be used, and Price Responsive Demand from any applicable approved PRD Plan, including any associated Reservation Prices, shall be reflected in the derivation of the Variable Resource Requirement Curves, in accordance with the methodology specified in the PJM Manuals.

i) Methodology to Establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve

Prior to the Base Residual Auction, in accordance with the schedule in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region as follows:

- Each Variable Resource Requirement Curve shall be plotted on a graph on which Unforced Capacity is on the x-axis and price is on the y-axis;
- The Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region shall be plotted by first combining (i) a horizontal line from the y-axis to point (1), (ii) a straight line connecting points (1) and (2), (iii) a straight line connecting points (2) and (3), and (iv) a vertical line from point (3) to the x-axis, where:
  - For point (1), price equals: [1.5 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORD) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability



Requirement multiplied by (100% plus the approved PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin (“IRM”) minus 3%) divided by (100% plus IRM%) minus the Forecast RTO ILR Obligation for Delivery Years through May 31, 2012 or less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for Delivery Years thereafter;

- For point (2), price equals: (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset) divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 1%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Forecast RTO ILR Obligation for Delivery Years through May 31, 2012 or less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for Delivery Years thereafter; and
- For point (3), price equals [0.2 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 5%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Forecast RTO ILR Obligation for Delivery Years through May 31, 2012 or less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for Delivery Years thereafter;

ii) For any Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for each LDA for which:

- A. the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit is less than 1.15 times the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with NERC and Applicable Regional Reliability Council guidelines; or
- B. such LDA had a Locational Price Adder in any one or more of the three immediately preceding Base Residual Auctions; or
- C. such LDA is determined in a preliminary analysis by the Office of the Interconnection to be likely to have a Locational Price Adder, based on historic offer price levels; provided however that for the Base Residual Auction conducted for the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2012, the EMAAC, SWMAAC and MAAC LDAs shall employ separate Variable Resource Requirement Curves regardless of the outcome of the above three tests; and provided further that the Office of the Interconnection may establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for an LDA not otherwise qualifying under the above three tests if it finds that such is required to achieve an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards, in which case the Office of the Interconnection shall post such finding, such LDA, and such

Variable Resource Requirement Curve on its internet site no later than the March 31 last preceding the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The same process as set forth in subsection (a)(i) shall be used to establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for any such LDA, except that the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for such LDA shall be substituted for the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and the LDA Short-Term Resource Procurement Target shall be substituted for the PJM Region Short-Term Resource Procurement Target. For purposes of calculating the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit under this section, all generation resources located in the PJM Region that are, or that qualify to become, Capacity Resources, shall be modeled at their full capacity rating, regardless of the amount of capacity cleared from such resource for the immediately preceding Delivery Year.

iii) Procedure for ongoing review of Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.

Beginning no later than for the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2015, and continuing no later than for every third Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall perform a review of the shape of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, as established by the requirements of the foregoing subsection. Such analysis shall be based on simulation of market conditions to quantify the ability of the market to invest in new Capacity Resources and to meet the applicable reliability requirements on a probabilistic basis. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall prepare a recommendation to either modify or retain the existing Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the recommendation and shall review the recommendation through the stakeholder process to solicit stakeholder input. If a modification of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape is recommended, the following process shall be followed:

- A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape on or before September 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- B) The PJM Members shall review the proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.
- C) The PJM Members shall either vote to endorse the proposed modification, to propose alternate modifications or to recommend no modification by October 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- D) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider a proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape,

and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape with the FERC by December 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

iv) Cost of New Entry

- A) For the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2012, and continuing thereafter unless and until changed pursuant to subsection (B) below, the Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region shall be \$112,868 per MW-year. The Cost of New Entry for each LDA shall be determined based upon the Transmission Owner zones that comprise such LDA, as provided in the table below. If an LDA combines transmission zones with differing Cost of New Entry values, the lowest such value shall be used.

<b>Geographic Location Within the PJM Region Encompassing These Zones</b>	<b>Cost of New Entry in \$/MW-Year</b>
PS, JCP&L, AE, PECO, DPL, RECO (“CONE Area 1”)	122,040
BGE, PEPSCO (“CONE Area 2”)	112,868
AEP, Dayton, ComEd, APS, DQL, ATSI (“CONE Area 3”)	115,479
PPL, MetEd, Penelec (“CONE Area 4”)	112,868
Dominion (“CONE Area 5”)	112,868

- B) Beginning with the 2013-2014 Delivery Year, the CONE shall be adjusted to reflect changes in generating plant construction costs based on changes in the Applicable H-W Index, in accordance with the following:

(1) The Applicable H-W Index for any Delivery Year shall be the most recently published twelve-month change, at the time CONE values are required to be posted for the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, in the Total Other Production Plant Index shown in the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs for the North Atlantic Region for purposes of CONE Areas 1, 2, and 4, for the North Central Region for purposes of CONE Area 3, and for the South Atlantic Region for purposes of CONE Area 5.

(2) The CONE in a CONE Area shall be adjusted prior to the Base Residual Auction for each Delivery Year by applying the Applicable H-W Index for such CONE Area to the Benchmark CONE for such CONE Area.

(3) The Benchmark CONE for a CONE Area shall be the CONE used for such CONE Area in the Base Residual Auction for the prior Delivery Year.

(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing, CONE values for any CONE Area for any Delivery Year shall be subject to amendment pursuant to appropriate filings with FERC under the Federal Power Act, including, without limitation, any filings resulting from the process described in section 5.10(a)(vii)(C) or any filing to establish new or revised CONE Areas.

v) Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset

A) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset each year for the PJM Region as (A) the annual average of the revenues that would have been received by the Reference Resource during a period of three consecutive calendar years preceding the time of the determination, based on (1) the heat rate and other characteristics of such Reference Resource; (2) fuel prices reported during such period at an appropriate pricing point for the PJM Region with a fuel transmission adder appropriate for such region, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, assumed variable operation and maintenance expenses for such resource of \$6.47 per MWh, and actual PJM hourly average Locational Marginal Prices recorded in the PJM Region during such period; and (3) an assumption that the Reference Resource would be dispatched on a Peak-Hour Dispatch basis; plus (B) ancillary service revenues of \$2,199 per MW-year.

B) The Office of the Interconnection also shall determine a Net Energy and Ancillary Market Revenue Offset each year for each sub-region of the PJM Region for which the Cost of New Entry is determined, as identified above, using the same procedures and methods as set forth in the previous subsection; provided, however, that: (1) the average hourly LMPs for the transmission zone in which such resource was assumed to be installed for purposes of the CONE estimate (as specified in the PJM Manuals) shall be used in place of the PJM Region average hourly LMPs; (2) if such sub-region was not integrated into the PJM Region for the entire applicable period, then the offset shall be calculated using only those whole calendar years during which the sub-region was integrated; and (3) a posted fuel pricing point in such sub-region, if available, and (if such pricing point is not available) a fuel transmission adder appropriate to each assumed Cost of New Entry location from an appropriate PJM Region pricing point shall be used for each such sub-region.

vi) Adjustment to Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset

Beginning with the Base Residual Auction scheduled for May 2010, the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset for a CONE Area shall be adjusted following any Delivery Year during which Scarcity Pricing was effective in such CONE Area pursuant to the Scarcity Pricing provisions of section 6A of Schedule 1 to the PJM Operating Agreement. Following each Delivery Year, the Scarcity Pricing revenues the Reference Resource in each CONE Area would have received during such Delivery Year shall be calculated based on the assumed heat rate and other characteristics of the Reference Resource, assumed Peak-Hour Dispatch, and the actual locational marginal prices and actual fuel prices during the Delivery Year for the applicable location, which shall be the transmission zone in which such resource was assumed to be installed for purposes of the estimate of CONE applicable to such CONE Area. The Scarcity Pricing revenues so determined shall be subtracted from the Net CONE otherwise calculated for such CONE Area for use in the Base Residual Auction next occurring after the Delivery Year in which Scarcity Pricing was effective in such CONE Area.

vii) Process for Establishing Parameters of Variable Resource Requirement Curve

- A) The parameters of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve will be established prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year and will be used for such Base Residual Auction.
- B) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a Variable Resource Requirement Curve has been established for such Base Residual Auction on or before February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values will be applied, in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement.
- C) Beginning no later than for the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2015, and continuing no later than for every third Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the calculation of the Cost of New Entry for each CONE Area.
  - 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Cost of New Entry values should be modified, the Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose new Cost of New Entry values on or before September 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed values.
  - 3) The PJM Members shall either vote to endorse the proposed values or propose alternate values by October 31,

prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

- 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider Cost of New Entry values, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Cost of New Entry values with the FERC by December 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- D) Beginning no later than for the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2015, and continuing no later than for every third Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the methodology set forth in this Attachment for determining the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset for the PJM Region and for each Zone.
- 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology on or before September 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed methodology.
  - 3) The PJM Members shall either vote to endorse the proposed methodology or propose an alternate methodology by October 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider the Net Revenue Offset methodology, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset values with the FERC by December 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

b) Locational Requirements

The Office of Interconnection shall establish locational requirements prior to the Base Residual Auction to quantify the amount of Unforced Capacity that must be committed in each Locational Deliverability Area, in accordance with the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement.

c) Minimum Annual Resource Requirements

Prior to the Base Residual Auction and each Incremental Auction for each Delivery Year, beginning with the Delivery Year that starts on June 1, 2014, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year.

d) Preliminary PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for the Delivery Year

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Preliminary PJM Region Load Forecast for the Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

e) Updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecasts for Incremental Auctions

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for a Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year.

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**5.11 Posting of Information Relevant to the RPM Auctions**

a) In accordance with the schedule provided in the PJM Manuals, PJM will post the following information for a Delivery Year prior to conducting the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year:

i) The Preliminary PJM Region Peak Load Forecast (for the PJM Region, and allocated to each Zone) and, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2012, the ILR Forecast by Locational Deliverability Area;

ii) The PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin, the Pool-wide average EFORD, and the Forecast Pool Requirement;

iii) The Demand Resource Factor;

iv) The PJM Region Reliability Requirement, and the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region, including the details of any adjustments to account for Price Responsive Demand and any associated Reservation Prices;

v) The Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement and the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve has been established for such Base Residual Auction, including the details of any adjustments to account for Price Responsive Demand and any associated Reservation Prices, and the CETO and CETL values for all Locational Deliverability Areas;

vi) For Delivery Years starting with June 1, 2014, the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which PJM is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year;

vii) Any Transmission Upgrades that are expected to be in service for such Delivery Year, provided that a Transmission Upgrade that is Backbone Transmission satisfies the project development milestones set forth in section 5.11A;

viii) The bidding window time schedule for each auction to be conducted for such Delivery Year;

ix) The Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset values for the PJM Region for use in the Variable Resource Requirement Curves for the PJM Region and each Locational Deliverability Area for which a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve has been established for such Base Residual Auction; and



x) The results of the Preliminary Market Structure Screen in accordance with section 6.2(a).

b) The information listed in (a) will be posted and applicable for the First, Second, Third, and Conditional Incremental Auctions for such Delivery Year, except to the extent updated or adjusted as required by other provisions of this Tariff.

c) In accordance with the schedule provided in the PJM Manuals, PJM will post the Final PJM Region Peak Load Forecast and the allocation to each zone of the obligation resulting from such final forecast, following the completion of the final Incremental Auction (including any Conditional Incremental Auction) conducted for such Delivery Year;

d) In accordance with the schedule provided in the PJM Manuals, PJM will advise owners of Generation Capacity Resources of the updated EFORD values for such Generation Capacity Resources prior to the conduct of the Third Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year.

e) After conducting the Reliability Pricing Model Auctions, PJM will post the results of each auction as soon thereafter as possible, including any adjustments to PJM Region or LDA Reliability Requirements to reflect Price Responsive Demand with a Reservation Price equal to or less than the applicable Base Residual Auction clearing price. The posted results shall include graphical supply curves that are (a) provided for the entire PJM Region, (b) provided for any Locational Deliverability Area for which there are four (4) or more suppliers, and (c) developed using a formulaic approach to smooth the curves using a statistical technique that fits a smooth curve to the underlying supply curve data while ensuring that the point of intersection between supply and demand curves is at the market clearing price.

If PJM discovers an error in the initial posting of auction results for a particular Reliability Pricing Model Auction, it shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the initial publication of the results of the auction. After this initial notification, if PJM determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the seventh business day following the initial publication of the results of the auction. Thereafter, PJM must post on its Web site any corrected auction results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth business day following the initial publication of the results of the auction. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced auction results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

**OPERATING AGREEMENT - OA SCHEDULE 1 - OA 1. MARKET OPERATIONS - OA  
Schedule 1 Section 1.3 Definitions**

**1.3 Definitions.**

**1.3.1 Acceleration Request.**

“Acceleration Request” shall mean a request pursuant to section 1.9.4A of this Schedule to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage scheduled pursuant to sections 1.9.2 or 1.9.4.

**1.3.1A Auction Revenue Rights.**

“Auction Revenue Rights” or “ARRs” shall mean the right to receive the revenue from the Financial Transmission Right auction, as further described in Section 7.4 of this Schedule.

**1.3.1B Auction Revenue Rights Credits.**

“Auction Revenue Rights Credits” shall mean the allocated share of total FTR auction revenues or costs credited to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

**1.3.1B.01 Batch Load Demand Resource.**

“Batch Load Demand Resource” shall mean a Demand Resource that has a cyclical production process such that at most times during the process it is consuming energy, but at consistent regular intervals, ordinarily for periods of less than ten minutes, it reduces its consumption of energy for its production processes to minimal or zero megawatts.

**1.3.1B.02 Congestion Price.**

“Congestion Price” shall mean the congestion component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line loadings, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

**1.3.1B.03 Curtailment Service Provider.**

“Curtailment Service Provider” or “CSP” shall mean a Member or a Special Member, which action on behalf of itself or one or more other Members or non-Members, participates in the PJM Interchange Energy Market by causing a reduction in demand.

**1.3.1B.04 Day-ahead Congestion Price.**

“Day-ahead Congestion Price” shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.3.1C Day-ahead Energy Market.**

“Day-ahead Energy Market” shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

**1.3.1C.01 Day-ahead Loss Price.**

“Day-ahead Loss Price” shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.3.1D Day-ahead Prices.**

“Day-ahead Prices” shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.3.1D.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves” shall mean thirty-minute reserves as defined by the Reliability First Corporation and SERC.

**1.3.1D.02 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement” shall mean the thirty-minute reserve requirement for the PJM Region established consistent with Reliability First Corporation and SERC reliability standards, or those of any additional and/or successor regional reliability organization(s) that are responsible for establishing reliability requirements for the PJM Region, plus any additional thirty-minute reserves scheduled in response to an RTO-wide Hot or Cold Weather Alert or other reasons for conservative operations.

**1.3.1D.03 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources.**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources” shall mean synchronized and non-synchronized generation resources and Demand Resources electrically located within the PJM Region that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

**1.3.1D.04 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market.**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market” shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section 1.10 of this Schedule.

**1.3.1D.05 Day-ahead System Energy Price.**

“Day-ahead System Energy Price” shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.3.1E Decrement Bid.**

“Decrement Bid” shall mean a bid to purchase energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**1.31E.01 Demand Resource.**

“Demand Resource” shall mean a resource with the capability to provide a reduction in demand.

**1.3.1F Dispatch Rate.**

“Dispatch Rate” shall mean the control signal, expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour, calculated and transmitted continuously and dynamically to direct the output level of all generation resources dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the Offer Data.

**1.3.1G Energy Storage Resource.**

“Energy Storage Resource” shall mean flywheel or battery storage facility solely used for short term storage and injection of energy at a later time to participate in the PJM energy and/or Ancillary Services markets as a Market Seller.

**1.3.2 Equivalent Load.**

“Equivalent Load” shall mean the sum of a Market Participant’s net system requirements to serve its customer load in the PJM Region, if any, plus its net bilateral transactions.

**1.3.2A Economic Load Response Participant.**

“Economic Load Response Participant” shall mean a Member or Special Member that qualifies under Section 1.5A of this Schedule to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market through reductions in demand.

**1.3.2A.01 Economic Minimum.**

“Economic Minimum” shall mean the lowest incremental MW output level a unit can achieve while following economic dispatch

**1.3.2B Energy Market Opportunity Cost.**

“Energy Market Opportunity Cost” shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of available run hours

due to limitations imposed on the unit by Applicable Laws and Regulations (as defined in PJM Tariff), and (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Energy Market Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit's lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same compliance period, which compliance period is determined by the applicable regulatory authority and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Energy Market Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement. Generation Capacity Resources recovering Energy Market Opportunity Cost that self-schedule generation run hours 50% or less of the total available run hours shall consider the generation unit outages when the limited number of available run hours are exhausted as an Out of Management Control (OMC) Outage.

### **1.3.3 External Market Buyer.**

"External Market Buyer" shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for consumption by end-users outside the PJM Region, or for load in the PJM Region that is not served by Network Transmission Service.

### **1.3.4 External Resource.**

"External Resource" shall mean a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the PJM Region.

### **1.3.5 Financial Transmission Right.**

"Financial Transmission Right" or "FTR" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2 of this Schedule.

#### **1.3.5A Financial Transmission Right Obligation.**

"Financial Transmission Right Obligation" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(b) of this Schedule.

#### **1.3.5B Financial Transmission Right Option.**

"Financial Transmission Right Option" shall mean a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Section 5.2.2(c) of this Schedule.

### **1.3.6 Generating Market Buyer.**

"Generating Market Buyer" shall mean an Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity that owns or has contractual rights to the output of generation resources capable of serving the Market Buyer's load in the PJM Region, or of selling energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or elsewhere.

### **1.3.7 Generator Forced Outage.**

“Generator Forced Outage” shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

### **1.3.8 Generator Maintenance Outage.**

“Generator Maintenance Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform necessary repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility meets the guidelines specified in the PJM Manuals.

### **1.3.9 Generator Planned Outage.**

“Generator Planned Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

### **1.3.9A Increment Bid.**

“Increment Bid” shall mean an offer to sell energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. An accepted Increment Bid results in scheduled generation at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

### **1.3.9B Interface Pricing Point.**

“Interface Pricing Point” shall have the meaning specified in section 2.6A.

### **1.3.10 Internal Market Buyer.**

“Internal Market Buyer” shall mean a Market Buyer making purchases of energy from the PJM Interchange Energy Market for ultimate consumption by end-users inside the PJM Region that are served by Network Transmission Service.

### **1.3.11 Inadvertent Interchange.**

“Inadvertent Interchange” shall mean the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the individual Control Areas operated by PJM.

#### **1.3.11.01 Load Management.**

“Load Management” shall mean either a Demand Resource (“DR”) or an Interruptible Load for Reliability (“ILR”) resource, both as defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

### **1.3.11A Load Reduction Event.**

“Load Reduction Event” shall mean a reduction in demand by a Member or Special Member for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

### **1.3.11B Loss Price.**

“Loss Price” shall mean the loss component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission losses, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

### **1.3.12 Market Operations Center.**

“Market Operations Center” shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by or on behalf of a Market Participant to communicate and coordinate with the Office of the Interconnection in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

### **1.3.12A Maximum Emergency.**

“Maximum Emergency” shall mean the designation of all or part of the output of a generating unit for which the designated output levels may require extraordinary procedures and therefore are available to the Office of the Interconnection only when the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency and requests generation designated as Maximum Emergency to run. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the aggregate amount of megawatts that are classified as Maximum Emergency.

### **1.3.13 Maximum Generation Emergency.**

“Maximum Generation Emergency” shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection to address either a generation or transmission emergency in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more Generation Capacity Resources, or Non-Retail Behind The Meter Generation resources to operate at its maximum net or gross electrical power output, subject to the equipment stress limits for such Generation Capacity Resource or Non-Retail Behind The Meter resource in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

### **1.3.14 Minimum Generation Emergency.**

“Minimum Generation Emergency” shall mean an Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection in which the Office of the Interconnection anticipates requesting one or more generating resources to operate at or below Normal Minimum Generation, in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

**1.3.14A NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator.**

“NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator” shall mean the NERC mechanism that is in effect and being used to calculate the distribution of energy, over specific transmission interfaces, from energy transactions.

**1.3.14B Net Benefits Test.**

“Net Benefits Test” shall mean a calculation to determine whether the benefits of a reduction in price resulting from the dispatch of Economic Load Response exceeds the cost to other loads resulting from the billing unit effects of the load reduction, as specified in Section 3.3A.4 of this Schedule.

**1.3.15 Network Resource.**

“Network Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Tariff.

**1.3.16 Network Service User.**

“Network Service User” shall mean an entity using Network Transmission Service.

**1.3.17 Network Transmission Service.**

“Network Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part III of the PJM Tariff, or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

**1.3.17A Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost.**

“Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost” shall mean the difference between (a) the forecasted cost to operate a specific generating unit when the unit only has a limited number of starts or available run hours resulting from (i) the physical equipment limitations of the unit, for up to one year, due to original equipment manufacturer recommendations or insurance carrier restrictions, (ii) a fuel supply limitation, for up to one year, resulting from an event of force majeure; and, (b) the forecasted future hourly Locational Marginal Price at which the generating unit could run while not violating such limitations. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost therefore is the value associated with a specific generating unit’s lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued period of time occurring within the same period of time in which the unit is bound by the referenced restrictions, and is reflected in the rules set forth in PJM Manual 15. Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs shall be limited to those resources which are specifically delineated in Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement. Generation Capacity Resources recovering Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost that self-schedule generation run hours 50% or less of the total available run hours shall consider the generation unit outages when the limited number of available run hours are exhausted as an Out of Management Control (OMC) Outage.

**1.3.17B Non-Variable Loads.**



“Non-Variable Loads” shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

**1.3.18 Normal Maximum Generation.**

“Normal Maximum Generation” shall mean the highest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

**1.3.19 Normal Minimum Generation.**

“Normal Minimum Generation” shall mean the lowest output level of a generating resource under normal operating conditions.

**1.3.20 Offer Data.**

“Offer Data” shall mean the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new resource, and other data and information necessary to schedule and dispatch generation resources and Demand Resource(s) for the provision of energy and other services and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the PJM Region, and specified for submission to the PJM Interchange Energy Market for such purposes by the Office of the Interconnection.

**1.3.21 Office of the Interconnection Control Center.**

“Office of the Interconnection Control Center” shall mean the equipment, facilities and personnel used by the Office of the Interconnection to coordinate and direct the operation of the PJM Region and to administer the PJM Interchange Energy Market, including facilities and equipment used to communicate and coordinate with the Market Participants in connection with transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or the operation of the PJM Region.

**1.3.21A On-Site Generators.**

“On-Site Generators” shall mean generation facilities (including Behind The Meter Generation) that (i) are not Capacity Resources, (ii) are not injecting into the grid, (iii) are either synchronized or non-synchronized to the Transmission System, and (iv) can be used to reduce demand for the purpose of participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**1.3.22 Operating Day.**

“Operating Day” shall mean the daily 24 hour period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the PJM Interchange Energy Market are scheduled.

**1.3.23 Operating Margin.**

“Operating Margin” shall mean the incremental adjustments, measured in megawatts, required in PJM Region operations in order to accommodate, on a first contingency basis, an operating contingency in the PJM Region resulting from operations in an interconnected Control Area.

Such adjustments may result in constraints causing Transmission Congestion Charges, or may result in Ancillary Services charges pursuant to the PJM Tariff.

#### **1.3.24 Operating Margin Customer.**

“Operating Margin Customer” shall mean a Control Area purchasing Operating Margin pursuant to an agreement between such other Control Area and the LLC.

#### **1.3.25 PJM Interchange.**

“PJM Interchange” shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds, or is exceeded by, the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller; or (e) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (f) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

#### **1.3.26 PJM Interchange Export.**

“PJM Interchange Export” shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load is exceeded by the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup sales; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy by a Market Seller from an External Resource; or (d) the hourly net metered output of any other Market Seller.

#### **1.3.27 PJM Interchange Import.**

“PJM Interchange Import” shall mean the following, as determined in accordance with the Schedules to this Agreement: (a) for a Market Participant that is a Network Service User, the amount by which its hourly Equivalent Load exceeds the sum of the hourly outputs of its operating generating resources; or (b) for a Market Participant that is not a Network Service User, the amount of its Spot Market Backup purchases; or (c) the hourly scheduled deliveries of Spot Market Energy to an External Market Buyer; or (d) the hourly scheduled deliveries to an Internal Market Buyer that is not a Network Service User.

#### **1.3.28 PJM Open Access Same-time Information System.**

“PJM Open Access Same-time Information System” shall mean the electronic communication system for the collection and dissemination of information about transmission services in the PJM Region, established and operated by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with FERC standards and requirements.

**1.3.28A Planning Period Quarter.**

“Planning Period Quarter” shall mean any of the following three month periods in the Planning Period: June, July and August; September, October and November; December, January and February; or March, April and May.

**1.3.28B Planning Period Balance.**

“Planning Period Balance” shall mean the entire period of time remaining in the Planning Period following the month that a monthly auction is conducted.

**1.3.29 Point-to-Point Transmission Service.**

“Point-to-Point Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part II of the PJM Tariff.

**1.3.29A PRD Curve**

PRD Curve shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.29B PRD Provider**

PRD Provider shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.29C PRD Reservation Price**

PRD Reservation Price shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.29D PRD Substation**

PRD Substation shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**1.3.29E Price Responsive Demand**

Price Responsive Demand shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

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**1.3.30 Ramping Capability.**

“Ramping Capability” shall mean the sustained rate of change of generator output, in megawatts per minute.

**1.3.30.01 Real-time Congestion Price.**

“Real-time Congestion Price” shall mean the Congestion Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.30.02 Real-time Loss Price.**

“Real-time Loss Price” shall mean the Loss Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.30A Real-time Prices.**

“Real-time Prices” shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.30B Real-time Energy Market.**

“Real-time Energy Market” shall mean the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges for quantity deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.30B.01 Real-time System Energy Price.**

“Real-time System Energy Price” shall mean the System Energy Price resulting from the Office of the Interconnection’s dispatch of the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Operating Day.

**1.3.31 Regulation.**

“Regulation” shall mean the capability of a specific generation resource or Demand Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to increase or decrease its output or adjust load in response to a regulating control signal, in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals.

**1.3.31.01 Residual Auction Revenue Rights.**

“Residual Auction Revenue Rights” shall mean incremental stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights created within a Planning Period by an increase in transmission system capability or a change in any other relevant factor that was not modeled pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement in compliance with section 7.4.2(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, and, if modeled, would have increased the amount of stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to section 7.4.2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement; provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, Residual Auction Revenue Rights shall exclude: 1) Incremental Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Part VI of the Tariff; and 2) Auction Revenue Rights allocated to entities that are assigned cost responsibility pursuant to Schedule 6 of this Agreement for transmission upgrades that create such rights.

**1.3.31.02 Special Member.**

“Special Member” shall mean an entity that satisfies the requirements of Section 1.5A.02 of this Schedule or the special membership provisions established under the Emergency Load Response Program.

**1.3.31A [Reserved.]**

**1.3.31B [Reserved.]**

**1.3.32 Spot Market Backup.**

“Spot Market Backup” shall mean the purchase of energy from, or the delivery of energy to, the PJM Interchange Energy Market in quantities sufficient to complete the delivery or receipt obligations of a bilateral contract that has been curtailed or interrupted for any reason.

**1.3.33 Spot Market Energy.**

“Spot Market Energy” shall mean energy bought or sold by Market Participants through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at System Energy Prices determined as specified in Section 2 of this Schedule.

**1.3.33A State Estimator.**

“State Estimator” shall mean the computer model of power flows specified in Section 2.3 of this Schedule.

**1.3.33B Station Power.**

“Station Power” shall mean energy used for operating the electric equipment on the site of a generation facility located in the PJM Region or for the heating, lighting, air-conditioning and office equipment needs of buildings on the site of such a generation facility that are used in the operation, maintenance, or repair of the facility. Station Power does not include any energy (i) used to power synchronous condensers; (ii) used for pumping at a pumped storage facility; (iii) used for compressors at a compressed air energy storage facility; (iv) used for charging an Energy Storage Resource; or (v) used in association with restoration or black start service.

**1.3.33B.01 Synchronized Reserve.**

“Synchronized Reserve” shall mean the reserve capability of generation resources that can be converted fully into energy or Demand Resources whose demand can be reduced within ten minutes from the request of the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher, and is provided by equipment that is electrically synchronized to the Transmission System.

**1.3.33B.02 Synchronized Reserve Event.**

“Synchronized Reserve Event” shall mean a request from the Office of the Interconnection to generation resources and/or Demand Resources able, assigned or self-scheduled to provide

Synchronized Reserve, within ten minutes, to increase the energy output or reduce load by the amount of assigned or self-scheduled Synchronized Reserve capability.

**1.3.33B.03 System Energy Price.**

“System Energy Price” shall mean the energy component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a resource, calculated as specified in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

**1.3.33C Target Allocation.**

“Target Allocation” shall mean the allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits as set forth in Section 5.2.3 of this Schedule or the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits as set forth in Section 7.4.3 of this Schedule.

**1.3.34 Transmission Congestion Charge.**

“Transmission Congestion Charge” shall mean a charge attributable to the increased cost of energy delivered at a given load bus when the transmission system serving that load bus is operating under constrained conditions, or as necessary to provide energy for third-party transmission losses in accordance with Section 9.3, which shall be calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.1 of this Schedule.

**1.3.35 Transmission Congestion Credit.**

“Transmission Congestion Credit” shall mean the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Charges credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section 5.2 of this Schedule.

**1.3.36 Transmission Customer.**

“Transmission Customer” shall mean an entity using Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

**1.3.37 Transmission Forced Outage.**

“Transmission Forced Outage” shall mean an immediate removal from service of a transmission facility by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the transmission facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A removal from service of a transmission facility at the request of the Office of the Interconnection to improve transmission capability shall not constitute a Forced Transmission Outage.

**1.3.37A Transmission Loading Relief.**

“Transmission Loading Relief” shall mean NERC’s procedures for preventing operating security limit violations, as implemented by PJM as the security coordinator responsible for maintaining transmission security for the PJM Region.

**1.3.37B Transmission Loading Relief Customer.**

“Transmission Loading Relief Customer” shall mean an entity that, in accordance with Section 1.10.6A, has elected to pay Transmission Congestion Charges during Transmission Loading Relief in order to continue energy schedules over contract paths outside the PJM Region that are increasing the cost of energy in the PJM Region.

**1.3.37C Transmission Loss Charge.**

“Transmission Loss Charge” shall mean the charges to each Market Participant, Network Customer, or Transmission Customer for the cost of energy lost in the transmission of electricity from a generation resource to load as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

**1.3.38 Transmission Planned Outage.**

“Transmission Planned Outage” shall mean any transmission outage scheduled in advance for a pre-determined duration and which meets the notification requirements for such outages specified in this Agreement or the PJM Manuals.

**1.3.38A Variable Loads.**

“Variable Loads” shall have the meaning specified in section 1.5A.6 of this Schedule.

**1.3.39 Zonal Base Load.**

“Zonal Base Load” shall mean the lowest daily zonal peak load from the twelve month period ending October 21 of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which an annual Auction Revenue Right allocation is conducted, increased by the projected load growth rate for the relevant Zone.

**OPERATING AGREEMENT - OA SCHEDULE 1 - OA 1. MARKET OPERATIONS - OA 1.7**  
**General**

**1.7 General.**

**1.7.1 Market Sellers.**

Only Market Sellers shall be eligible to submit offers to the Office of the Interconnection for the sale of electric energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Market Sellers shall comply with the prices, terms, and operating characteristics of all Offer Data submitted to and accepted by the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**1.7.2 Market Buyers.**

Only Market Buyers shall be eligible to purchase energy or related services in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Market Buyers shall comply with all requirements for making purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**1.7.2A Economic Load Response Participants.**

Only Economic Load Response Participants shall be eligible to participate in the Real-time Energy Market and the Day-ahead Energy Market by submitting offers to the Office of the Interconnection to reduce demand.

**1.7.3 Agents.**

A Market Participant may participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market through an agent, provided that the Market Participant informs the Office of the Interconnection in advance in writing of the appointment of such agent. A Market Participant participating in the PJM Interchange Energy Market through an agent shall be bound by all of the acts or representations of such agent with respect to transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, and shall ensure that any such agent complies with the requirements of this Agreement.

**1.7.4 General Obligations of the Market Participants.**

(a) In performing its obligations to the Office of the Interconnection hereunder, each Market Participant shall at all times (i) follow Good Utility Practice, (ii) comply with all applicable laws and regulations, (iii) comply with the applicable principles, guidelines, standards and requirements of FERC, NERC and Applicable Regional Reliability Councils, (iv) comply with the procedures established for operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region and (v) cooperate with the Office of the Interconnection as necessary for the operation of the PJM Region in a safe, reliable manner consistent with Good Utility Practice.

(b) Market Participants shall undertake all operations in or affecting the PJM Interchange Energy Market and the PJM Region including but not limited to compliance with all Emergency procedures, in accordance with the power and authority of the Office of the Interconnection with respect to the operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market and the PJM Region as



established in this Agreement, and as specified in the Schedules to this Agreement and the PJM Manuals. Failure to comply with the foregoing operational requirements shall subject a Market Participant to such reasonable charges or other remedies or sanctions for non-compliance as may be established by the PJM Board, including legal or regulatory proceedings as authorized by the PJM Board to enforce the obligations of this Agreement.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection may establish such committees with a representative of each Market Participant, and the Market Participants agree to provide appropriately qualified personnel for such committees, as may be necessary for the Office of the Interconnection and PJMSettlement to perform its obligations hereunder.

(d) All Market Participants shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection the scheduling and other information specified in the Schedules to this Agreement, and such other information as the Office of the Interconnection may reasonably require for the reliable and efficient operation of the PJM Region and PJM Interchange Energy Market, and for compliance with applicable regulatory requirements for posting market and related information. Such information shall be provided as much in advance as possible, but in no event later than the deadlines established by the Schedules to this Agreement, or by the Office of the Interconnection in conformance with such Schedules. Such information shall include, but not be limited to, maintenance and other anticipated outages of generation or transmission facilities, scheduling and related information on bilateral transactions and self-scheduled resources, and implementation of active load management, interruption of load, Price Responsive Demand, and other load reduction measures. The Office of the Interconnection shall abide by appropriate requirements for the non-disclosure and protection of any confidential or proprietary information given to the Office of the Interconnection by a Market Participant. Each Market Participant shall maintain or cause to be maintained compatible information and communications systems, as specified by the Office of the Interconnection, required to transmit scheduling, dispatch, or other time-sensitive information to the Office of the Interconnection in a timely manner.

(e) Subject to the requirements for Economic Load Response participants in section 1.5A above, each Market Participant shall install and operate, or shall otherwise arrange for, metering and related equipment capable of recording and transmitting all voice and data communications reasonably necessary for the Office of the Interconnection and PJMSettlement to perform the services specified in this Agreement. A Market Participant that elects to be separately billed for its PJM Interchange shall, to the extent necessary, be individually metered in accordance with Section 14 of this Agreement, or shall agree upon an allocation of PJM Interchange between it and the Market Participant through whose meters the unmetered Market Participant's PJM Interchange is delivered. The Office of the Interconnection shall be notified of the allocation by the foregoing Market Participants.

(f) Each Market Participant shall operate, or shall cause to be operated, any generating resources owned or controlled by such Market Participant that are within the PJM Region or otherwise supplying energy to or through the PJM Region in a manner that is consistent with the standards, requirements or directions of the Office of the Interconnection and that will permit the Office of the Interconnection to perform its obligations under this Agreement; provided,

however, no Market Participant shall be required to take any action that is inconsistent with Good Utility Practice or applicable law.

(g) Each Market Participant shall follow the directions of the Office of the Interconnection to take actions to prevent, manage, alleviate or end an Emergency in a manner consistent with this Agreement and the procedures of the PJM Region as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(h) Each Market Participant shall obtain and maintain all permits, licenses or approvals required for the Market Participant to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the manner contemplated by this Agreement.

(i) Consistent with Section 36.1.1 of the PJM Tariff, to the extent its generating facility is dispatchable, a Market Participant shall submit an Economic Minimum in the Real-time Energy Market that is no greater than the higher of its physical operating minimum or its Capacity Interconnection Rights, as that term is defined in the PJM Tariff, associated with such generating facility under its Interconnection Service Agreement under Attachment O of the PJM Tariff or a wholesale market participation agreement.

#### **1.7.5 Market Operations Center.**

Each Market Participant shall maintain a Market Operations Center, or shall make appropriate arrangements for the performance of such services on its behalf. A Market Operations Center shall meet the performance, equipment, communications, staffing and training standards and requirements specified in this Agreement for the scheduling and completion of transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market and the maintenance of the reliable operation of the PJM Region, and shall be sufficient to enable (i) a Market Seller or an Economic Load Response Participant to perform all terms and conditions of its offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, and (ii) a Market Buyer or an Economic Load Response Participant to conform to the requirements for purchasing from the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

#### **1.7.6 Scheduling and Dispatching.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule and dispatch in real-time generation resources and/or Demand Resources economically on the basis of least-cost, security-constrained dispatch and the prices and operating characteristics offered by Market Sellers, continuing until sufficient generation resources and/or Demand Resources are dispatched to serve the PJM Interchange Energy Market energy purchase requirements under normal system conditions of the Market Buyers (taking into account any reductions to such requirements in accordance with PRD Curves properly submitted by PRD Providers), as well as the requirements of the PJM Region for ancillary services provided by generation resources and/or Demand Resources, in accordance with this Agreement. Such scheduling and dispatch shall recognize transmission constraints on coordinated flowgates external to the Transmission System in accordance with Appendix A to the Joint Operating Agreement between the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 38) and on other such flowgates that are coordinated in accordance with agreements between the LLC and other entities. Scheduling and dispatch shall be conducted in accordance with this Agreement.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall undertake to identify any conflict or incompatibility between the scheduling or other deadlines or specifications applicable to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, and any relevant procedures of another Control Area, or any tariff (including the PJM Tariff). Upon determining that any such conflict or incompatibility exists, the Office of the Interconnection shall propose tariff or procedural changes, and undertake such other efforts as may be appropriate, to resolve any such conflict or incompatibility.

(c) To protect its generation or distribution facilities, or local Transmission Facilities not under the monitoring responsibility and dispatch control of the Office of the Interconnection, an entity may request that the Office of the Interconnection schedule and dispatch generation or reductions in demand to meet a limit on Transmission Facilities different from that which the Office of the Interconnection has determined to be required for reliable operation of the Transmission System. To the extent consistent with its other obligations under this Agreement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule and dispatch generation and reductions in demand in accordance with such request. An entity that makes a request pursuant to this section 1.7.6(c) shall be responsible for all generation and other costs resulting from its request that would not have been incurred by operating the Transmission System and scheduling and dispatching generation in the manner that the Office of the Interconnection otherwise has determined to be required for reliable operation of the Transmission System.

#### **1.7.7 Pricing.**

The price paid for energy bought and sold in the PJM Interchange Energy Market and for demand reductions will reflect the hourly Locational Marginal Price at each load and generation bus, determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Agreement. Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, which shall be determined by differences in Congestion Prices and Loss Prices in an hour, shall be calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and collected by PJMSettlement, and the revenues therefrom shall be disbursed by PJMSettlement in accordance with this Schedule.

#### **1.7.8 Generating Market Buyer Resources.**

A Generating Market Buyer may elect to self-schedule its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer's Equivalent Load, in accordance with and subject to the procedures specified in this Schedule, and the accounting and billing requirements specified in Section 3 to this Schedule. PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party with respect to such self-scheduled or self-supplied transactions.

#### **1.7.9 Delivery to an External Market Buyer.**

A purchase of Spot Market Energy by an External Market Buyer shall be delivered to a bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region specified by the Office of the Interconnection, or to load in such area that is not served by Network Transmission Service, using Point-to-Point Transmission Service paid for by the External Market Buyer. Further delivery of such energy shall be the responsibility of the External Market Buyer.

### 1.7.10 Other Transactions.

(a) Bilateral Transactions.

- (i) In addition to transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Market Participants may enter into bilateral contracts for the purchase or sale of electric energy to or from each other or any other entity, subject to the obligations of Market Participants to make Generation Capacity Resources available for dispatch by the Office of the Interconnection. Such bilateral contracts shall be for the physical transfer of energy to or from a Market Participant and shall be reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules relating to its eSchedules and Enhanced Energy Scheduler tools.
- (ii) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral contracts for the physical transfer of energy to a Market Participant inside the PJM Region, title to the energy that is the subject of the bilateral contract shall pass to the buyer at the source specified for the bilateral contract, and the further transmission of the energy or further sale of the energy into the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall be transacted by the buyer under the bilateral contract. With respect to all bilateral contracts for the physical transfer of energy to an entity outside the PJM Region, title to the energy shall pass to the buyer at the border of the PJM Region and shall be delivered to the border using transmission service. In no event shall the purchase and sale of energy between Market Participants under a bilateral contract constitute a transaction in the PJM Interchange Energy Market or be construed to define PJMSettlement as a contracting party to any bilateral transactions between Market Participants.
- (iii) Market Participants that are parties to bilateral contracts for the purchase and sale and physical transfer of energy reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, to limit the megawatt hours of such reported transactions to amounts reflecting the expected load and other physical delivery obligations of the buyer under the bilateral contract.
- (iv) All payments and related charges for the energy associated with a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to the bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by the Office of the Interconnection or PJMSettlement. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under a bilateral contract reported and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

- (v) A buyer under a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the costs of any Spot Market Backup used to meet the bilateral contract seller's obligation to deliver energy under the bilateral contract and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the seller under the bilateral contract, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection. Upon any default in obligations to the LLC or PJMSettlement by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall (i) not accept any new eSchedules or Enhanced Energy Scheduler reporting by the Market Participant and (ii) terminate all of the Market Participant's eSchedules and Enhanced Energy Schedules associated with its bilateral contracts previously reported to the Office of the Interconnection for all days where delivery has not yet occurred. All claims regarding a buyer's default to a seller under a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller. In such circumstances, the seller may instruct the Office of the Interconnection to terminate all of the eSchedules and Enhanced Energy Schedules associated with bilateral contracts between buyer and seller previously reported to the Office of the Interconnection. PJMSettlement shall assign its claims against a seller with respect to a seller's nonpayment for Spot Market Backup to a buyer the extent that the buyer has made an indemnification payment to PJMSettlement with respect to the seller's nonpayment.
- (vi) Bilateral contracts that do not contemplate the physical transfer of energy to or from a Market Participant are not subject to this Schedule, shall not be reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection, and shall not in any way constitute a transaction in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(b) Market Participants shall have Spot Market Backup with respect to all bilateral transactions that contemplate the physical transfer of energy to or from a Market Participant, that are not dynamically scheduled pursuant to Section 1.12 and that are curtailed or interrupted for any reason (except for curtailments or interruptions through active load management for load located within the PJM Region).

(c) To the extent the Office of the Interconnection dispatches a Generating Market Buyer's generation resources, such Generating Market Buyer may elect to net the output of such resources against its hourly Equivalent Load. Such a Generating Market Buyer shall be deemed a buyer from the PJM Interchange Energy Market to the extent of its PJM Interchange Imports, and shall be deemed a seller to the PJM Interchange Energy Market to the extent of its PJM Interchange Exports.

(d) A Market Seller may self-supply Station Power for its generation facility in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) A Market Seller may self-supply Station Power for its generation facility during any month (1) when the net output of such facility is positive, or (2) when the net output of such facility is negative and the Market Seller during the same month has available at other of its generation facilities positive net output in an amount at least sufficient to offset fully such negative net output. For purposes of this subsection (d), “net output” of a generation facility during any month means the facility’s gross energy output, less the Station Power requirements of such facility, during that month. The determination of a generation facility’s or a Market Seller’s monthly net output under this subsection (d) will apply only to determine whether the Market Seller self-supplied Station Power during the month and will not affect the price of energy sold or consumed by the Market Seller at any bus during any hour during the month. For each hour when a Market Seller has positive net output and delivers energy into the Transmission System, it will be paid the LMP at its bus for that hour for all of the energy delivered. Conversely, for each hour when a Market Seller has negative net output and has received Station Power from the Transmission System, it will pay the LMP at its bus for that hour for all of the energy consumed.
- (ii) Transmission Provider will determine the extent to which each affected Market Seller during the month self-supplied its Station Power requirements or obtained Station Power from third-party providers (including affiliates) and will incorporate that determination in its accounting and billing for the month. In the event that a Market Seller self-supplies Station Power during any month in the manner described in subsection (1) of subsection (d)(i) above, Market Seller will not use, and will not incur any charges for, transmission service. In the event, and to the extent, that a Market Seller self-supplies Station Power during any month in the manner described in subsection (2) of subsection (d)(i) above (hereafter referred to as “remote self-supply of Station Power”), Market Seller shall use and pay for transmission service for the transmission of energy in an amount equal to the facility’s negative net output from Market Seller’s generation facility(ies) having positive net output. Unless the Market Seller makes other arrangements with Transmission Provider in advance, such transmission service shall be provided under Part II of the PJM Tariff and shall be charged the hourly rate under Schedule 8 of the PJM Tariff for Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service with an election to pay congestion charges, provided, however, that no reservation shall be necessary for such transmission service and the terms and charges under Schedules 1, 1A, 2 through 6, 9 and 10 of the PJM Tariff shall not apply to such service. The amount of energy that a Market Seller transmits in conjunction with remote self-supply of Station Power will not be affected by any other sales, purchases, or transmission of capacity or energy by or for such Market Seller under any other provisions of the PJM Tariff.

- (iii) A Market Seller may self-supply Station Power from its generation facilities located outside of the PJM Region during any month only if such generation facilities in fact run during such month and Market Seller separately has reserved transmission service and scheduled delivery of the energy from such resource in advance into the PJM Region.

#### **1.7.11 Emergencies.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection, with the assistance of the Members' dispatchers as it may request, shall be responsible for monitoring the operation of the PJM Region, for declaring the existence of an Emergency, and for directing the operations of Market Participants as necessary to manage, alleviate or end an Emergency. The standards, policies and procedures of the Office of the Interconnection for declaring the existence of an Emergency, including but not limited to a Minimum Generation Emergency, and for managing, alleviating or ending an Emergency, shall apply to all Members on a non-discriminatory basis. Actions by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Participants shall be carried out in accordance with this Agreement, the NERC Operating Policies, Applicable Regional Reliability Council reliability principles and standards, Good Utility Practice, and the PJM Manuals. A declaration that an Emergency exists or is likely to exist by the Office of the Interconnection shall be binding on all Market Participants until the Office of the Interconnection announces that the actual or threatened Emergency no longer exists. Consistent with existing contracts, all Market Participants shall comply with all directions from the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of managing, alleviating or ending an Emergency. The Market Participants shall authorize the Office of the Interconnection and PJM Settlement to purchase or sell energy on their behalf to meet an Emergency, and otherwise to implement agreements with other Control Areas interconnected with the PJM Region for the mutual provision of service to meet an Emergency, in accordance with this Agreement.

(b) To the extent load must be shed to alleviate an Emergency in a Control Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the maximum extent practicable, direct the shedding of load within such Control Zone. The Office of the Interconnection may shed load in one Control Zone to alleviate an Emergency in another Control Zone under its control only as necessary after having first shed load to the maximum extent practicable in the Control Zone experiencing the Emergency and only to the extent that PJM supports other control areas (not under its control) in those situations where load shedding would be necessary, such as to prevent isolation of facilities within the Eastern Interconnection, to prevent voltage collapse, or to restore system frequency following a system collapse; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection may not order a manual load dump in a Control Zone solely to address capacity deficiencies in another Control Zone. This subsection shall be implemented consistent with North American Electric Reliability Council and applicable reliability council standards.

#### **1.7.12 Fees and Charges.**

Each Market Participant, except for Special Members, shall pay all fees and charges of the Office of the Interconnection for operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market as determined

by and allocated to the Market Participant by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Schedule 3.

#### **1.7.13 Relationship to the PJM Region.**

The PJM Interchange Energy Market operates within and subject to the requirements for the operation of the PJM Region.

#### **1.7.14 PJM Manuals.**

The Office of the Interconnection shall be responsible for maintaining, updating, and promulgating the PJM Manuals as they relate to the operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market. The PJM Manuals, as they relate to the operation of the PJM Interchange Energy Market, shall conform and comply with this Agreement, NERC operating policies, and Applicable Regional Reliability Council reliability principles, guidelines and standards, and shall be designed to facilitate administration of an efficient energy market within industry reliability standards and the physical capabilities of the PJM Region.

#### **1.7.15 Corrective Action.**

Consistent with Good Utility Practice, the Office of the Interconnection shall be authorized to direct or coordinate corrective action, whether or not specified in the PJM Manuals, as necessary to alleviate unusual conditions that threaten the integrity or reliability of the PJM Region, or the regional power system.

#### **1.7.16 Recording.**

Subject to the requirements of applicable State or federal law, all voice communications with the Office of the Interconnection Control Center may be recorded by the Office of the Interconnection and any Market Participant communicating with the Office of the Interconnection Control Center, and each Market Participant hereby consents to such recording.

#### **1.7.17 Operating Reserves.**

(a) The following procedures shall apply to any generation unit subject to the dispatch of the Office of the Interconnection for which construction commenced before July 9, 1996, or any Demand Resource subject to the dispatch of the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall schedule to the Operating Reserve and load-following objectives of the Control Zones of the PJM Region and the PJM Interchange Energy Market in scheduling generation resources and/or Demand Resources pursuant to this Schedule. A table of Operating Reserve objectives for each Control Zone is calculated and published annually in the PJM Manuals. Reserve levels are probabilistically determined based on the season's historical load forecasting error and forced outage rates.



(c) Nuclear generation resources shall not be eligible for Operating Reserve payments unless: 1) the Office of the Interconnection directs such resources to reduce output, in which case, such units shall be compensated in accordance with section 3.2.3(f) of this Schedule; or 2) the resource submits a request for a risk premium to the Market Monitoring Unit under the procedures specified in Section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. A nuclear generation resource (i) must submit a risk premium consistent with its agreement under such process, or, (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on an appropriate risk premium, may submit its own determination of an appropriate risk premium to the Office of the Interconnection, subject to acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection, with or without prior approval from the Commission.

(d) PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Operating Reserve in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

#### **1.7.18 Regulation.**

(a) Regulation to meet the Regulation objective of each Regulation Zone shall be supplied from generation resources and/or Demand Resources located within the metered electrical boundaries of such Regulation Zone. Generating Market Buyers, and Market Sellers offering Regulation, shall comply with applicable standards and requirements for Regulation capability and dispatch specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall obtain and maintain for each Regulation Zone an amount of Regulation equal to the Regulation objective for such Regulation Zone as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Regulation range of a generation unit or Demand Resource shall be at least twice the amount of Regulation assigned.

(d) A generation unit capable of automatic energy dispatch that is also providing Regulation shall have its energy dispatch range reduced by twice the amount of the Regulation provided. The amount of Regulation provided by a generation unit shall serve to redefine the Normal Minimum Generation and Normal Maximum Generation energy limits of that generation unit, in that the amount of Regulation shall be added to the generation unit's Normal Minimum Generation energy limit, and subtracted from its Normal Maximum Generation energy limit.

(e) Qualified Regulation must satisfy the verification tests described in the PJM Manuals.

#### **1.7.19 Ramping.**

A generator dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to a control signal appropriate to increase or decrease the generator's megawatt output level shall be able to change output at the ramping rate specified in the Offer Data submitted to the Office of the Interconnection for that generator.

#### **1.7.19A Synchronized Reserve.**

(a) Synchronized Reserve shall be supplied from generation resources and/or Demand Resources located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region. Generating Market Buyers, and Market Sellers offering Synchronized Reserve shall comply with applicable standards and requirements for Synchronized Reserve capability and dispatch specified in the PJM Manuals.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall obtain and maintain for each Synchronized Reserve Zone an amount of Synchronized Reserve equal to the Synchronized Reserve objective for such Synchronized Reserve Zone, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve capability of a generation resource and Demand Resource shall be the increase in energy output or load reduction achievable by the generation resource and Demand Resource within a continuous 10-minute period.

(d) A generation unit capable of automatic energy dispatch that also is providing Synchronized Reserve shall have its energy dispatch range reduced by the amount of the Synchronized Reserve provided. The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by a generation unit shall serve to redefine the Normal Maximum Generation energy limit of that generation unit in that the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided shall be subtracted from its Normal Maximum Generation energy limit.

**1.7.19B Bilateral Transactions Regarding Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.**

(a) In addition to transactions in the Regulation market, Synchronized Reserve market, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market, Market Participants may enter into bilateral contracts for the purchase or sale of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves to or from each other or any other entity. Such bilateral contracts shall be for the physical transfer of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves to or from a Market Participant and shall be reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules relating to its eMarket tools.

(b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral contracts for the physical transfer of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves to a Market Participant in the PJM Region, title to the product that is the subject of the bilateral contract shall pass to the buyer at the source specified for the bilateral contract, and any further transactions associated with such products or further sale of such Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the markets for Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves, respectively, shall be transacted by the buyer under the bilateral contract. In no event shall the purchase and sale of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves between Market Participants under a bilateral contract constitute a transaction in PJM's markets for Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves, or otherwise construed to define PJM Settlement as a contracting party to any bilateral transactions between Market Participants.

(c) Market Participants that are parties to bilateral contracts for the purchase and sale and physical transfer of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves reported to and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, to limit the amounts of such reported transactions to amounts reflecting the expected requirements for Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves of the buyer pursuant to such bilateral contracts.

(d) All payments and related charges for the Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves associated with a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to the bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJM Settlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under a bilateral contract reported and coordinated with the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(e) A buyer under a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the costs of any purchases by the seller under the bilateral contract in the markets for Regulations, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves used to meet the bilateral contract seller's obligation to deliver Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves under the bilateral contract and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the seller under the bilateral contract, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection. Upon any default in obligations to the LLC or PJMSettlement by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall (i) not accept any new eMarket reporting by the Market Participant and (ii) terminate all of the Market Participant's reporting of eMarkets schedules associated with its bilateral contracts previously reported to the Office of the Interconnection for all days where delivery has not yet occurred. All claims regarding a buyer's default to a seller under a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller. In such circumstances, the seller may instruct the Office of the Interconnection to terminate all of the reported eMarkets schedules associated with bilateral contracts between buyer and seller previously reported to the Office of the Interconnection.

(f) Market Participants shall purchase Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves from PJM's markets for Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves, in quantities sufficient to complete the delivery or receipt obligations of a bilateral contract that has been curtailed or interrupted for any reason, with respect to all bilateral transactions that contemplate the physical transfer of Regulation, Synchronized Reserve, or Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves to or from a Market Participant.

#### **1.7.20 Communication and Operating Requirements.**

(a) Market Participants. Each Market Participant shall have, or shall arrange to have, its transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market subject to control by a Market Operations Center, with staffing and communications systems capable of real-time communication with the Office of the Interconnection during normal and Emergency conditions and of control of the

Market Participant's relevant load or facilities sufficient to meet the requirements of the Market Participant's transactions with the PJM Interchange Energy Market, including but not limited to the following requirements as applicable.

(b) Market Sellers selling from generation resources and/or Demand Resources within the PJM Region shall: report to the Office of the Interconnection sources of energy and Demand Resources available for operation; supply to the Office of the Interconnection all applicable Offer Data; report to the Office of the Interconnection generation resources that are self-scheduled; with respect to generation resources, report to the Office of the Interconnection bilateral sales transactions to buyers not within the PJM Region; confirm to the Office of the Interconnection bilateral sales to Market Buyers within the PJM Region; respond to the Office of the Interconnection's directives to start, shutdown or change output levels of generation units, or change scheduled voltages or reactive output levels of generation units, or reduce load from Demand Resources; continuously maintain all Offer Data concurrent with on-line operating information; and ensure that, where so equipped, generating equipment and Demand Resources are operated with control equipment functioning as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) Market Sellers selling from generation resources outside the PJM Region shall: provide to the Office of the Interconnection all applicable Offer Data, including offers specifying amounts of energy available, hours of availability and prices of energy and other services; respond to Office of the Interconnection directives to schedule delivery or change delivery schedules; and communicate delivery schedules to the Market Seller's Control Area.

(d) Market Participants that are Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities shall: respond to Office of the Interconnection directives for load management steps; report to the Office of the Interconnection Generation Capacity Resources to satisfy capacity obligations that are available for pool operation; report to the Office of the Interconnection all bilateral purchase transactions; respond to other Office of the Interconnection directives such as those required during Emergency operation.

(e) Market Participants that are not Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities shall: provide to the Office of the Interconnection requests to purchase specified amounts of energy for each hour of the Operating Day during which it intends to purchase from the PJM Interchange Energy Market, along with Dispatch Rate levels above which it does not desire to purchase; respond to other Office of the Interconnection directives such as those required during Emergency operation.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants are responsible for maintaining demand reduction information, including the amount and price at which demand may be reduced. The Economic Load Response Participant shall provide this information to the Office of the Interconnection by posting it on the Load Response Program Registration link of the PJM website as required by the PJM Manuals. The Economic Load Response Participant shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of a demand reduction concurrent with, or prior to, the beginning of such demand reduction in accordance with the PJM Manuals. In the event that an Economic Load Response Participant chooses to measure load reductions using a Customer Baseline Load, the Economic Load Response Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of a change

in its operations or the operations of the end-use customer that would affect a relevant Customer Baseline Load as required by the PJM Manuals.

(g) PRD Providers shall be responsible for ensuring automated reductions to their Price Responsive Demand in response to price in accordance with their PRD Curves submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

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**OPERATING AGREEMENT - OA SCHEDULE 1 - OA 1. MARKET OPERATIONS - OA 1.10 Scheduling.**

**1.10 Scheduling.**

**1.10.1 General.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer's self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer's Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-To Congestion transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales, or Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection's forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in

accordance with the Market Sellers' offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM Manuals.

#### **1.10.1A Day-ahead Energy Market Scheduling.**

The following actions shall occur not later than 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. Price Responsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.

(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection:  
(i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such self-scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer's intent not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection schedules for any bilateral transactions involving use of generation or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the Interconnection whether the transaction is to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any Market Participant that elects to include a bilateral transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed the maximum price that may be specified in the PJM Manuals), if any, at which it will be wholly or partially curtailed rather than pay Transmission Congestion Charges. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified bilateral transaction source and sink points in the day-ahead scheduling process only. Any Market Participant that

elects not to include its bilateral transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the transaction are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market in order to complete any such scheduled bilateral transaction. Scheduling of bilateral transactions shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following requirements:

- i) Internal Market Buyers shall submit schedules for all bilateral purchases for delivery within the PJM Region, whether from generation resources inside or outside the PJM Region;
- ii) Market Sellers shall submit schedules for bilateral sales to entities outside the PJM Region from generation within the PJM Region that is not dynamically scheduled to such entities pursuant to Section 1.12; and
- iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for bilateral transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of each scheduled bilateral transaction from each other party to the transaction in addition to the party submitting the schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(d) Market Sellers wishing to sell into the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy (including energy from hydropower units), demand reductions, Regulation, Operating Reserves or other services for the following Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. The submission of offers for resource increments that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection's Offer Data specification, this Section 1.10.1A(d), Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that have not cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region. The foregoing offers:

- i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource and energy or demand reduction, amount, respectively, for each hour in the



offer period, and the minimum run time for generation resources and minimum down time for Demand Resources;

- ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;
- iii) If based on energy from a specific generating unit, may specify start-up and no-load fees equal to the specification of such fees for such unit on file with the Office of the Interconnection, if based on reductions in demand from a Demand Resource may specify shutdown costs;
- iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;
- v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with a second schedule applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;
- vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted;
- vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day; and
- viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of \$1,000/megawatt-hour.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation that shall specify the megawatt of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.5 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such regulation is offered, the price of the offer in dollars per MWh, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource's opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed \$100 per MWh in the case of Regulation offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

- i. The costs (in \$/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation;
- ii. The cost increase (in \$/MW) in variable operating and maintenance costs resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation; and
- iii. An adder of up to \$12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with start-up and no-load fees, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours.

(g) Each offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM Open Access Same-time Information System the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Increment Bids and/or Decrement Bids that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such bids must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount, location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of 3000 bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Bid or Decrement Bid.

(j) A Market Seller that wishes to make a generation resource or Demand Resource available to sell Synchronized Reserve shall submit an offer for Synchronized Reserve that shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.5 megawatts, the price of the offer in dollars per megawatt hour, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the

energy used by the generation resource to provide the Synchronized Reserve and the generation resource's unit specific opportunity costs. The price of the offer shall not exceed the variable operating and maintenance costs for providing Synchronized Reserve plus seven dollars and fifty cents.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the Interconnection. The offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, and the offer shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, start-up costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs).

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied or offered and cleared in the Base Residual Auction or one of the Incremental Auctions, or owning or controlling the output of an ILR resource which was certified as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Demand Resource or ILR resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for resource increments that have not cleared in the Base Residual Auction or in one of the Incremental Auctions, or for ILR resources that were not certified, or were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program to be included in such bids. A Demand Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program, provided however, that in the event of an Emergency, PJM shall require Demand Resources and ILR resources to reduce load notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) Market Sellers that wish to make Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources available to sell Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves shall submit offers, each of which must equal or exceed 0.5 megawatts, in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market specifying: 1) the price of the offer in dollars per megawatt hour; and 2) such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to determine any relevant opportunity costs for the resource(s). The foregoing notwithstanding, to qualify to submit offers pursuant to this section, the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall submit energy offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market including start-up and shut-down costs for generation resource and Demand Resources, respectively, and all generation resources that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide that service. The MW quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves that a particular resource can provide in a given hour will be

determined based on the energy offer data submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as detailed in the PJM Manuals.

### **1.10.2 Pool-scheduled Resources.**

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to Sections 1.10.9 or 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

- (a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, start-up, no-load and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A.
- (b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.
- (c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.
- (d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for start-up and no-load fees, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Section 3 of this Schedule 1. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of start-up and no-load fees, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource's start-up cost, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.
- (e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.
- (f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant's option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand

in the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

### **1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.**

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

- (a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.
- (b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled, or otherwise not following the dispatch orders of the Office of the Interconnection, shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.
- (c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.
- (d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

### **1.10.4 Capacity Resources.**

- (a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.
- (b) Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

(c) A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for start-up or no-load fees.

#### **1.10.5 External Resources.**

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of dynamic dispatch shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller's Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data. If a Market Seller submits more than one offer on an aggregated resource basis, the withdrawal of any such offer shall be deemed a withdrawal of all higher priced offers for the same period.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

#### **1.10.6 External Market Buyers.**

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to dynamic dispatch by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the load bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market Buyer's load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged or credited at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing load bus or buses.

(b) An External Market Buyer's hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

**1.10.6A Transmission Loading Relief Customers.**

(a) An entity that desires to elect to pay Transmission Congestion Charges in order to continue its energy schedules during an Operating Day over contract paths outside the PJM Region in the event that PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief that otherwise would cause PJM to request security coordinators to curtail such Member's energy schedules shall:

- (i) enter its election on OASIS by 12:00 p.m. of the day before the Operating Day, in accordance with procedures established by PJM, which election shall be applicable for the entire Operating Day; and
- (ii) if PJM initiates Transmission Loading Relief, provide to PJM, at such time and in accordance with procedures established by PJM, the hourly integrated energy schedules that impacted the PJM Region (as indicated from the NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator) during the Transmission Loading Relief.

(b) If an entity has made the election specified in Section (a), then PJM shall not request security coordinators to curtail such entity's energy transactions, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

(c) In order to make elections under this Section 1.10.6A, an entity must (i) have met the creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection or provided a letter of credit or other form of security acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection, and (ii) have executed either the Agreement, a Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, or other agreement committing to pay all Transmission Congestion Charges incurred under this Section.

**1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.**

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in Section 1.10.1A that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

**1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection's forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand loads they serve; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) Not later than 4:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, or such earlier deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in Section 1.10.8(b), the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM Open Access Same-time Information System at times specified in the PJM Manuals a revised forecast of the location and duration of any expected transmission congestion, and of the range of differences in Locational Marginal Prices between major subareas of the PJM Region expected to result from such transmission congestion.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Section 3.3A of this Schedule.



(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, Ancillary Services Markets or Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve Market after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and Day-ahead Energy Market. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth business day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market and the Day-ahead Energy Market. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Ancillary Services Markets, Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Market. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Section 18.17.1 of the PJM Operating Agreement, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants' non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

#### **1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.**

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, a generation rebidding period shall exist from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for any generation resource that was not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Adjustments to Day-ahead Energy Markets shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 10:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows:

- i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;
- ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or
- iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or
- iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any start-up fee.

(c) With respect to a pool-scheduled resource that is included in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller may not change or otherwise modify its offer to sell energy.

(d) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 60 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(e) For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this Section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

**OPERATING AGREEMENT - OA SCHEDULE 1 - OA 2. CALCULATION OF LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES - OA 2.5 Calculation of Real-time Prices.**

**2.5 Calculation of Real-time Prices.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the least costly means of obtaining energy to serve the next increment of load (taking account of any applicable and available load reductions indicated on PRD Curves properly submitted by any PRD Provider) at each bus in the PJM Region represented in the State Estimator and each Interface Pricing Point between PJM and an adjacent Control Area, based on the system conditions described by the most recent power flow solution produced by the State Estimator program and the energy offers that are the basis for the Day-ahead Energy Market, or that are determined to be eligible for consideration under Section 2.4 in connection with the real-time dispatch, as applicable. This calculation shall be made by applying an incremental linear optimization method to minimize energy costs, given actual system conditions, a set of energy offers, and any binding transmission constraints that may exist. In performing this calculation, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the cost of serving an increment of load at each bus from each resource associated with an eligible energy offer as the sum of the following components of Locational Marginal Price: (1) System Energy Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a generation resource or decrease an increment of energy being consumed by a Demand Resource, (2) Congestion Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from the resource on transmission line loadings, and (3) Loss Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission losses. The energy offer or offers that can serve an increment of load at a bus at the lowest cost, calculated in this manner, shall determine the Real-time Price at that bus.

(b) During the Operating Day, the calculation set forth in (a) shall be performed every five minutes, using the Office of the Interconnection's Locational Marginal Price program, producing a set of Real-time Prices based on system conditions during the preceding interval. The prices produced at five-minute intervals during an hour will be integrated to determine the Real-time Prices for that hour.

**OPERATING AGREEMENT - OA SCHEDULE 1 - OA 2. CALCULATION OF LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES - OA 2.6 Calculation of Day-ahead Prices.**

**2.6 Calculation of Day-ahead Prices.**

For the Day-ahead Energy Market, day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices shall be determined on the basis of the least-cost, security-constrained dispatch, model flows and system conditions resulting from the load specifications (including PRD Curves properly submitted by Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand loads that they serve), offers for generation, dispatchable load, Increment Bids, Decrement Bids, offers for demand reductions, and bilateral transactions submitted to the Office of the Interconnection and scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such prices shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Section applicable to the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall be the basis for purchases and sales of energy and Transmission Congestion Charges resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market. This calculation shall be made for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market by applying a linear optimization method to minimize energy costs, given scheduled system conditions, scheduled transmission outages, and any transmission limitations that may exist. In performing this calculation, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the cost of serving an increment of load at each bus from each resource associated with an eligible energy offer as the sum of the following components of Locational Marginal Price: (1) System Energy Price, which is the price at which the Market Seller has offered to supply an additional increment of energy from a resource, (2) Congestion Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from the resource on transmission line loadings, and (3) Loss Price, which is the effect on transmission loss costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line losses. The energy offer or offers that can serve an increment of load at a bus at the lowest cost, calculated in this manner, shall determine the Day-ahead Price at that bus.

**OPERATING AGREEMENT - OA SCHEDULE 1 - OA 3. ACCOUNTING AND BILLING - OA 3.2 Market Buyers**

**3.2 Market Buyers.**

**3.2.1 Spot Market Energy Charges.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.

(b) Market Buyers shall be charged for all load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served from the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(c) Generating Market Buyers shall be paid for all energy scheduled to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price.

(d) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of net hourly PJM Interchange for each Market Buyer, including Generating Market Buyers, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. For Internal Market Buyers that are Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall include determination of the net energy flows from: (i) tie lines; (ii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by the Market Buyer but delivered to it over another entity's Transmission Facilities; (iii) any generation resource the output of which is controlled by another entity but which is directly interconnected with the Market Buyer's transmission system; (iv) deliveries pursuant to bilateral energy sales; (v) receipts pursuant to bilateral energy purchases; and (vi) an adjustment to account for the day-ahead PJM Interchange, calculated as the difference between scheduled withdrawals and injections by that Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market. For External Market Buyers and Internal Market Buyers that are not Load Serving Entities or purchasing on behalf of Load Serving Entities, this calculation shall determine the energy scheduled hourly for delivery to the Market Buyer net of the amounts scheduled by the External Market Buyer in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) An Internal Market Buyer shall be charged for Spot Market Energy purchases to the extent of its hourly net purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. An External Market Buyer shall be charged for its Spot Market Energy purchases based on the energy delivered to it, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total charge shall be determined by the product of the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Imports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Buyer.

(f) A Generating Market Buyer shall be paid as a Market Seller for sales of Spot Market Energy to the extent of its hourly net sales into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, determined as specified in Section 3.2.1(d) above. The total payment shall be determined by the product of

the hourly net amount of PJM Interchange Exports times the hourly Real-time System Energy Price for that Market Seller.

### **3.2.2 Regulation.**

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation shall be charged for Regulation dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Regulation market-clearing price determined in accordance with subsection (c) of this Section, plus the amounts, if any, described in subsection (f) of this section.

(b) A Generating Market Buyer supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection in excess of its hourly Regulation obligation shall be credited for each increment of such Regulation at the higher of (i) the Regulation market-clearing price in such Regulation Zone or (ii) the sum of the regulation offer and the unit-specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Regulation, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined at a time to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection which shall be no earlier than the day before the Operating Day. The market-clearing price for each regulating hour shall be equal to the highest sum of a resource's Regulation offer plus its estimated unit-specific opportunity costs, determined as described in subsection (d) below from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.3.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.

(d) In determining the Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour shall be equal to the sum of the unit-specific opportunity costs (i) incurred during the hour in which the obligation is fulfilled, plus costs (ii) associated with uneconomic operation during the hour preceding the initial regulating hour ("preceding shoulder hour"), plus costs (iii) associated with uneconomic operation during the hour after the final regulating hour ("following shoulder hour").

The unit-specific opportunity costs incurred during the hour in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest

available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the preceding shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the lesser of the resource's actual or expected output in the preceding shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a lower output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, or, the higher of the resource's actual or expected output in the preceding shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a higher output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the preceding shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the following shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the lesser of the resource's actual or expected output in the following shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a lower output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, or, the higher of the resource's actual or expected output in the following shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a higher output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the following shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Generating Market Buyer selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and for the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour and the following shoulder hour during which the Generating Market Buyer or Market Seller provided Regulation. The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the hour in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available

market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the preceding shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the lesser of the resource's actual or expected output in the preceding shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a lower output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, or, the higher of the resource's actual or expected output in the preceding shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a higher output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the preceding shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the preceding shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during the following shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating hour in order to provide Regulation and the lesser of the resource's actual or expected output in the following shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a lower output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, or, the higher of the resource's actual or expected output in the following shoulder hour when the resource is requested at a higher output than what is otherwise economic in order to provide Regulation, times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in the following shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, times (iii) the percentage of the following shoulder hour during which the deviation was incurred, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Internal Market Buyer in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

### **3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.**

#### **3.2.2A.1 Applicability.**



(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

(b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:

- (i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region for which the cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).
- (ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.

### **3.2.3 Operating Reserves.**

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all hours exceeds the total value summed over all hours, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller. The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:

- (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.

- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:

- (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant

to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(d) The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection and that is not committed solely for the purpose of providing Synchronized Reserve: For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of hours the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous hours when the resource

is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy as determined by the Real-time Energy Market and the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) plus the resource's opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding hour(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each period the unit operates in condensing and generation mode for one or more contiguous hours.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the hourly integrated, real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to  $\{(LMP_{DMW} - AG) \times (URTLMP - UB)\}$ , where:

LMP<sub>DMW</sub> equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended, determined according to the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where  $URTLMP - UB$  shall not be negative.

(f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost if either of the following conditions occur:

- (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
- (ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i)  $\{(URTLMP - UDALMP) \times DAG\}$ , or (ii)  $\{(URTLMP - UB) \times DAG\}$  where:

$URTLMP$  equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

$UDALMP$  equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

$DAG$  equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit, determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule; and

where  $URTLMP - UDALMP$  and  $URTLMP - UB$  shall not be negative.

(f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a

transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2A(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves, plus any redispatch costs incurred in accordance with section 10(a) of this Schedule, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.

(h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of the absolute values of its (i) load deviations (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, except as noted in subsection (h)(5) below and in the PJM Manuals; (ii) generation deviations (not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) from the Day-ahead Energy Market for non-dispatchable generation resources, including External Resources, in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; (iii) deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market for bilateral transactions from outside the PJM Region for delivery within such region in megawatt-hours during the Operating Day; and (iv) deviations of energy sales from the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such region pursuant to Section 1.12.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

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Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at interfaces and hubs shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the busses that define all interfaces or all hubs are located in the region. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by busses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed in accordance with the following provisions:

- (#4) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.
- (#5) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of an Operating Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for load reductions in real-time in order to avoid an Operating Reserve shortage as described in this Schedule, Section 6A, Scarcity Pricing.
- (#6) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

(i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.

(j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each Control Zone of the PJM Region based on the Control Zone to which the resource was synchronized to provide synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation.

(k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are dynamically scheduled to load outside such Control Zone pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

(l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared (“Maximum Generation Emergency Alert”); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3.(e) in connection with marked-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as “MaxGen Conditions”). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

(m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3.(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the hours that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the hours that the offer is economic. The hours that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the hours that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the hours in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any hours required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.



(n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 12:00 noon on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described in the PJM Manuals. Ramp-limited desired MW values shall be used to determine generation resource real-time deviations from the resource's day-ahead schedules.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

- (i) real-time economic minimum  $\leq$  105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.

- (ii) real-time economic maximum  $\geq$  95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\text{Ramp\_Request}_t = \frac{(\text{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1})}{(\text{UDSLAtime}_{t-1})}$$

$$\text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \left( \text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \right)$$

where:

1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
5. RL\_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramp-limited desired MW value. The % off dispatch and MW off dispatch will be a time-weighted average over the course of an hour.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is  $\leq$  10, or its hourly integrated Real-time MWh is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of the hourly integrated ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the hour is either below the real time economic minimum or

above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is  $\leq 20\%$ , balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh – hourly integrated Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% or 5 MW (whichever is greater) of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is  $> 20\%$ , balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the hour the resource tripped and the hours it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real time MWh – Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: hourly integrated Real-time MWh and Day-Ahead MWh.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating

Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
  - (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

(B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

(q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton ATSI transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

(iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.

(iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.

### **3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.**

(a) Each Internal Market Buyer that is a Load Serving Entity shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Synchronized Reserve Zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Buyer's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Synchronized Reserve Zone, for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in

section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). An Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged for the Synchronized Reserve dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection to meet such obligation at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price determined in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, plus the amounts if any, described in subsections (g), (h) and (i) of this section.

(b) A Generating Market Buyer supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:

- i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation units that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event (“Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price.
- ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions (“Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve”) shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is the average of the five-minute Locational Marginal Prices calculated during the Synchronized Reserve Event plus an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.

(d) The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Synchronized Reserve Zone by the Office of the Interconnection prior to the operating hour and

such market-clearing price shall be equal to, from among the generation resources or Demand Resources selected to provide Synchronized Reserve for such Synchronized Reserve Zone, the highest sum of either (i) a generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer and opportunity cost or (ii) a demand response resource's Synchronized Reserve offer.

(e) In determining the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource times (B) the megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (B) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Generating Market Buyer selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each hour that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be equal to the sum of (i) the product of (A) the megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource, and (ii) the product of (A) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Seller in excess of that Market Seller's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the remainder of the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Seller's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

(h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in an hour in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Internal Market Buyer that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during an hour than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that hour due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.

(j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled by the owner to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Synchronized Reserve in response to an actual Synchronized Reserve Event, the owner of the resource shall incur an additional Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the amount of the shortfall for a period of three consecutive days with the same peak classification (on-peak or off-peak) as the day of the Synchronized Reserve Event at least three business days following the Synchronized Reserve Event. The overall Synchronized Reserve requirement for each Synchronized Reserve Zone of the PJM Region on which the Synchronized Reserve Obligations, except for the additional obligations set forth in this section, are based shall be reduced by the amount of this shortfall for the applicable three-day period.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption ten minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten



minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

### **3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.**

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the MW obligation in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.

(c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:

- (i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.
- (ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shut-down times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.
- (iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's

MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.

- (iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The cost of credits allocated to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources pursuant to this section shall be charged to Load-Serving Entities in the PJM Region based on load ratio share (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero), provided that a Load-Serving Entity may satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation, which is equal to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the Load-Serving Entity's load ratio share for the PJM Region, through one or any combination of the following: 1) the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market; 2) and bilateral arrangements. The Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve charges allocated pursuant to this section shall reflect any portion of a Load-Serving Entity's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation that is met by bilateral arrangement(s).

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

### **3.2.3B Reactive Services.**

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.

(b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).

(c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit hourly in an amount equal to  $\{(LMP_{DMW} - AG) \times (URLMP - UB)\}$

where:

LMP<sub>DMW</sub> equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

URLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is reduced or suspended determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where  $URLMP - UB$  shall not be negative.

(d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost if either of the following conditions occur:

(i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.

(ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i)  $\{(URTLMP - UDALMP) \times DAG\}$ , or (ii)  $\{(URTLMP - UB) \times DAG\}$  where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a price-based schedule and the offer associated with that price-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where  $URTLMP - UDALMP$  and  $URTLMP - UB$  shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the hourly integrated, real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to  $\{(AG - LMP_{DMW}) \times (UB - URTLMP)\}$  where:

AG equals the actual hourly integrated output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time LMP;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where  $UB - URLMP$  shall not be negative.

(g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2A(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

(i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous

condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generation unit's bus, (C) the generation unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (l) below.

(j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).

(k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.

(l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive

performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

### **3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.**

(a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element (“contingency flow”) exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility (“post-contingency operation”). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.

(b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit’s operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each hour a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource’s hourly cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the hourly product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource’s start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit’s cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.

(d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

#### **3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.**

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

#### **3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.**

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

#### **3.2.6 Emergency Energy.**

(a) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each hour of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

(b) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each hour of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.

(c) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of hourly energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each hour of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its



net PJM Interchange in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

**3.2.7 Billing.**

(a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Buyer in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Buyer. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Buyer's internal accounting.

(b) If deliveries to a Market Buyer that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Buyer, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Buyer and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

**ARTICLE 1 -- DEFINITIONS**

Unless the context otherwise specifies or requires, capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned herein or in the Schedules hereto for all purposes of this Agreement (such definitions to be equally applicable to both the singular and the plural forms of the terms defined). Unless otherwise specified, all references herein to Articles, Sections or Schedules, are to Articles, Sections or Schedules of this Agreement. As used in this Agreement:

**1.1 Agreement**

Agreement shall mean this Reliability Assurance Agreement, together with all Schedules hereto, as amended from time to time.

**1.1A Annual Demand Resource**

Annual Demand Resource shall mean a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the Delivery Year, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such Delivery Year by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of June through October and the following May, and 6:00AM through 9:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of November through April unless there is an Office of the Interconnection approved maintenance outage during October through April. The Annual Demand Resource must be available in the corresponding Delivery year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Annual Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**1.2 Applicable Regional Reliability Council**

Applicable Regional Reliability Council shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**1.3 Base Residual Auction**

Base Residual Auction shall have the same meaning as in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

**1.4 Behind The Meter Generation**

Behind The Meter Generation shall mean a generating unit that delivers energy to load without using the Transmission System or any distribution facilities (unless the entity that owns or leases the distribution facilities consented to such use of the distribution facilities and such consent has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection; provided, however, that Behind The Meter Generation does not include (i) at any time, any portion of such generating unit's capacity that is designated as a Capacity Resource or (ii) in any hour, any

portion of the output of such generating unit that is sold to another entity for consumption at another electrical location or into the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

#### **1.5 Black Start Capability**

Black Start Capability shall mean the ability of a generating unit or station to go from a shutdown condition to an operating condition and start delivering power without assistance from the power system.

#### **1.6 Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (“CETO”)**

Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (“CETO”) shall mean the amount of electric energy that a given area must be able to import in order to remain within a loss of load expectation of one event in 25 years when the area is experiencing a localized capacity emergency, as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Without limiting the foregoing, CETO shall be calculated based in part on EFORD determined in accordance with Paragraph C of Schedule 5.

#### **1.7 Capacity Emergency Transmission Limit (“CETL”)**

Capacity Emergency Transmission Limit (“CETL”) shall mean the capability of the transmission system to support deliveries of electric energy to a given area experiencing a localized capacity emergency as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

#### **1.8 Capacity Resources**

Capacity Resources shall mean megawatts of (i) net capacity from existing or Planned Generation Capacity Resources meeting the requirements of Schedules 9 and 10 that are or will be owned by or contracted to a Party and that are or will be committed to satisfy that Party's obligations under this Agreement, or to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, for a Delivery Year; (ii) net capacity from existing or Planned Generation Capacity Resources within the PJM Region not owned or contracted for by a Party which are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in Schedules 9 and 10; and (iii) load reduction capability provided by Demand Resources, Energy Efficiency Resources, or ILR that are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in Schedule 6.

#### **1.9 Capacity Transfer Right**

Capacity Transfer Right shall have the meaning specified in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

#### **1.10 Control Area**

Control Area shall mean an electric power system or combination of electric power systems bounded by interconnection metering and telemetry to which a common generation control scheme is applied in order to:

(a) match the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);

(b) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;

(c) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of NERC and Applicable Regional Reliability Councils;

(d) maintain power flows on transmission facilities within appropriate limits to preserve reliability; and

(e) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

#### **1.11 Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation**

Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation shall have the meaning set forth in Schedule 8 or, as to an FRR Entity, in Schedule 8.1.

#### **1.12 Delivery Year**

Delivery Year shall mean a Planning Period for which a Capacity Resource is committed pursuant to the auction procedures specified in Attachment DD to the Tariff or pursuant to an FRR Capacity Plan.

#### **1.13 Demand Resource**

Demand Resource or "DR" shall mean a Limited Demand Resource, Extended Summer Demand Resource, or Annual Demand Resource with a demonstrated capability to provide a reduction in demand or otherwise control load in accordance with the requirements of Schedule 6 that offers and that clears load reduction capability in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction or that is committed through an FRR Capacity Plan. As set forth in Schedule 6, a Limited Demand Resource, Extended Summer Demand Resource or Annual Demand Resource may be an existing demand response resource or a Planned Demand Resource.

#### **1.14 Demand Resource Provider**

Demand Resource Provider shall have the meaning specified in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

#### **1.15 DR Factor**

DR Factor shall mean that factor approved from time to time by the PJM Board used to determine the unforced capacity value of a Demand Resource or ILR in accordance with Schedule 6.

**1.16 East RAA**

East RAA shall mean that certain Reliability Assurance Agreement among Load-Serving Entities in the PJM Region, PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 27.

**1.17 Electric Cooperative**

Electric Cooperative shall mean an entity owned in cooperative form by its customers that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

**1.18 Electric Distributor**

Electric Distributor shall mean an entity that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership electric distribution facilities that are providing electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region.

**1.19 Emergency**

Emergency shall mean (i) an abnormal system condition requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent loss of firm load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or (ii) a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or (iii) a condition that requires implementation of emergency procedures as defined in the PJM Manuals.

**1.20 End-Use Customer**

End-Use Customer shall mean a Member that is a retail end-user of electricity within the PJM Region.

**1.20A Energy Efficiency Resource**

Energy Efficiency Resource shall mean a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of Schedule 6 of this Agreement and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during peak periods as described in Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

**1.20B Existing Generation Capacity Resource**

Existing Generation Capacity Resource shall mean, for purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource that, as of the date on which bidding commences for such auction: (a) is in service; or (b) is not yet in service, but has cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Generation Capacity Resource for which construction has not commenced and which would otherwise have been treated as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource but for the fact that it was bid into RPM Auctions for at least two consecutive Delivery Years, and cleared the last such auction only because it was considered existing and its mitigated offer cap was accepted when its price offer would not have otherwise been accepted, shall be deemed to be a Planned Generation Capacity Resource. A Generation Capacity Resource shall be deemed to be in service if interconnection service has ever commenced (for resources located in the PJM Region), or if it is physically and electrically interconnected to an external Control Area and is in full commercial operation (for resources not located in the PJM Region). The additional megawatts of a Generation Capacity Resource that is being, or has been, modified to increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof shall not be deemed to be an Existing Generation Capacity Resource until such time as those megawatts (a) are in service; or (b) are not yet in service, but have cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year.

#### **1.20C Extended Summer Demand Resource**

Extended Summer Demand Resource shall mean a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will be available June through October and the following May, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Extended Summer Demand Resource must be available June through October and the following May in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Extended Summer Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

#### **1.21 Facilities Study Agreement**

Facilities Study Agreement shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff

#### **1.22 FERC**

FERC shall mean the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or any successor federal agency, commission or department.

#### **1.23 Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service**

Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service shall mean Firm Transmission Service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part II of the PJM Tariff.

#### **1.24 Firm Transmission Service**

Firm Transmission Service shall mean transmission service that is intended to be available at all times to the maximum extent practicable, subject to an Emergency, an unanticipated failure of a facility, or other event beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility or the Office of the Interconnection.

**1.25 Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative or FRR Alternative**

Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative or FRR Alternative shall mean an alternative method for a Party to satisfy its obligation to provide Unforced Capacity hereunder, as set forth in Schedule 8.1 to this Agreement.

**1.26 Forecast Pool Requirement**

Forecast Pool Requirement or FPR shall mean the amount equal to one plus the unforced reserve margin (stated as a decimal number) for the PJM Region required pursuant to this Agreement, as approved by the PJM Board pursuant to Schedule 4.1.

**1.27 Forecast RTO ILR Obligation**

Forecast RTO ILR Obligation shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**1.28 Forecast Zonal ILR Obligation**

Forecast Zonal ILR Obligation shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**1.29 FRR Capacity Plan**

FRR Capacity Plan shall mean a long-term plan for the commitment of Capacity Resources to satisfy the capacity obligations of a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative, as more fully set forth in Schedule 8.1 to this Agreement.

**1.30 FRR Entity**

FRR Entity shall mean, for the duration of such election, a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative hereunder.

**1.31 FRR Service Area**

FRR Service Area shall mean (a) the service territory of an IOU as recognized by state law, rule or order; (b) the service area of a Public Power Entity or Electric Cooperative as recognized by franchise or other state law, rule, or order; or (c) a separately identifiable geographic area that is: (i) bounded by wholesale metering, or similar appropriate multi-site aggregate metering, that is visible to, and regularly reported to, the Office of the Interconnection, or that is visible to, and regularly reported to an Electric Distributor and such Electric Distributor agrees to aggregate the load data from such meters for such FRR Service Area and regularly report such aggregated information, by FRR Service Area, to the Office of the Interconnection; and (ii) for which the FRR Entity has or assumes the obligation to provide capacity for all load

(including load growth) within such area excluding the load of Single-Customer LSEs that are FRR Entities. In the event that the service obligations of an Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity are not defined by geographic boundaries but by physical connections to a defined set of customers, the FRR Service Area in such circumstances shall be defined as all customers physically connected to transmission or distribution facilities of such Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity within an area bounded by appropriate wholesale aggregate metering as described above.

### **1.32 Full Requirements Service**

Full Requirements Service shall mean wholesale service to supply all of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.

### **1.33 Generation Capacity Resource**

Generation Capacity Resource shall mean a generation unit, or the right to capacity from a specified generation unit, that meets the requirements of Schedules 9 and 10 of this Agreement. A Generation Capacity Resource may be an *Existing* Generation Capacity Resource or a *Planned* Generation Capacity Resource.

### **1.34 Generation Owner**

Generation Owner shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership facilities for the generation of electric energy that are located within the PJM Region. Purchasing all or a portion of the output of a generation facility shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Generation Owner.

### **1.35 Generator Forced Outage**

Generator Forced Outage shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

### **1.36 Generator Maintenance Outage**

Generator Maintenance Outage shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility qualifies as a maintenance outage pursuant to the PJM Manuals.

### **1.37 Generator Planned Outage**



Generator Planned Outage shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

### **1.38 Good Utility Practice**

Good Utility Practice shall mean any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather is intended to include acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region.

### **1.39 ILR Provider**

ILR Provider shall have the meaning specified in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

### **1.40 Incremental Auction**

Incremental Auction shall mean the First Incremental Auction, the Second Incremental Auction, the Third Incremental Auction, or the Conditional Incremental Auction, each as defined in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

### **1.41 Interconnection Agreement**

Interconnection Agreement shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

### **1.42 Interruptible Load for Reliability, or ILR**

Interruptible Load for Reliability, or ILR, shall mean a resource with a demonstrated capability to provide a reduction in demand or otherwise control load in accordance with the requirements of Schedule 6 that is certified by PJM no later than three months prior to a Delivery Year. At a minimum, ILR shall be available for interruption for at least 10 times during the summer period of June through September in the Delivery Year, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 6-hour duration. At a minimum, the ILR shall be available for such interruptions on weekdays, other than NERC holidays, from 12:00PM (noon) to 8:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time in the corresponding Delivery Year.

### **1.43 IOU**

IOU shall mean an investor-owned utility with substantial business interest in owning and/or operating electric facilities in any two or more of the following three asset categories: generation, transmission, distribution.

### **1.43A Limited Demand Resource**

Limited Demand Resource shall mean a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will, at a minimum, be available for interruption for at least 10 times during the summer period of June through September in the Delivery Year, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 6-hour duration. At a minimum, the Limited Demand Resource shall be available for such interruptions on weekdays, other than NERC holidays, from 12:00PM (noon) to 8:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Limited Demand Resource must be available during the summer period of June through September in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as a Limited Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

#### **1.44 Load Serving Entity or LSE**

Load Serving Entity or LSE shall mean any entity (or the duly designated agent of such an entity), including a load aggregator or power marketer, (i) serving end-users within the PJM Region, and (ii) that has been granted the authority or has an obligation pursuant to state or local law, regulation or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users located within the PJM Region. Load Serving Entity shall include any end-use customer that qualifies under state rules or a utility retail tariff to manage directly its own supply of electric power and energy and use of transmission and ancillary services.

#### **1.45 Locational Reliability Charge**

Locational Reliability Charge shall mean the charge determined pursuant to Schedule 8.

#### **1.46 Markets and Reliability Committee**

Markets and Reliability Committee shall mean the committee established pursuant to the Operating Agreement as a Standing Committee of the Members Committee.

#### **1.46A Maximum Emergency Service Level**

Maximum Emergency Service Level or MESL of Price Responsive Demand shall mean the level, determined at a PRD Substation level, to which Price Responsive Demand shall be reduced during the Delivery Year when a Maximum Generation Emergency is declared and the Locational Marginal Price exceeds the price associated with such Price Responsive Demand identified by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan.

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#### **1.47 Member**

Member shall mean an entity that satisfies the requirements of Sections 1.24 and 11.6 of the PJM Operating Agreement. In accordance with Article 4 of this Agreement, each Party to this Agreement also is a Member.

#### **1.48 Members Committee**

Members Committee shall mean the committee specified in Section 8 of the PJM Operating Agreement composed of the representatives of all the Members.

**1.49 NERC**

NERC shall mean the North American Electric Reliability Council or any successor thereto.

**1.50 Network Resources**

Network Resources shall have the meaning set forth in the PJM Tariff.

**1.51 Network Transmission Service**

Network Transmission Service shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Part III of the PJM Tariff or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner (as that term is defined in the PJM Tariff).

**1.51A Nominal PRD Value**

Nominal PRD Value shall mean, as to any PRD Provider, an adjustment, determined in accordance with Schedule 6.1 of this Agreement, to the peak-load forecast used to determine the quantity of capacity sought through an RPM Auction, reflecting the aggregate effect of Price Responsive Demand on peak load resulting from the Price Responsive Demand to be provided by such PRD Provider.

**1.52 Nominated Demand Resource Value**

Nominated Demand Resource Value shall have the meaning specified in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

**1.53 Nominated ILR Value**

Nominated ILR Value shall have the meaning specified in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

**1.54 Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation**

Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation shall mean Behind the Meter Generation that is used by municipal electric systems, electric cooperatives, and electric distribution companies to serve load.

**1.55 Obligation Peak Load**

Obligation Peak Load shall have the meaning specified in Schedule 8 of this Agreement.

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**1.56 Office of the Interconnection**

Office of the Interconnection shall mean the employees and agents of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., subject to the supervision and oversight of the PJM Board, acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement.

**1.57 Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. or Operating Agreement**

Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. or Operating Agreement shall mean that certain agreement, dated April 1, 1997 and as amended and restated June 2, 1997 and as amended from time to time thereafter, among the members of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

**1.58 Operating Reserve**

Operating Reserve shall mean the amount of generating capacity scheduled to be available for a specified period of an operating day to ensure the reliable operation of the PJM Region, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

**1.59 Other Supplier**

Other Supplier shall mean a Member that is (i) a seller, buyer or transmitter of electric capacity or energy in, from or through the PJM Region, and (ii) is not a Generation Owner, Electric Distributor, Transmission Owner or End-Use Customer.

**1.60 Partial Requirements Service**

Partial Requirements Service shall mean wholesale service to supply a specified portion, but not all, of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.

**1.61 Percentage Internal Resources Required**

Percentage Internal Resources Required shall mean, for purposes of an FRR Capacity Plan, the percentage of the LDA Reliability Requirement for an LDA that must be satisfied with Capacity Resources located in such LDA.

**1.62 Party**

Party shall mean an entity bound by the terms of this Agreement.

**1.63 PJM**

PJM shall mean the PJM Board and the Office of the Interconnection.

**1.64 PJM Board**

PJM Board shall mean the Board of Managers of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement.

**1.65 PJM Manuals**

PJM Manuals shall mean the instructions, rules, procedures and guidelines established by the Office of the Interconnection for the operation, planning and accounting requirements of the PJM Region.

**1.66 PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff or PJM Tariff**

PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff or PJM Tariff shall mean the tariff for transmission service within the PJM Region, as in effect from time to time, including any schedules, appendices, or exhibits attached thereto.

**1.67 PJM Region**

PJM Region shall have the same meaning as provided in the Operating Agreement.

**1.68 PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin**

PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin shall mean the percent installed reserve margin for the PJM Region required pursuant to this Agreement, as approved by the PJM Board pursuant to Schedule 4.1.

**1.69 Planned Demand Resource**

Planned Demand Resource shall mean a Demand Resource that does not currently have the capability to provide a reduction in demand or to otherwise control load, but that is scheduled to be capable of providing such reduction or control on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed, as determined in accordance with the requirements of Schedule 6.

**1.69A Planned External Generation Capacity Resource**

Planned External Generation Capacity Resource shall mean a proposed Generation Capacity Resource, or a proposed increase in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource, that (a) is to be located outside the PJM Region, (b) participates in the generation interconnection process of a Control Area external to PJM, (c) is scheduled to be physically and electrically interconnected to the transmission facilities of such Control Area on or before the first day of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, and (d) is in full commercial operation prior to the first day of such Delivery Year, such that it is sufficient to provide the Installed Capacity set forth in the Sell Offer forming the basis of such resource's commitment to the PJM Region. Prior to participation in any Reliability Pricing Model Auction for such Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that it has executed an interconnection agreement (functionally equivalent to a System Impact Study Agreement under the PJM Tariff for Base Residual Auction and an

Interconnection Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff for Incremental Auction) with the transmission owner to whose transmission facilities or distribution facilities the resource is being directly connected, and if applicable the transmission provider. A Planned External Generation Capacity Resource must provide evidence to PJM that it has been studied as a Network Resource, or such other similar interconnection product in such external Control Area, must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for or purchased transmission service to be deliverable to the PJM border, and must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for transmission service to be deliverable to the bus at which energy is to be delivered, the agreements for which must have been executed prior to participation in any Reliability Pricing Model Auction for such Delivery Year. An External Generation Capacity Resource shall cease to be considered a Planned External Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that interconnection service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction, in which case it shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for all subsequent Delivery Years.

### 1.70 Planned Generation Capacity Resource

Planned Generation Capacity Resource shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource participating in the generation interconnection process under Part IV, Subpart A of the PJM Tariff, for which: (i) Interconnection Service is scheduled to commence on or before the first day of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to RPM or to an FRR Plan; (ii) a System Impact Study Agreement has been executed prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year; (iii) an Interconnection Service Agreement has been executed prior to any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year in which such resource plans to participate; and (iv) no megawatts of capacity have cleared an RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year. For purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource shall cease to be considered a Planned Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that Interconnection Service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year, in which case it shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for any RPM Auction for all subsequent Delivery Years. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Generation Capacity Resource for which construction has not commenced and which would otherwise have been treated as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource but for the fact that it was bid into RPM Auctions for at least two consecutive Delivery Years, and cleared the last such auction only because it was considered existing and its mitigated offer cap was accepted when its price offer would not have otherwise been accepted, shall be deemed to be a Planned Generation Capacity Resource.

### 1.71 Planning Period

Planning Period shall mean the 12 months beginning June 1 and extending through May 31 of the following year, or such other period approved by the Members Committee.

#### 1.71A PRD Curve

PRD Curve shall mean a price-consumption curve at a PRD Substation level, if available, and otherwise at a Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) level, that details the base

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consumption level of Price Responsive Demand and the decreasing consumption levels at increasing prices.

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**1.71B PRD Provider**

PRD Provider shall mean (i) a Load Serving Entity that provides PRD; or (ii) an entity without direct load serving responsibilities that has entered contractual arrangements with end-use customers served by a Load Serving Entity that satisfy the eligibility criteria for Price Responsive Demand.

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**1.71C PRD Provider's Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD**

PRD Provider's Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD shall mean the expected contribution to Delivery Year peak load of a PRD Provider's Price Responsive Demand, were such demand not to be reduced in response to price, based on the contribution of the end-use customers comprising such Price Responsive Demand to the most recent prior Delivery Year's peak demand, escalated to the Delivery Year in question, as determined in a manner consistent with the Office of the Interconnection's load forecasts used for purposes of the RPM Auctions.

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**1.71D PRD Reservation Price**

PRD Reservation Price shall mean an RPM Auction clearing price identified in a PRD Plan for Price Responsive Demand load below which the PRD Provider desires not to commit the identified load as Price Responsive Demand.

**1.71E PRD Substation**

PRD Substation shall mean an electrical substation that is located in the same Zone or in the same sub-Zonal LDA as the end-use customers identified in a PRD Plan or PRD registration and that, in terms of the electrical topography of the Transmission Facilities comprising the PJM Region, is as close as practicable to such loads.

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**1.71F Price Responsive Demand**

Price Responsive Demand or PRD shall mean end-use customer load registered by a PRD Provider pursuant to Schedule 6.1 of the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement that have, as set forth in more detail in the PJM Manuals, the metering capability to record electricity consumption at an interval of one hour or less, supervisory control capable of curtailing such load (consistent with applicable RERRA requirements) at each PRD Substation identified in the relevant PRD Plan or PRD registration in response to a Maximum Generation Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection, and a retail rate structure, or equivalent contractual arrangement, capable of changing retail rates as frequently as an hourly basis, that is linked to or based upon changes in real-time Locational Marginal Prices at a PRD Substation level and that results in a predictable automated response to varying wholesale electricity prices.

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**1.71G Price Responsive Demand Credit**

Price Responsive Demand Credit shall mean a credit, based on committed Price Responsive Demand, as determined under Schedule 6.1 of this Agreement.

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#### **1.71H Price Responsive Demand Plan or PRD Plan**

Price Responsive Demand Plan or PRD Plan shall mean a plan, submitted by a PRD Provider and received by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Schedule 6.1 of this Agreement and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, claiming a peak demand limitation due to Price Responsive Demand to support the determination of such PRD Provider's Nominal PRD Value.

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#### **1.72 Public Power Entity**

Public Power Entity shall mean any agency, authority, or instrumentality of a state or of a political subdivision of a state, or any corporation wholly owned by any one or more of the foregoing, that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

#### **1.73 Qualifying Transmission Upgrades**

Qualifying Transmission Upgrades shall have the meaning specified in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

#### **1.74 Markets and Reliability Committee**

Markets and Reliability Committee shall mean the committee established pursuant to the Operating Agreement as a Standing Committee of the Members Committee.

#### **1.74A Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority**

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Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority or RERRA shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Operating Agreement.

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#### **1.75 Reliability Principles and Standards**

Reliability Principles and Standards shall mean the principles and standards established by NERC or an Applicable Regional Reliability Council to define, among other things, an acceptable probability of loss of load due to inadequate generation or transmission capability, as amended from time to time.

#### **1.76 Required Approvals**

Required Approvals shall mean all of the approvals required for this Agreement to be modified or to be terminated, in whole or in part, including the acceptance for filing by FERC and every other regulatory authority with jurisdiction over all or any part of this Agreement.

#### **1.77 Self-Supply**



Self Supply shall have the meaning provided in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

**1.78 Single-Customer LSE**

Single-Customer LSE shall mean a Party that (a) serves only retail customers that are Affiliates of such Party; (b) owns or controls generation facilities located at one or more of the retail customer location(s) that in the aggregate satisfy at least 50% of such Party's Unforced Capacity obligations; and (c) serves retail customers having (i) an Obligation Peak Load at all locations of no less than 100 MW, where such peak load of each such location is no less than 10 MW; or (ii) an Obligation Peak Load at each location served of no less than 25 MW.

**1.79 South RAA**

South RAA shall mean that certain Reliability Assurance Agreement among Load-Serving Entities in the PJM South Region, on file with FERC as PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 40.

**1.80 State Consumer Advocate**

State Consumer Advocate shall mean a legislatively created office from any State, all or any part of the territory of which is within the PJM Region, and the District of Columbia established, inter alia, for the purpose of representing the interests of energy consumers before the utility regulatory commissions of such states and the District of Columbia and the FERC.

**1.81 State Regulatory Structural Change**

State Regulatory Structural Change shall mean as to any Party, a state law, rule, or order that, after September 30, 2006, initiates a program that allows retail electric consumers served by such Party to choose from among alternative suppliers on a competitive basis, terminates such a program, expands such a program to include classes of customers or localities served by such Party that were not previously permitted to participate in such a program, or that modifies retail electric market structure or market design rules in a manner that materially increases the likelihood that a substantial proportion of the customers of such Party that are eligible for retail choice under such a program (a) that have not exercised such choice will exercise such choice; or (b) that have exercised such choice will no longer exercise such choice, including for example, without limitation, mandating divestiture of utility-owned generation or structural changes to such Party's default service rules that materially affect whether retail choice is economically viable.

**1.82 Threshold Quantity**

Threshold Quantity shall mean, as to any FRR Entity for any Delivery Year, the sum of (a) the Unforced Capacity equivalent (determined using the Pool-Wide Average EFORD) of the Installed Reserve Margin for such Delivery Year multiplied by the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for which such FRR Entity is responsible under its FRR Capacity Plan for such Delivery Year, plus (b) the lesser of (i) 3% of the Unforced Capacity amount determined in (a) above or

(ii) 450 MW. If the FRR Entity is not responsible for all load within a Zone, the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for such entity shall be the FRR Entity's Obligation Peak Load last determined prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, times the Base FRR Scaling Factor (as determined in accordance with Schedule 8.1).

### **1.83 Transmission Facilities**

Transmission Facilities shall mean facilities that: (i) are within the PJM Region; (ii) meet the definition of transmission facilities pursuant to FERC's Uniform System of Accounts or have been classified as transmission facilities in a ruling by FERC addressing such facilities; and (iii) have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection to be integrated with the PJM Region transmission system and integrated into the planning and operation of the PJM Region to serve all of the power and transmission customers within the PJM Region.

### **1.84 Transmission Owner**

Transmission Owner shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership Transmission Facilities. Taking transmission service shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Transmission Owner.

### **1.85 Transmission Owners Agreement**

Transmission Owners Agreement shall mean that certain Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, dated as of December 15, 2005 and as amended from time to time, among transmission owners within the PJM Region.

### **1.86 Unforced Capacity**

Unforced Capacity shall mean installed capacity rated at summer conditions that is not on average experiencing a forced outage or forced derating, calculated for each Capacity Resource on the 12-month period from October to September without regard to the ownership of or the contractual rights to the capacity of the unit.

### **1.87 West RAA**

West RAA shall mean the "PJM West Reliability Assurance Agreement among the Load Serving Entities in the PJM West Region," on file with FERC as PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 32.

### **1.88 Zonal Capacity Price**

Zonal Capacity Price shall mean the price of Unforced Capacity in a Zone that an LSE that has not elected the FRR Alternative is obligated to pay for a Delivery Year as determined pursuant to Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff.

### **1.89 Zone or Zonal**

| Zone or Zonal shall ~~mean-refer to~~ an area within the PJM Region, as set forth in Schedule 15, or as such areas may be (i) combined as a result of mergers or acquisitions or (ii) added as a result of the expansion of the boundaries of the PJM Region. A Zone shall include any Non-Zone Network Load (as defined in the PJM Tariff) located outside the PJM Region that is served from such Zone under Schedule H-A of the PJM Tariff.

*RAA Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA) Cover On - RAA ARTICLE 9 -- COORDINATED PLANNING AND OPERATIO - RAA 9.5 Metering.*

**9.5 Metering.**

Each Party shall comply with the metering standards for the PJM Region, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, as well as any further metering requirements applicable to Price Responsive Demand, where such is relied upon for an adjustment to peak load pursuant to Schedule 6.1 of this Agreement.

**SCHEDULE 6.1**

**PRICE RESPONSIVE DEMAND**

A. As more fully set forth in this Schedule 6.1 and the PJM Manuals, for any Delivery Year beginning on or after June 1, 2015 (subject to a transition plan, as set forth below), any PRD Provider, including any FRR Entity, may commit that certain loads identified by such PRD Provider shall not exceed a specified demand level at specified prices during Maximum Generation Emergencies, as a consequence of the implementation of Price Responsive Demand. Based on information provided by the PRD Provider in a PRD Plan (and, to the extent such plan identifies a PRD Reservation Price, based on the clearing price in the Base Residual Auction or Third Incremental Auction, as applicable), the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the Nominal PRD Value for the specified loads identified by such PRD Provider by Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable). The Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and LDA Reliability Requirements, as applicable, to reflect committed PRD. Actual PRD reductions in response to price shall be added back in determining peak load contributions. Any PRD Provider that fails fully to honor its PRD commitments for a Delivery Year shall be assessed a compliance charge.

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B. End-use customer loads identified in a PRD Plan or PRD registration for a Delivery Year as Price Responsive Demand may not, for such Delivery Year, (i) be registered as Economic Load Response or Emergency Load Response (ii) be used as the basis of any Demand Resource Sell Offer or Energy Efficiency Resource Sell Offer in any RPM Auction; or (iii) be identified in a PRD Plan or PRD registration of any other PRD Provider.

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C. Any PRD Provider seeking to commit PRD hereunder for a Delivery Year must submit to the Office of the Interconnection a PRD Plan identifying and supporting the Nominal PRD Value (calculated as the difference between the PRD Provider's Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD and the Maximum Emergency Service Level of Price Responsive Demand) for each Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) for which such PRD is committed; such information shall be provided on a PRD Substation level to the extent available at the time the PRD Plan is submitted. Such plan must be submitted no later than the January 15 last preceding the Base Residual Auction for the Delivery Year for which such PRD is committed; any submitted plan that does not contain, by such January 15, all information required hereunder shall be rejected. A PRD Provider may submit a PRD Plan, or a modified PRD Plan, by the January 15 last preceding the Third Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year requesting approval of additional Price Responsive Demand but only in the event, and to the extent, that the final peak load forecast for the relevant LDA for such Delivery Year exceeds the preliminary peak load forecast for such LDA and Delivery Year. The Office of the Interconnection shall revise such requests (as adjusted, to the extent a PRD Reservation Price is specified, for the results of the Third Incremental Auction) for additional Price Responsive Demand downward, in accordance with rules in the PJM Manuals, if the submitted requests (as adjusted) in the aggregate exceed the increase in the load forecast in the LDA modeled. The Office of the Interconnection shall advise

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the PRD Provider, following the Third Incremental Auction, of its acceptance of, or any downward adjustment to, the Nominal PRD Value based on its review of the PRD Plan and the results of the auction. Approval of the PRD Plan by the Office of the Interconnection shall establish a firm commitment by the PRD Provider to the specified Nominal PRD Value of Price Responsive Demand at each Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) during the relevant Delivery Year (subject to any PRD Reservation Price), and may not be uncommitted or replaced by any Capacity Resource. Although the PRD Plan may include reasonably supported forecasts and expectations concerning the development of Price Responsive Demand for a Delivery Year, the PRD Provider's commitment to a Nominal PRD Value for such Delivery Year shall not depend or be conditioned upon realization of such forecasts or expectations.

D. All submitted PRD Plans must comply with the requirements and criteria in the PJM Manuals for such plans, including assumptions and standards specified in the PJM Manuals for estimates of expected load levels. The PRD Plan shall explain and justify the methods used to determine the Nominal PRD Value. All assumptions and relevant variables affecting the Nominal PRD Value must be clearly stated. The PRD Plan must include sufficient data to allow a third party to audit the procedures and verify the Nominal PRD Value. Any non-compliance with a Nominal PRD Value for a prior Delivery Year shall be identified and taken into account. In addition, each submitted PRD Plan must include:

(i) documentation, in the form specified in the PJM Manuals, that: (1) where the PRD Provider is a Load Serving Entity, the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority has provided any required approval (including conditional approval, but only if the Load Serving Entity asserts that all such conditions have been satisfied) of such Load Serving Entity's time-varying retail rate structure and, regardless of whether RERRA approval is required, that such rate structure adheres to PRD implementation standards specified in the PJM Manuals; and (2) where the PRD Provider is not a Load Serving Entity, such PRD Provider has in place contractual arrangements with the relevant end-use customers establishing a time-varying retail rate structure that adheres to PRD implementation standards specified in the PJM Manuals; in such cases, the PRD Provider shall provide the Office of the Interconnection copies of its applicable contracts with end-use customers (including any proposed contracts) within ten business days after a request for such contracts, or its PRD Plan shall be rejected;

(ii) the expected peak load value that would apply, absent load reductions in response to price, to the end-use customer loads at a PRD Substation level, including applicable peak-load contribution data for such customers, to the extent available and otherwise at a Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA if applicable) level;

(iii) the Maximum Emergency Service Level of the identified load given the load's price-responsive characteristics, at a PRD Substation level if available and otherwise at a Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA if applicable) level;

(iv) Price-consumption curves ("PRD Curves") at a PRD Substation level if available and otherwise at a Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA if applicable) level that detail the base consumption level of the identified loads; and the decreasing consumption levels at increasing prices, provided

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that all identified load reductions must be capable of full implementation within 15 minutes of declaration of a Maximum Generation Emergency by the Office of the Interconnection, and provided further that the specified prices may not exceed the maximum energy offer price cap under the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement;

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(v) the estimated Nominal PRD Value of the Price Responsive Demand at a PRD Substation level if available and otherwise at a Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA if applicable) level;

(vi) specifications of equipment used to satisfy the advanced metering and supervisory control criteria for eligible Price Responsive Demand, including a timeline and milestones demonstrating that such equipment shall be available and operational for the start of the relevant Delivery Year. Such equipment shall comply with applicable RERRA requirements and shall be designed to meet all PRD requirements, including, without limitation, meter reading requirements and supervisory control requirements, specified in the PJM Manuals. The PRD Provider shall demonstrate in the PRD Plan that the supervisory control equipment enables an automated load response by Price Responsive Demand to the price trigger; provided, however, that the PRD Provider may request in the PRD Plan an exception to the automation requirement for any individual registered end-use customer that is located at a single site and that has supervisory control over processes by which load reduction would be accomplished; and provided further that nothing herein relieves such end-use customer of the obligation to respond within 15 minutes to declaration of a Maximum Generation Emergency in accordance with applicable PRD Curves. In addition to the above requirements and those in the PJM Manuals for metering equipment and associated data, metering equipment shall provide integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis and shall either meet the electric distribution company requirements for accuracy or have a maximum error of two percent over the full range of the metering equipment (including potential transformers and current transformers). The installed metering equipment must be that used for retail electric service; or metering equipment owned by the end-use customer or PRD Provider that is approved by PJM and either read electronically by PJM or read by the customer or PRD Provider and forwarded to PJM, in either case in accordance with requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals; and

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(vii) any RPM Auction clearing price below which the PRD Provider does not choose to commit PRD ("PRD Reservation Price"), specifying the relevant auction, Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA if applicable), and, if applicable, a range of up to ten pairs of PRD commitment levels and associated minimum RPM Auction clearing prices; provided however that the Office of the Interconnection may interpolate PRD commitment levels based on clearing prices between prices specified by the PRD Provider.

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E. Each PRD Provider that commits Price Responsive Demand through an accepted PRD Plan must, no later than ten business days prior to the start of the Delivery Year for which such PRD is committed, register with PJM, in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals, sufficient PRD-eligible load at a PRD Substation level to satisfy its Nominal PRD Value commitment. All information required in the PRD Plan to be at a PRD Substation level if available at the time of submission of the PRD Plan that was not provided at the time of submission of such plan must be provided with the registration. The PRD Provider shall also identify in the registration each individual end-use customer with a peak demand of 10 kW or greater included in such Price Responsive Demand, the peak-load contribution of such

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customers, the Load Serving Entity responsible for serving such customers, and the Load Serving Entities responsible for serving the end-use customers not identified on an individual basis. The PRD Provider shall maintain, and provide to the Office of the Interconnection upon request, an identification of all individual end-use customers with a peak demand of less than 10kW included in such Price Responsive Demand, and the peak-load contribution of such customers. The PRD Provider must maintain its PRD Substation-level registration of PRD-eligible load at the level of its Zonal (or sub-zonal LDA, if applicable) Nominal PRD Value commitment during each day of the Delivery Year for which such commitment was made. The PRD Provider may change the end-use customer registered to meet the PRD Provider's commitment during the Delivery Year, but such PRD Provider must always in the aggregate register sufficient Price Responsive Demand to meet or exceed the Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) committed Nominal PRD Value level. A PRD Provider must timely notify the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, of all changes in PRD registrations. Such notification must remove from the PRD Provider's registration(s) any end-use customer load that no longer meets the eligibility criteria for PRD, effective as of the first day that such end-use customer load is no longer PRD-eligible.

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F. Each PRD Provider that is a Load Serving Entity shall be required to identify its committed Price Responsive Demand as price-sensitive demand at a PRD Substation level in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets. Each PRD Provider that is not a Load Serving Entity shall be required to identify its committed Price Responsive Demand as price-sensitive demand at a PRD Substation level in the Real-Time Energy Market. The most recent PRD Curve submitted by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan or PRD registration shall be used for such purpose unless and until changed by the PRD Provider in accordance with the market rules of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that any changes to PRD Curves must be consistent with the PRD Provider's commitment of Price Responsive Demand hereunder

G. The Obligation Peak Load of a Load Serving Entity that serves end-users registered as Price Responsive Demand in any Zone shall be as determined in Schedule 8 to this Agreement; provided, however, that such Load Serving Entity shall receive, for each day that an approved Price Response Demand registration is effective and applicable to such LSE's load, a Price Responsive Demand Credit for such registration during the Delivery Year, against the Locational Reliability Charge otherwise assessed upon such Load Serving Entity in such Zone for such day, determined as follows:

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LSE PRD Credit = [( Share of Zonal Nominal PRD Value committed in Base Residual Auction \* (FZWNSP/FZPLDY) \* Final Zonal RPM Scaling Factor \* FPR \* Final Zonal Capacity Price) + (Share of Zonal Nominal PRD Value committed in Third Incremental Auction \* (FZWNSP/FZPLDY) \* Final Zonal RPM Scaling Factor \* FPR \* Final Zonal Capacity Price \* Third Incremental Auction Component of Final Zonal Capacity Price stated as a Percentage)] .

Where:

Share of Zonal Nominal PRD Value Committed in Base Residual Auction = Nominal PRD Value for such registration/Total Zonal Nominal PRD Value of all Price Responsive



Demand registered by the PRD Provider of such registration \*Zonal Nominal PRD Value committed in the Base Residual Auction by the PRD Provider of such registration .

Share of Zonal Nominal PRD Value Committed in Third Incremental Auction = Nominal PRD Value for such registration/Total Zonal Nominal PRD Value of all Price Responsive Demand registered by the PRD Provider of such registration \*Zonal Nominal PRD Value committed in the Third Incremental Auction by the PRD Provider of such registration.

FZPLDY = Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast for such Delivery Year; and

FZWNSP = Zonal Weather-Normalized Peak Load for the summer concluding prior to the commencement of such Delivery Year;

And where the PRD registration is associated with a sub-Zone, the Share of the Nominal PRD Value Committed in Base Residual Auction or Third Incremental Auction will be based on the Nominal PRD Values committed and registered in a sub-Zone. A Load Serving Entity will receive a LSE PRD Credit for each approved Price Responsive Demand registration that is effective and applicable to load served by such Load Serving Entity on a given day. The total daily credit to an LSE in a Zone shall be the sum of the credits received as a result of all approved registrations in the Zone for load served by such LSE on a given day.

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H. A PRD Provider may transfer all or part of its PRD commitment for a Delivery Year in a Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA) to another PRD Provider for its use in the same Zone or sub-Zonal LDA, through notice of such transfer provided by both the transferor and transferee PRD Providers to the Office of the Interconnection in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals. From and after the effective date of such transfer, and to the extent of such transfer, the transferor PRD Provider shall be relieved of its PRD commitment and credit requirements, shall not be liable for PRD compliance charges, and shall not be entitled to a Price Responsive Demand Credit; and the transferee PRD Provider, to the extent of such transfer, shall assume such PRD commitment, credit requirements, and obligation for compliance charges and, if it is a Load Serving Entity, shall be entitled to a Price Responsive Demand Credit.

I. Any PRD Provider that commits Price Responsive Demand and does not register and maintain registration of sufficient PRD-eligible load, (including, without limitation, failing to install or maintain the required advanced metering or supervisory control facilities) in a Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) to satisfy in full its Nominal PRD Value commitment in such Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA) on each day of the Delivery Year for which such commitment is made shall be assessed a compliance charge for each day that the registered Price Responsive Demand is less than the committed Nominal PRD Value. Such daily penalty shall equal:

[MW Shortfall] \* [Forecast Pool Requirement] \* [(Weighted Final Zonal Capacity Price in \$/MW-day)

+ higher of (0.2 \* Weighted Final Zonal Capacity Price) or (\$20/MW-day)]

Where: MW Shortfall = Daily Nominal PRD Value committed in such PRD Provider's PRD Plan (including any permitted amendment to such plan) for the relevant Zone or sub-Zonal LDA – Daily Nominal PRD Value as a result of PRD registration for such Zone or sub-Zonal LDA; and

Weighted Final Zonal Capacity Price is the average of the Final Zonal Capacity Price and the price component of the Final Zonal Capacity Price attributable to the Third Incremental Auction, weighted by the Nominal PRD Values committed by such PRD Provider in connection with the Base Residual Auction and those committed by such PRD Provider in connection with the Third Incremental Auction.

The MW Shortfall shall not be reduced through replacement of the Price Responsive Demand by any Capacity Resource or Excess Commitment Credits, provided, however, that the PRD Provider may register additional PRD-eligible end-use customer load to satisfy its PRD commitment.

J. PRD Providers shall be responsible for verifying the performance of their PRD loads during each maximum emergency event declared by the Office of the Interconnection. PRD Providers shall demonstrate that the identified PRD loads performed in accordance with the PRD Curves submitted at a PRD Substation level in the PRD Plan or PRD registration; provided, however, that the previously submitted MESL value shall be adjusted by a ratio equal to the amount by which the actual zonal load during the declared event exceeded the PJM load forecast underlying the previously submitted MESL value. In accordance with procedures and deadlines specified in the PJM Manuals, the PRD Providers must submit actual customer load levels for all hours during the declared event and all other information reasonably required by the Office of the Interconnection to verify performance of the committed PRD loads.

K. If the identified loads submitted for a Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA) by a PRD Provider exceed during any Emergency the aggregate Maximum Emergency Service Level (“MESL”) specified in all PRD registrations of such PRD Provider that have a PRD Curve specifying a price at or below the highest Real-time LMP recorded during such Emergency, the PRD Provider that committed such loads as Price Responsive Demand shall be assessed a compliance charge hereunder. The charge shall be based on the net performance during an Emergency of the loads that were identified as Price Responsive Demand for such Delivery Year in the PRD registrations submitted by such PRD Provider in each Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) and that specified a price at the MESL that is at or below the highest Real-Time LMP recorded during such Emergency. The compliance charge hereunder shall equal:

[MW Shortfall] \* [Forecast Pool Requirement] \* [(Weighted Final Zonal Capacity Price in \$/MW-day)

+ higher of (0.2 \* Final Zonal Capacity Price) or (\$20/MW-day)] \* 365 days

Where: MW Shortfall = [highest hourly integrated aggregate metered load for such PRD Provider’s PRD load in the Zone or sub-Zonal LDA meeting the price condition specified above] – {(aggregate MESL for the Zone or sub-Zonal LDA) \* the higher of [1.0] or [(actual Zonal load – actual total PRD load in Zone) / (Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast – final Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD in total for all PRD load in Zone meeting the price condition specified above)]}.

For purposes of the above provision, the MW Shortfall for any portion of the Emergency event that is less than a full clock hour shall be treated as a shortfall for a full clock hour unless either:

(i) the load was reduced to the adjusted MESL level within 15 minutes of the emergency procedures notification, regardless of the response rate submitted, or (ii) the hourly integrated value of the load was at or below the adjusted MESL. Such MW shortfall shall not be reduced

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through replacement of the Price Responsive Demand by any Capacity Resource or Excess Commitment Credits; provided, however, that the performance and MW Shortfalls of all PRD-eligible load registered by the PRD Provider, including any additional or replacement load registered by such PRD Provider, provided that it meets the price condition specified above, shall be reflected in the calculation of the overall MW Shortfall. Any greater MW Shortfall during a subsequent Emergency for such Zone or sub-Zonal LDA during the same Delivery Year shall result in a further charge hereunder, limited to the additional increment of MW Shortfall. As appropriate, the MW Shortfall for non-compliance during an Emergency shall be adjusted downward to the extent such PRD Provider also was assessed a compliance penalty for failure to register sufficient PRD to satisfy its PRD commitment.

L. PRD Providers that register Price Responsive Demand shall be subject to test at least once per year to demonstrate the ability of the registered Price Responsive Demand to reduce to the specified Maximum Emergency Service Level, and such PRD Providers shall be assessed a compliance charge to the extent of failure by the registered Price Responsive Demand during such test to reduce to the Maximum Emergency Service Level, in accordance with the following:

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(i) If the Office of the Interconnection does not declare during the relevant Delivery Year a Maximum Generation Emergency that requires the registered PRD to reduce to the Maximum Emergency Service Level then such registered PRD must demonstrate that it was tested for a one-hour period during any hour when a Maximum Generation Emergency may be called during June through October or the following May of the relevant Delivery Year. If a Maximum Generation Emergency that requires the registered PRD to reduce to the Maximum Emergency Service Level is called during the relevant Delivery Year, then no compliance charges will be assessed hereunder.

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(ii) All PRD registered in a zone must be tested simultaneously except that, when less than 25 percent (by megawatts) of a PRD Provider's total PRD registered in a Zone fails a test, the PRD Provider may conduct a re-test limited to all registered PRD that failed the prior test, provided that such re-test must be at the same time of day and under approximately the same weather conditions as the prior test, and provided further that all affiliated registered PRD must test simultaneously, where affiliated means registered PRD that has any ability to shift load and that is owned or controlled by the same entity. If less than 25 percent of a PRD Provider's total PRD registered in a Zone fails the test and the PRD Provider chooses to conduct a retest, the PRD Provider may elect to maintain the performance compliance result for registered PRD achieved during the test if the PRD Provider: (1) notifies the Office of the Interconnection 48 hours prior to the re-test under this election; and (2) the PRD Provider retests affiliated registered PRD under this election as set forth in the PJM Manuals.

(iii) A PRD Provider that registered PRD shall be assessed a PRD Test Failure Charge equal to the net PRD capability testing shortfall in a Zone during such test in the aggregate of all of such PRD Provider's registered PRD in such Zone times the PRD Test Failure Charge Rate. The net capability testing shortfall in such Zone shall be the following megawatt quantity, converted to an Unforced Capacity basis using the applicable Forecast Pool Requirement:

MW Shortfall = [highest hourly integrated aggregate metered load for such PRD Provider's PRD load in the Zone or sub-Zonal LDA] – {(aggregate MESL for the Zone or sub-Zonal LDA) \* the higher of [1.0] or [(actual Zonal load – actual total PRD load in Zone) / (Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast – final Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD in total for all PRD load in Zone)]}.

The net PRD capability testing shortfall in such Zone shall be reduced by the PRD Provider's summer daily average of the MW shortfalls determined for compliance charge purposes under section I of this Schedule 6.1 in such Zone for such PRD Provider's registered PRD.

(iv) The PRD Test Failure Charge Rate shall equal such PRD Provider's Weighted Final Zonal Capacity Price in such Zone plus the greater of (0.20 times the Weighted Final Zonal Capacity Price in such Zone or \$20/MW-day) times the number of days in the Delivery Year, where the Weighted Final Zonal Capacity Price is the average of the Final Zonal Capacity Price and the price component of the Final Zonal Capacity Price attributable to the Third Incremental Auction, weighted by the Nominal PRD Values committed by such PRD Provider in connection with the Base Residual Auction and those committed by such PRD Provider in connection with the Third Incremental Auction. Such charge shall be assessed daily and charged monthly (or otherwise in accordance with customary PJM billing practices in effect at the time); provided, however, that a lump sum payment may be required to reflect amounts due, as a result of a test failure, from the start of the Delivery Year to the day that charges are reflected in regular billing.

M. The revenue collected from assessment of the charges assessed under subsections I, K, and L of this Schedule 6.1 shall be distributed on a pro-rata basis to all entities that committed Capacity Resources in the RPM Auctions for the Delivery Year for which the compliance charge is assessed, pro rata based on each such entity's revenues from Capacity Market Clearing Prices in such auctions, net of any compliance charges incurred by such entity.

N. Aggregate Price Responsive Demand that may be registered shall be limited for the first four Delivery Years that peak load adjustments for Price Responsive Demand are allowed under this Agreement. The maximum quantity of Price Responsive Demand that may be registered by all PRD Providers and for all Zones or sub-Zones shall be:

1. 1500 MW for the Delivery Year that begins on June 1, 2015;
2. 2500 MW for the Delivery Year that begins on June 1, 2016;
3. 3500 MW for the Delivery Year that begins on June 1, 2017; and
4. 4000 MW for the Delivery Year that begins on June 1, 2018.

A portion of such limit shall be assigned to each Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) pro rata based on each such Zone's (or sub-Zone's) Preliminary Zonal Peak Load Forecast for the Delivery Year compared to the PJM Region's Preliminary RTO Peak Load Forecast for such Delivery Year (less, in each case, load expected to be served in such area under the Fixed Resource Requirement). Within each Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) the permitted registrations shall be those quantities within the Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA) limit with the lowest identified PRD Reservation Prices for their identified loads; and, as between PRD Providers submitting PRD registrations at the same PRD Reservation Price, pro rata based on each such LSE's share of the Preliminary Zonal Peak Load Forecast for such Zone (or sub-Zonal LDA) less load expected to be served under the Fixed Resource Requirement. Nothing in this section

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precludes price-responsive load from exercising any opportunity it may otherwise have to participate in the day-ahead or real-time energy markets in the PJM Region. For Delivery Years beginning on or after June 1, 2019, there is no limit on the quantity of Price Responsive Demand that may register.

**RAA Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA) Cover On - RAA SCHEDULE 8.1 - RAA SCHEDULE 8.1.D-FRR Capacity Plans**

**D. FRR Capacity Plans**

1. Each FRR Entity shall submit its initial FRR Capacity Plan as required by subsection C.1 of this Schedule, and shall annually extend and update such plan by no later than one month prior to the Base Residual Auction for each succeeding Delivery Year in such plan. Each FRR Capacity Plan shall indicate the nature and current status of each resource, including the status of each Planned Generation Capacity Resource or Planned Demand Resource, the planned deactivation or retirement of any Generation Capacity Resource or Demand Resource, and the status of commitments for each sale or purchase of capacity included in such plan.

2. The FRR Capacity Plan of each FRR Entity that commits that it will not sell surplus Capacity Resources as a Capacity Market Seller in any auction conducted under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, or to any direct or indirect purchaser that uses such resource as the basis of any Sell Offer in such auction, shall designate Capacity Resources in a megawatt quantity no less than the Forecast Pool Requirement for each applicable Delivery Year times the FRR Entity's allocated share of the Preliminary Zonal Peak Load Forecast for such Delivery Year, as determined in accordance with procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals. The set of Capacity Resources designated in the FRR Capacity Plan must meet the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement associated with the FRR Entity's capacity obligation. If the FRR Entity is not responsible for all load within a Zone, the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for such entity shall be the FRR Entity's Obligation Peak Load last determined prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, times the Base Zonal FRR Scaling Factor. The FRR Capacity Plan of each FRR Entity that does not commit that it will not sell surplus Capacity Resources as set forth above shall designate Capacity Resources at least equal to the Threshold Quantity. To the extent the FRR Entity's allocated share of the Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast exceeds the FRR Entity's allocated share of the Preliminary Zonal Peak Load Forecast, such FRR Entity's FRR Capacity Plan shall be updated to designate additional Capacity Resources in an amount no less than the Forecast Pool Requirement times such increase; provided, however, any excess megawatts of Capacity Resources included in such FRR Entity's previously designated Threshold Quantity, if any, may be used to satisfy the capacity obligation for such increased load. To the extent the FRR Entity's allocated share of the Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast is less than the FRR Entity's allocated share of the Preliminary Zonal Peak Load Forecast, such FRR Entity's FRR Capacity Plan may be updated to release previously designated Capacity Resources in an amount no greater than the Forecast Pool Requirement times such decrease. Peak load values referenced in this section shall be adjusted as necessary to take into account any applicable Nominal PRD Values approved pursuant to Schedule 6.1 of this Agreement. Any FRR Entity seeking an adjustment to peak load for Price Responsive Demand must submit a separate PRD Plan in compliance with Section 6.1 (provided that the FRR Entity shall not specify any Reservation Price), and shall register all PRD-eligible load needed to satisfy its PRD commitment and be subject to compliance charges as set forth in that Schedule under the circumstances specified therein; provided that for non-compliance by an FRR Entity, the compliance charge rate shall be equal to 1.20 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price resulting from all RPM Auctions for such Delivery Year for the LDA encompassing the FRR Entity's Zone, weight-averaged for the Delivery Year based on

the prices established and quantities cleared in the RPM auctions for such Delivery Year; and provided further that an alternative PRD Provider may provide PRD in an FRR Service Area by agreement with the FRR Entity responsible for the load in such FRR Service Area, subject to the same terms and conditions as if the FRR Entity had provided the PRD.

3. As to any FRR Entity, the Base Zonal FRR Scaling Factor for each Zone in which it serves load for a Delivery Year shall equal  $ZPLDY/ZWNSP$ , where:

$ZPLDY$  = Preliminary Zonal Peak Load Forecast for such Zone for such Delivery Year; and

$ZWNSP$  = Zonal Weather-Normalized Summer Peak Load for such Zone for the summer concluding four years prior to the commencement of such Delivery Year.

4. Capacity Resources identified and committed in an FRR Capacity Plan shall meet all requirements under this Agreement and the PJM Operating Agreement applicable to Capacity Resources, including, as applicable, requirements and milestones for Planned Generation Capacity Resources and Planned Demand Resources. A Capacity Resource submitted in an FRR Capacity Plan must be on a unit-specific basis, and may not include “slice of system” or similar agreements that are not unit specific. An FRR Capacity Plan may include bilateral transactions that commit capacity for less than a full Delivery Year only if the resources included in such plan in the aggregate satisfy all obligations for all Delivery Years. All demand response, load management, energy efficiency, or similar programs on which such FRR Entity intends to rely for a Delivery Year must be included in the FRR Capacity Plan submitted three years in advance of such Delivery Year and must satisfy all requirements applicable to Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency Resources, as applicable, including, without limitation, those set forth in Schedule 6 to this Agreement and the PJM Manuals; provided, however, that previously uncommitted Unforced Capacity from such programs may be used to satisfy any increased capacity obligation for such FRR Entity resulting from a Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast applicable to such FRR Entity.

5. For each LDA for which the Office of the Interconnection has established a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for any Delivery Year addressed by such FRR Capacity Plan, the plan must include a minimum percentage of Capacity Resources for such Delivery Year located within such LDA. Such minimum percentage (“Percentage Internal Resources Required”) will be calculated as the LDA Reliability Requirement less the CETL for the Delivery Year, as determined by the RTEP process as set forth in the PJM Manuals. Such requirement shall be expressed as a percentage of the Unforced Capacity Obligation based on the Preliminary Zonal Peak Load Forecast multiplied by the Forecast Pool Requirement.

6. An FRR Entity may reduce such minimum percentage as to any LDA to the extent the FRR Entity commits to a transmission upgrade that increases the capacity emergency transfer limit for such LDA. Any such transmission upgrade shall adhere to all requirements for a Qualified Transmission Upgrade as set forth in Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff. The increase in CETL used in the FRR Capacity Plan shall be that approved by PJM prior to inclusion of any such upgrade in an FRR Capacity Plan. The FRR Entity shall designate specific additional

Capacity Resources located in the LDA from which the CETL was increased, to the extent of such increase.

7. The Office of the Interconnection will review the adequacy of all submittals hereunder both as to timing and content. A Party that seeks to elect the FRR Alternative that submits an FRR Capacity Plan which, upon review by the Office of the Interconnection, is determined not to satisfy such Party's capacity obligations hereunder, shall not be permitted to elect the FRR Alternative. If a previously approved FRR Entity submits an FRR Capacity Plan that, upon review by the Office of the Interconnection, is determined not to satisfy such Party's capacity obligations hereunder, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the FRR Entity, in writing, of the insufficiency within five (5) business days of the submittal of the FRR Capacity Plan. If the FRR Entity does not cure such insufficiency within five (5) business days after receiving such notice of insufficiency, then such FRR Entity shall be assessed an FRR Commitment Insufficiency Charge, in an amount equal to two times the Cost of New Entry for the relevant location, in \$/MW-day, times the shortfall of Capacity Resources below the FRR Entity's capacity obligation (including any Threshold Quantity requirement) in such FRR Capacity Plan, for the remaining term of such plan.

8. In a state regulatory jurisdiction that has implemented retail choice, the FRR Entity must include in its FRR Capacity Plan all load, including expected load growth, in the FRR Service Area, notwithstanding the loss of any such load to or among alternative retail LSEs. In the case of load reflected in the FRR Capacity Plan that switches to an alternative retail LSE, where the state regulatory jurisdiction requires switching customers or the LSE to compensate the FRR Entity for its FRR capacity obligations, such state compensation mechanism will prevail. In the absence of a state compensation mechanism, the applicable alternative retail LSE shall compensate the FRR Entity at the capacity price in the unconstrained portions of the PJM Region, as determined in accordance with Attachment DD to the PJM Tariff, provided that the FRR Entity may, at any time, make a filing with FERC under Sections 205 of the Federal Power Act proposing to change the basis for compensation to a method based on the FRR Entity's cost or such other basis shown to be just and reasonable, and a retail LSE may at any time exercise its rights under Section 206 of the FPA.

9. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in lieu of providing the compensation described above, such alternative retail LSE may, for any Delivery Year subsequent to those addressed in the FRR Entity's then-current FRR Capacity Plan, provide to the FRR Entity Capacity Resources sufficient to meet the capacity obligation described in paragraph D.2 for the switched load. Such Capacity Resources shall meet all requirements applicable to Capacity Resources pursuant to this Agreement and the PJM Operating Agreement, all requirements applicable to resources committed to an FRR Capacity Plan under this Agreement, and shall be committed to service to the switched load under the FRR Capacity Plan of such FRR Entity. The alternative retail LSE shall provide the FRR Entity all information needed to fulfill these requirements and permit the resource to be included in the FRR Capacity Plan. The alternative retail LSE, rather than the FRR Entity, shall be responsible for any performance charges or compliance penalties related to the performance of the resources committed by such LSE to the switched load. For any Delivery Year, or portion thereof, the foregoing obligations apply to the alternative retail LSE serving the load during such time period. PJM shall manage the transfer accounting associated with such



compensation and shall administer the collection and payment of amounts pursuant to the compensation mechanism.

Such load shall remain under the FRR Capacity Plan until the effective date of any termination of the FRR Alternative and, for such period, shall not be subject to Locational Reliability Charges under Section 7.2 of this Agreement.

**RAA Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA) Cover On - RAA SCHEDULE 8.1 - RAA SCHEDULE 8.1.F-FRR Daily Unforced Capacity Obl**

**F. FRR Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations and Deficiency Charges**

1. For each billing month during a Delivery Year, the Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation of an FRR Entity shall be determined on a daily basis for each Zone as follows:

$$\text{Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation} = \frac{[(\text{OPL} * \text{Final Zonal FRR Scaling Factor}) - \text{Nominal PRD Value committed by the FRR Entity}]}{\text{FPR}}$$

where:

OPL =Obligation Peak Load, defined as the daily summation of the weather-adjusted coincident summer peak, last preceding the Delivery Year, of the end-users in such Zone (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) for which such Party was responsible on that billing day, as determined in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals

Final Zonal FRR Scaling Factor = FZPLDY/FZWNSP;

FZPLDY = Final Zonal Peak Load Forecast for such Delivery Year; and

FZWNSP = Zonal Weather-Normalized Peak Load for the summer concluding prior to the commencement of such Delivery Year.

2. An FRR Entity shall be assessed an FRR Capacity Deficiency Charge in each Zone addressed in such entity's FRR Capacity Plan for each day during a Delivery Year that it fails to satisfy its Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation in each Zone. Such FRR Capacity Deficiency Charge shall be in an amount equal to the deficiency below such FRR Entity's Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation for such Zone times (1.20 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price resulting from all RPM Auctions for such Delivery Year for the LDA encompassing such Zone, weight-averaged for the Delivery Year based on the prices established and quantities cleared in such auctions).

3. If an FRR Entity acquires load that is not included in the Preliminary Zonal Peak Load Forecast such acquired load shall be treated in the same manner as provided in Sections H.1 and H.2 of this Schedule.

4. The shortages in meeting the minimum requirement within the constrained zones and the shortage in meeting the total obligation are first calculated. The shortage in the unconstrained area is calculated as the total shortage less shortages in constrained zones and excesses in constrained zones (the shortage is zero if this is a negative number). The Capacity Deficiency Charge is charged to the shortage in each zone and in the unconstrained area separately. This procedure is used to allow the use of capacity excesses from constrained zones to reduce shortage in the unconstrained area and to disallow the use of capacity excess from unconstrained area to reduce shortage in constrained zones.

5. The shortages in meeting the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement associated with the FRR Entity's capacity obligation are calculated separately. The applicable penalty rate is calculated for Annual Resources, Extended Summer Demand Resources, and Limited Resources as (1.20 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price resulting from all RPM Auctions for such Delivery Year for the LDA encompassing such Zone, weight-averaged for the Delivery Year based on the prices established and quantities cleared in such auctions).